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ABSTRACT 
WHAT WILL YOU DO HERE? DIGNIFIED WORK AND THE POLITICS 
OF MOBILITY IN SERBIA  
 
MAY 2019 
 
DANA N. JOHNSON, B.A., DEPAUL UNIVERSITY 
 
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Directed by: Professor Julie Hemment 
 
 
 
Serbia is said to have one of the highest rates of brain drain in the world. 
For the generation glossed as the “children of the 1990s,” stances toward mobility 
and migration have shifted along with geopolitics. Following nearly two decades 
of wartime entrapment, in 2009 the conditions of possibility for mobility 
fundamentally changed for Serbian citizens. Of both symbolic and material 
consequence, the country’s return to respectable geopolitical standing also 
marked a shift toward more nuanced stancetaking in relation to mobility and 
migration. Namely, by the time of my research, the expectations of youth—not 
only of “normal mobility” but of “normalcy” more generally—had become more 
and more often calibrated against personal experiences of real-life travel. 
Based on fifteen months of ethnographic fieldwork in Belgrade, Serbia 
from October 2014–December 2015, this dissertation tracks some of the 
consequences of this shift for young potential migrants in Serbia. I explore how 
the problem of skilled migration is constituted, the discourses produced, and the 
practices prompted. I analyze the mobility narratives of young potential migrants 
 x 
as proxies for commentary on a host of other socioeconomic issues. My focus is 
on the real and symbolic geographies invoked in talk of leaving and staying in 
Serbia; on how young potential migrants narrate their everyday navigations in 
the “here and now” and give moral weight to migratory aspirations for, and 
experiences of, lives lived in the “then and there.” I argue that the foundational 
motif of these varied imaginaries is a deep investment in meritocracy, a value-
laden register called upon to articulate aspiration as well as critique. 
Engaging the politics of mobility holistically, I also excavate what it means 
to stay in a context so many others leave. I explore the growth of social 
entrepreneurship and the digital economy as recent efforts to coax dignified work 
from an inhospitable climate of precarity (and as key to governmental “solutions” 
to brain drain). I untangle how entrepreneurialism is promoted as a project of 
reforming values while also serving as a realm of authenticity and “apolitical 
activism” for some. Training attention on work in the digital economy I 
illuminate how economic subjectivities are cultivated in complex relation to place 
and belonging in ways that muddy the dichotomy between staying and leaving. 
Finally, I show how both promoters of entrepreneurship and Serbia’s digital 
transformation harness the dominant discourse on brain drain to cast themselves 
as certain social types and legitimize their agendas. This dissertation 
demonstrates how contemporary stances toward mobility and migration 
articulate aspirations to dignify the conditions of life and work, are implicated in 
a reconfiguration of middle-classness, and reveal how postsocialist subjects 
understand themselves and construct life projects in the context of ongoing 
political and socioeconomic change.
 xi 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION: THE “PROBLEM” OF BRAIN DRAIN FROM SERBIA 
 
Serbian society is saturated with talk of leaving. According to predictably 
regular media accounts, Serbia’s young and educated are fleeing the country in 
one of the highest rates of brain drain in the world. The tone of such coverage is 
invariably grim, with one recent headline declaring, “Brain drain will stop as soon 
as everybody leaves” (B92 2011). Such reports lamenting the loss of Serbia’s 
future to the forces of migration often cite a startling number of annual migrants 
for this country of around seven million. Estimates abound that anywhere from 
150,000 to 600,000 “young and educated” Serbs have permanently left the 
country in the past twenty-five years. A recent report by a Belgrade migration 
policy NGO confirmed that claims at the upper end of this range are simply 
impossible, given the number of university degrees awarded over the past two 
decades (Group 484 2010, 7; see also Bolčić 2002, 96).1 Nevertheless, references 
to Serbia’s rate of brain drain persist and are persistently pessimistic, year after 
year placing the country in the global top five for this inauspicious ranking.  
The young potential migrants I came to know in the course of my research 
on the politics of brain drain in Serbia read the same news articles as I did. In our 
interviews and casual conversations they frequently cited the same figures that I 
had encountered. For many, these reports confirmed an unfortunately reality. 
                                                   
1 About 12.4 percent of the Serbian population aged 25–54 has achieved tertiary education, 
according to the latest Global Human Capital Report of the World Economic Forum (WEF 2017, 
161). For purposes of comparison, this same rate is 26.4 percent in Germany and 31.5 percent in 
the United States (WEF 2017, 98, 182). 
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Others read the news of mass exodus with a skeptical eye, recognizing its 
potential as a self-fulfilling prophecy. As one young interlocutor who I call Anja 
said, “For some time now there has been that strong narrative in the media and 
such…even to the extreme that anyone worth anything (svako ko valja) has left 
the country, that the smart ones leave. And somehow in fact, that has an effect on 
those who maybe wouldn’t leave, that narrative that says, ‘go, go, you are so 
smart, you will go.’”2  
In this dissertation, I trace the contours of talk about leaving and staying 
as it appeared in the media, policies, public and private discussions, and the 
narratives of young potential migrants. I turn attention to how the problem of 
skilled migration is constituted, the discourses produced, and the practices 
prompted. Tracking how Serbian youth narrate their life chances and imagine a 
better future “over there” or seek to materialize opportunities at home, I ask: 
How are different stances on mobility constructed and inhabited? What value 
frameworks undergird the socioeconomic aspirations and practices of Serbia’s 
young potential migrants? And how do the mobility narratives of Serbian youth 
manifest expectations of work and life at once informed by yet removed from the 
vision of the good life of their parents’ generation? Premised on the notion that 
talk about staying and leaving can be analyzed as a proxy for commentary on a 
host of other issues (cf. Dick 2018), this dissertation demonstrates how 
contemporary stances toward mobility and migration articulate aspirations to 
dignify the conditions of life and work, are implicated in a reconfiguration of 
                                                   
2 Most of the names in this dissertation are pseudonyms. First and last names are given for public 
officials and others speaking in a professional capacity.  
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middle-classness, and reveal how postsocialist subjects understand themselves 
and construct life projects in the context of ongoing political and socioeconomic 
change. 
 
The Making of a Migration Problem 
The annual reports of the World Economic Forum (WEF) are consistently 
cited as the source of figures relayed in media accounts of Serbia’s “migration 
problem.” According to WEF’s annual human capital report, in 2013 Serbia was 
ranked second to last of the countries included in terms of its “capacity to retain 
talent,” one of two elements of the “brain drain indicator.”3 Yet the report also 
notes that in the Serbian case there is no emigration rate available for those with 
tertiary education (WEF 2013, 448–449). I wondered—if no one is counting the 
departures of the well-educated, how is such a dismal ranking achieved?  
Scrutinizing the report’s introduction, I was surprised to find that the 
brain drain indicator—a given country’s capacity to retain talent—is based not on 
border crossings but on data collected through something called the Executive 
Opinion Survey. This survey, part of WEF’s global competitiveness report, is 
administered annually to business leaders around the world via national partner 
institutions. The survey aims to gather “the opinions of business leaders…on a 
broad range of topics for which data sources are scarce, or frequently, 
nonexistent on a global scale” (Browne et al. 2015, 75). As part of this survey, one 
                                                   
3 As noted in The Global Competitiveness Report 2013–14: Full Data Edition, what used to be 
known as the brain drain indicator in the Executive Opinion Survey was revised in 2013 into the 
two indicators of “country capacity to retain talent” and “country capacity to attract talent” 
(Schwab 2013, 98).  
 4 
hundred Serbian business leaders are asked to rank the country’s capacity to 
retain talent on a scale of one through seven. In 2013, the aggregate perception of 
these one hundred business leaders earned the country a brain drain ranking of 
146 out of 148 countries. By 2016 this ranking had disappeared from the country 
profiles in the human capital report, which had been revised to focus more 
specifically on “a life-course approach to human capital, evaluating the levels of 
education, skills and employment available to people in five distinct age groups” 
(Schwab 2016, v). But it is still collected through the Executive Opinion Survey 
and used in tabulating each country’s global competitiveness ranking. In 2017–
2018 Serbia’s capacity to retain talent remained essentially unchanged—the 
country ranked 134 of 137 countries (Schwab 2017, 257).4 
The apparent significance of such international rankings becomes 
amplified by the dearth of reliable migration statistics on the national level. As 
elsewhere, the Serbian national census is the authoritative source for all 
population measures, and, as the first since 2002, the 2011 census was met with 
great anticipation. For decades the census has included a question about family 
members “living and working abroad,” and the 2011 census added a new question 
about family members studying abroad. The inclusion of these categories can be 
taken as an indication of the bureaucratic legibility of such populations and the 
government’s interest in managing them (Kertzer and Arel 2002). While census 
data suggest an absolute drop in the number of Serbian citizens living abroad 
                                                   
4 Switzerland, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States ranked one through three in the 
latest report; behind Serbia were Bosnia and Herzegovina, Haiti, and Venezuela. See 
http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-index-2017-2018/competitiveness-
rankings/?doing_wp_cron=1552058967.7119450569152832031250#series=EOSQ399 for a 
sortable list of indicator rankings.  
 5 
between 2002–2011, demographers recognize the unreliability of drawing even 
this general conclusion: “Reasons for the reduction are quite numerous—from 
the boycott of the census by members of the Albanian nationality, to the 
unusually high non-inclusion of residents working or living abroad, to changes in 
the method of enumerating that migratory contingent” (Penev 2017, 1). But, as 
with the WEF reports, the methodological problems grappled with by experts 
when interpreting census data are filtered out of its public presentation. Media 
reports based on analyses of the 2011 census data tended to repeat easily 
recognizable and digestible tropes of a country in the throes of demographic 
crisis—a theme I return to in my conclusion.5  
I include this discussion not as a critique of the World Economic Forum, 
census, or the survey as method, but rather to highlight one important element of 
how discourses of brain drain are constructed and in turn, how they help to 
produce an empirical reality. As Sally Engle Merry (2009) argues, indicators such 
as human rights—or in this case, brain drain—rankings are technologies of global 
governance. They contribute to the country’s “competitiveness” rating, which in 
turn informs perceptions of Serbia’s fitness as a “safe” place to do business. The 
results of studies such as the Executive Opinion Survey of the World Economic 
Forum “appear as forms of knowledge, rather than as particular representations 
of a methodology and particular political decisions about what to measure and 
what to call it” (Merry 2009, 243; see also Davis, Kingsbury, and Merry 2012; 
                                                   
5 For examples of such coverage see: 
http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/125/Dru%C5%A1tvo/1755947/Demografski+alarm+%E
2%80%93+Srba+sve+manje.html and http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Drustvo/U-Beogradu-
skoro-polovina-tridesetogodisnjakinja-nema-dete.lt.html. 
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Shore and Wright 2015). Stripped of the original survey’s footnotes and 
methodological caveats, the annually collected opinions of one hundred Serbian 
business leaders get translated as truth in the public sphere.  
Regardless of their dubious ability to adequately capture the essence of 
human mobility, global brain drain rankings form an important part of how the 
migration of Serbia’s talented youth is constituted as one of the greatest problems 
facing the nation-state. Such figures resonate both because of the scientism they 
encode (Kipnis 2008) and the fact that they validate the lived experience of so 
many—so many ordinary citizens who employ more pedestrian methods of 
quantifying departures, such as counting those in their high school cohort who 
have emigrated (Dzenovska 2013, 202–203). This point was illustrated by in 
conversation with Sofija, a thirty-year-old graduate of the faculty of dramatic arts 
who cobbles together work as a “cultural manager” among other roles on NGO 
projects. As with most of my interlocutors who were planning to leave Serbia, I 
asked Sofija if she could identify a turning point when she decided to try her luck 
elsewhere, in this case, London. She responded:  
Well, for me personally, that is strongly connected with, well, the greater 
part of my closest circle of friends who have left....of course they didn’t all 
leave at once, but I realized that I actually remain in the minority here and 
that’s such a, you know, life message that comes to you. I mean, what does 
that mean? Because we were all somehow in the same position here, it’s 
just a question of the fact that I haven’t tried [to leave], nothing else. 
 
Rejecting my framework of “turning point,” Sofija reminded me that 
everyday life in Belgrade is saturated with talk of leaving punctuated by actual 
departures. Among both those planning to leave and those planning to stay, 
many of my interlocutors referred to their friends, classmates, and acquaintances 
 7 
who have left without return. Some spoke wistfully, others matter-of-factly, but 
for many, the vast number of peers abroad served as a sort of diagnostic tool that 
revealed a national social disease. This affliction is a globally resonant one.  
 
Managing Brain Drain 
Brain drain has long preoccupied many a nation-state. As articulated in a 
1968 volume on the “international brain market,” “the long-term economic and 
social prosperity of a country depends on the knowledge available to it. Progress 
is based on knowledge—and knowledge is used by brains and increased by 
brains” (Chorafas 1968, 13). Concern with the fate of the highly educated thus 
took on some of its contemporary dimensions with the rise of the post-World 
War II knowledge economy, peaking in the 1960s and spurring governmental 
interventions (see Friborg 1975).6 As economic globalization has accelerated in 
more recent years, the understanding of brain drain as national threat has come 
to be complemented by a perspective that regards it as opportunity: given that 
emigration has become a human right (if not an equally distributed right), how 
can countries harness the human capital of their educated émigrés abroad? (see 
Bhagwati 2009; Saxenian 2007). The perspective of brain drain as opportunity is 
advanced by, among others, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), 
and has come to dominate various national policies. Since the early 2000s, 
                                                   
6 Note that the term first referred to skilled workers from the United Kingdom who began to 
emigrate in large numbers (primarily to the United States). See Grubel and Scott 1977, 7–8 for 
discussion of the conditions in the US that attracted the highly educated from around the world. 
Now brain drain is generally invoked to describe skilled migration from so-called developing 
countries to the countries of the West.   
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governments in the broader Balkan region have likewise drafted “brain 
circulation” and “brain gain” policies that focus on engaging their significant 
diaspora populations in knowledge-transfer programs. But such regional efforts 
have largely remained aspirational, ad hoc, and weakly implemented.7  
In Serbia, the perspective of brain drain as opportunity can be found 
scattered throughout its migration management and other national strategies and 
promoted in policy papers drafted by NGOs such as Grupa 484 (Group 484).8 
Such embrace of the reality of skilled migration and focus on the development of 
human capital are embedded in broader convictions about the global knowledge 
economy. As articulated in one strategy paper of the Serbian government, “Today 
the key indicator of national wealth is the ability to generate new knowledge, 
ideas, innovations, and technology, for which the creation and availability of 
human capital is a prerequisite” (Ministry of Religion and Diaspora 2011, 16).9 
                                                   
7 All countries of the region are considered emigration or “sending” countries with longstanding 
migratory patterns. I discuss the specifics of post-World War II shifts in these patterns in chapter 
2, including in socialist Yugoslavia and postsocialist Serbia. But migratory dynamics have also 
played out differently in each national context. The wars that broke up Yugoslavia resulted in the 
significant displacement of citizens of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). Cosic and 
Dzebo estimate that over half the population of BiH was displaced internationally during and in 
the immediate aftermath of the 1992–1995 war (2013, 57). The demands of postwar recovery have 
increased the urgency (but not efficacy) of coaxing the return of educated citizens. Another 
distinctive regional case is Albania, which experienced an extremely repressive version of state 
socialism that resulted in both an “old” (pre-1945) and “new” (post-1991) Albanian diaspora. With 
the support of the United Nations Development Programme, Albania is the only country in the 
Balkan region to have implemented a systematic “brain gain program” (Zeneli 2013).  
 
8 Group 484 was founded in 1995 to support (largely Serbian) refugees fleeing violence in Croatia. 
It since developed into one of the primary NGOs working in all areas of migration. In 2011 Group 
484 established a research and policy branch, the Centre for Migration (CEMI), that has 
published numerous reports on national and regional brain drain. Due in part to the shifting 
priorities of donor organizations, CEMI has not published on this topic since 2013. See: 
http://grupa484.org.rs/cemi/.  
 
9 Most, if not all, recent governmental policies can be found online in English as well as the 
original Serbian. The quality of these translations varies. In this work I generally cite the Serbian 
version of official policies, with quotes in my own translation.   
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Underpinning this view is a pervasive concern with national competitiveness, 
mirrored at the European level in the latest overall strategy of the European 
Union, Europe 2020. This strategy reinforces a longer-term concern with the 
employability of young Europeans that preceded the 2008 economic meltdown 
(Hirtt 2009, 215). But the latest global economic crisis has brought the concerns 
of competitiveness, innovation, the cultivation of talent, and indeed, brain drain, 
to the fore, especially in relation to the issue of unemployment. As rates of youth 
unemployment skyrocket across Europe, the Portuguese prime minister 
infamously suggested that teachers “just emigrate” (Queiroz 2011), Spain’s best-
educated cohort has been dubbed a “lost generation” (Sills 2012), and Greece has 
been characterized as “bleeding in human capital” (Katsaros 2013).  
The pragmatism of “brain circulation” informs a normalizing discourse on 
mobility that coexists in awkward tension with the more pervasive discourse of 
brain drain as threat to the nation-state. Both bubbled up in the perspectives of 
my interlocutors. Regular media reports on the brain drain problem, 
governmental efforts to manage—and at times normalize—the problem, and the 
lived experience of many combined to congeal a kind of Gramscian “common 
sense”—a common sense about the meaning(s) of migration and mobility that 
“refers not merely to practical know-how but also to conceptions of the world that 
contradict one another and hence form an incoherent whole” (Krause 2018, 183).  
It is important to note that in the context of contemporary Serbia, “brain 
drain” is conceptualized expansively (which informed how I defined the target 
demographic of my research, discussed below). That is, when the problem 
appears in the media, in the speeches of politicians, and in everyday 
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conversations, it is discussed as the departure of the “young and talented” or 
“young and educated” in ways almost never meant to refer only to Serbia’s most 
promising or accomplished scientists, engineers, and doctors. The imprecise 
extension of these categories to all university graduates, or even to all those 
presumed youthful and ambitious—but not to all potential migrants—points to 
how brain drain is contoured as both a general concern with competitiveness in a 
global marketplace as well as a more specific anxiety about who will make the 
future of the nation.  
Expressed in terms of the fate of talent, it is the classed rather than ethno-
national characteristics of who makes the future that become amplified. This 
anxiety was often voiced humorously when I shared my research topic, in the 
response that “only those without brains have stayed in Serbia.” The implication 
of this cliché is twofold: those who are smart “leave in time” but also—the country 
is full of morons. This self-deprecating joke (relayed to me by Belgradians, who 
were, at least for the time being, staying) expresses some of the cultural and 
historical specificity of the phenomenon that is the focus of this dissertation. It 
taps into a deep urban–rural divide that took on political dimensions during the 
1990s. It also points to the bounds of brain drain sketched in relation to a deeper 
past, as those who have left in the past twenty-five years are characterized as 
young, educated, and talented, in contrast with the guest workers of socialist 
Yugoslavia, a migratory cohort popularly understood to be wholly uneducated, 
unskilled, and from whom my interlocutors generally distanced themselves. It is 
features such as these—that I explore in chapter 2 and address throughout this 
dissertation—that demonstrate the importance that mobility has garnered as a 
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barometer of the (ab)normality of life in Serbia. While the phenomenon of brain 
drain is hardly unique to Serbia, movement is not everywhere inflected with such 
meaning. In the next section, I situate my research in relation to the literature on 
migration and mobility before outlining some of the generational experience that 
crucially informs how mobility became politicized in the particular context of 
postsocialist Serbia.  
 
Migration and Mobility in the Literature  
This dissertation responds to Douglas Rogers’ call for the anthropology of 
postsocialism to become “postsocialisms unbound,” that is, for scholars to take 
the region of postsocialist Europe “less as a base assumption and more as part of 
the research question” (2010, 4). For example, how do the history of socialist 
Yugoslavia, the memory of its violent demise, and lived experiences of 
international mobility intersect to produce particular expectations and 
aspirations among urban, educated youth in Serbia? Following Rogers, this 
question becomes one to be investigated empirically. In posing such questions I 
take up the strategy identified by Rogers as attending to more complex 
circulations of people, ideas, and things than were generally the focus of early 
postsocialist ethnographies positioned against troubling the assumptions of 
“transition.” This strategy is particularly relevant given the unique market 
socialism of Yugoslavia and the movements of people, ideas, and things 
facilitated by the geopolitical status of this former country, as well as the 
foreclosure of such circulation during the international isolation of the 1990s and 
early 2000s. I detail this historical context in chapter 2 and trace its ongoing 
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influence as well as the importance of postsocialist mobilities throughout this 
dissertation.    
Attention to complex circulations also helps avoid the trap of 
methodological nationalism, a charge that has caused consternation among 
migration scholars (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002). Particularly in places like 
the former Yugoslavia, where there has been an overreliance on the explanatory 
potential of ethnonational belonging in the wake of violent conflict, a danger 
lurks in giving too much uncritical weight to the national frame—of assuming a 
“necessary, essential link between territory and identity” (Jansen and Löfving 
2009, 5). Yet there is also a danger, in studying mobilities of the relatively 
privileged, of overemphasizing the possibility for “deterritorialized” or 
cosmopolitan identities (Appadurai 1996; Nowicka 2006; see also Khandekar and 
Murphy 2012). I forge a path through this terrain by approaching the role of the 
nation-state, placemaking, and the constitution of classed subjectivities as 
components of the politics of mobility to be investigated empirically (Jansen and 
Löfving 2009).  
In the stances they took and the narratives they told about staying and 
leaving, my interlocutors expressed a range of positions from “weak nationalism” 
(Todorova 2015) to cosmopolitan global citizenship, pointing to the complexities 
of postsocialist, postwar senses of belonging. For example, twenty-five-year-old 
Nikola shared an epiphany he had experienced during an internship in Austria. “I 
am myself wherever I go…and then I understood, in fact, the concept of ‘global 
citizen.’ Then I understood that, you know, to return to Serbia, to stay in Austria, 
or wherever one goes, is becoming irrelevant. Because this is one earthly sphere 
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and why have borders?” As I explore in the pages to come, such a remarkable 
stance issues from both the crude pivots of Serbia’s geopolitical status as well as 
the fine-grained distinctions found in generational experiences of the decade that 
created independent republics out of socialist Yugoslavia.  
While “unbounding postsocialisms” can help loosen the tight weave of 
methodological nationalism, the latter is a bias deeply embedded in migration 
research as well as public policy. The problem of methodological nationalism can 
also be seen as an outgrowth of modernist assumptions that inflected burgeoning 
disciplinary interest in migration as populations began to move in the context of 
post-World War II development projects (Brettell 2000, 97–98).10 The 
assumption that rural–urban migration was unidirectional (Rhoades 1979) and 
the “sedentarist analytic bias” (Malkki 1995, 508) by which early anthropologists 
shied away from studying complex circulations meant that diverse patterns and 
experiences of mobility were slow to gain analytic purchase. Such premises led 
much early literature to approach migration as a continuation of urbanization 
and industrialization processes on a global scale, refracting broader discourses of 
modernization and progress still in play (see Brettell 2000, 102–103; Kearney 
1986, 334–335). These notions inflect contemporary migration management 
policies as well as public perceptions of mobility. As Hilary Parsons Dick argues 
in the case of Mexico, migration discourses commonly map time onto space in a 
modernist chronotope, as “migrants depart from the trappings of their 
                                                   
10 Post-World War II anthropology was primarily concerned with defining typologies of migration 
(González 1961, 1989) and preoccupied with the massive population shifts prompted by 
urbanization (Halpern 1975; Simić 1973 for the Serbian case). 
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rurality…and move toward an urban future, with their backs turned on the past” 
(2010, 278). The movements of talented Serbian youth are similarly coded in the 
context of a differently ordered geopolitical hierarchy. While brain drain 
discourse often mobilizes modernist notions of both national and individual 
progress, it may also seek to normalize the movement of young Serbian citizens 
in obscuring the conditions by which they are constituted as not (yet) fully 
European. And, as I discuss in chapters 5 and 6, brain drain discourse can also be 
harnessed to bolster claims to the right to stay.  
Whether movement or stasis is the norm of human life, and how to 
approach the relationship between these two conditions, is a related question that 
has vexed the field. Part of the impetus for the “mobilities turn” that began in the 
1990s was the challenge meted out within the social sciences to the privileging of 
fixity.11 In addition to the objections raised against methodological nationalism 
and the sedentarist bias noted above, in anthropology, this challenge was 
exemplified by the shift to multi-sited ethnography outlined by George Marcus 
(1995) as well as James Clifford’s corrective call to turn attention from the 
rootedness of culture to its “routes” (1997). There is thus a careful balance to be 
struck, as scholars have recently emphasized the importance of attending to the 
power dynamics of mobility by keeping immobility or fixity in the analytical 
                                                   
11 In the 1990s, work on globalization and transnationalism helped to spur a “mobilities turn” that 
coalesced the interdisciplinary field of mobilities studies. Mobilities research has brought together 
sociologists, geographers, anthropologists, historians, transport studies and communications 
scholars and others with an interest in spatial and social movement. In the past two decades, 
numerous research centers have been founded around the concept of mobility, with the Centre for 
Mobilities Research at Lancaster University and its journal Mobilities dominating the field (e.g. 
Sheller and Urry 2006; Urry 2000, 2007). For these scholars, the mobilities turn moved mobility 
from the margins to the center of inquiry, becoming “acknowledged as part of the energetic buzz 
of the everyday...and seen as a set of highly meaningful social practices that make up social, 
cultural and political life” (Adey et al. 2014, 3). 
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frame. As Jónsson notes, “very little research analyses how people experience and 
make sense of their existence as non-migrants, and how these aspects relate to a 
greater socio-cultural matrix of values and expectations informing (im)mobility” 
(2011, 4).  
While brain drain has the specific inflections discussed above, not all of 
my interlocutors had permanent migration in mind when discussing their 
aspirations and plans. I thus also use the term mobility throughout this work to 
encompass the broad range of experiences and intentions around movement 
expressed by my interlocutors, and as a conceptual tool for accessing “how 
mobilities, as socio-cultural constructs, are experienced and imagined” (Salazar 
and Smart 2011, v). My research is premised on the idea that attending to the 
aspirations, strategies, and life projects of nonmigrants as well as those who are 
planning to leave and those who have returned from abroad is a crucial analytic 
dimension in contexts where mobility is politicized. I thus draw on scholarship 
that turns attention to the imaginaries of mobility and migration, divorced from 
actual movement (Harris and Rapport 2016; Salazar 2010; see also Simoni 2015) 
as well as Hilary Parsons Dick’s research among Mexican nonmigrants that 
elucidates “how migration reflects upon and orders social worlds long before, and 
even without, actual movement abroad” (2018, 7; see also 2011). 
In centering aspirations as well as practices of mobility I also seek to build 
on the work of anthropologists such as Julie Chu, who argues for viewing the 
“illegal trajectories” of rural Chinese strategizing to leave the country not as 
resistance to state policies but as evidence of the desire to inhabit a more 
privileged subject position (2010, 93–94). A similar concern animates Jennifer 
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Patico’s study of the international matchmaking industry, in which both 
American men and Russian women participate in order to “move into new 
contexts in which they might be differently valued, differently desirable, and 
differently competitive” (2010, 40). And as sociologist Michaela Benson (2009, 
2011) demonstrates, mobility can crucially reveal conceptions of “quality of life,” 
and the subjective qualities of middle-classness. I draw on these veins of research 
to approach mobility as a discursively constructed object of knowledge (Dick 
2010, 2013) that is richly revelatory of broader frameworks of value.  
In the next section, I shift focus to the demographic around which this 
dissertation is constructed, sketching the formative events of youth that congeal 
my interlocutors as a generational cohort (see Schuman and Rodgers 2004; 
Schuman and Scott 1989, 359–360). I first introduce a friend whose 
demographic profile, career ambitions, and ambiguous stance toward mobility 
exemplifies those of an absolutely average interlocutor. 
 
The Children of the 1990s: Generation and Politics 
In January 2018 my friend Daca called on Skype from her new apartment 
in the hip Belgrade neighborhood of lower Dorćol. As she gave me a virtual tour 
she pointed to images of Madrid taped to the walls, saying, with a laugh that 
seemed to wink, that she had not yet given up on moving to the city of her 
dreams. Daca and I first met in late May 2015 when she sought out an English–
Serbian language-exchange partner. We hit it off and quickly became more 
friends than language partners, though we would sometimes take care to return 
to this original intent. In time I also came to think of Daca as something of a 
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calibrating force for my research. Educated, ambitious, and twenty-six when we 
met, she was, in many respects, an exemplar of the “talented youth” whose 
departure from the country was much lamented in public discourse. But she 
hasn’t left—at least not yet.    
Daca is from Niš, Serbia’s third-largest city. Her mother is a seamstress, 
her father a carpenter. She earned her bachelor’s degree in Spanish language and 
literature from the University of Niš. This language was her passion; a love stoked 
by a high-school visit to relatives in Barcelona and a brief internship in Madrid. 
While her younger brother followed a vocational path she was a born student, 
known in her hometown by a signature tote bag reliably slung over her shoulder, 
bulging with books. When she began teaching Spanish herself the tote bore 
textbooks; as she volunteered in various NGOs, pamphlets and reports.  
Daca’s mother joined us for coffee one day in Belgrade. “We support Daca, 
we always have,” she told me. “Most families in our town, when they can afford 
to, they buy their kids a new car or a nice phone, but we always invested in Daca’s 
education. How to explain to her?” she continued, looking imploringly at her 
daughter. “We aren’t intellectuals, we are normal...”  
Daca jumped in: “a working-class family.”  
“Yes,” her mom agreed. “When I graduated thirty years ago, finishing high 
school was success. But Daca always really applied herself in school, and we 
supported her.” 
The daughter’s specific goals related to work, mobility, and migration 
shifted many times during and after my fieldwork. But not capriciously so. She 
was, like many of the recent college graduates I came to know, struggling to 
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navigate the “school-to-work” transition in a way that would do justice to the 
effort she had put into her studies and set her on a path toward a fulfilling career. 
As her mother observed, the path to success was far from clear. Daca enjoyed 
teaching Spanish but had only found insecure contract work in this field. She 
yearned for a career that would enable her to advance her experience in Europe-
oriented NGOs. And Madrid was the city of her dreams.  
Daca and the other young Serbian citizens I met in the course of my 
research are, by and large, members of a generation loosely considered the 
“children of the 1990s.” They follow the “First Yugoslavs” who built socialist 
Yugoslavia and the “Last Yugoslavs” whose adult lives were ruptured by that 
country’s bloody demise but who also experienced something of its golden age 
(see Palmberger 2016, Volcic 2011; cf. Yurchak 2006 on the “last Soviet 
generation”). One young interlocutor—just a toddler when he fled with his family 
from Croatia to Serbia as war broke out—referred to his parents as belonging to a 
“lost generation.” But it is more often his generation that is regarded as lost. A 
recent compilation of texts published by the Austrian ERSTE Foundation dubbed 
those born in the 1980s and 1990s in the former Yugoslavia “generation in-
between” (Gries, Asboth, and Krakovsky 2016). The contributions register a 
particularly Western European alarmism about whether these potential future 
citizens of the European Union are sufficiently European according to vague 
matrices of attitude and value orientation. In these pages, Daca and her peers are 
cast as ambivalent toward the West, crucially impacted by violence, and facing a 
bleak future “with no horizons of hope” (Gries 2016, 19).  
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It is not just Western observers who have expressed such anxieties. A host 
of Serbian publications in the late 1990s focused on the apparently concerning 
attitudes and values of youth born into the prolonged wartime crisis (see N. 
Petrović 2011, 145). My interlocutors themselves would sometimes grimly 
comment on their generation as defined by inertia or a kind of nihilistic inaction. 
As a twenty-nine-year-old graduate of information sciences told me, “We are 
rudderless (nesnađeni). We see that it is bad, but we don’t know what to do.”  
To contextualize the contrast between the prevailing view of the “children 
of the 1990s” and the ambitions of those like Daca, I now turn to a brief sketch of 
the decade such youth grew up in and the political subjectivities it engendered. 
While in the next chapter I elaborate on how these events crucially impacted 
meanings of mobility and migration, here I seek to establish the political 
scaffolding necessary to apprehend the stories to come.  
 
The Milošević Years 
Daca was born in 1989 as state socialism was crumbling across Eastern 
Europe. While the broader region began to experience the dizzying effects of 
post-1989 shock therapy and NGO-led transition projects, the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) was disintegrating into war.12 The scholarly 
consensus holds that while the violent fracturing of socialist Yugoslavia into its 
constituent republics was not a product of nationalist ideologies, nationalism 
                                                   
12 The violent demise of socialist Yugoslavia is a complex topic that has received considerable 
scholarly attention. Some of the most rigorous analyses of the breakup of Yugoslavia include 
Ingrao and Emmert 2009; Lampe 2000; Ramet 2006, 2018.  
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greased the wheels of war in a federation in deep economic and political crisis 
(Popov 2000; Wachtel and Bennett 2009). In the run-up to war Serbian 
President Slobodan Milošević and Croatian President Franjo Tuđman performed 
a kind of symbiotic call-and-response that fostered a climate of fear and conjured 
a generalized sense that the country’s days as a multiethnic federation were 
numbered. At the same time, older friends have mentioned how shocked they 
were when the first shots were fired. As one former Sarajevan grimly 
remembered, “no one expected that war would actually come. Except for the 
Jews. They knew what war looked like and they organized busses and left.” While 
Tuđman and supporters had their own designs for an independent Croatian state, 
it is the Serbian regime of Slobodan Milošević that bears the greatest 
responsibility for the violence that unfolded in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
and later in Kosovo.13 That some of my interlocutors would balk at this statement 
is a point I return to below.  
Slobodan Milošević began his rise to power within the League of 
Communists of Serbia during the 1980s. In 1987 he gained control of the party in 
what amounted to an intraparty coup and began purging political opponents. 
After forcing the resignation of his one-time political sponsor Ivan Stambolić he 
assumed the Serbian presidency. With Milošević at the helm, the Socialist Party 
of Serbia (SPS) inherited the infrastructure and membership of the League of 
                                                   
13 When it declared independence in 1991 Slovenia endured a brief ten-day war with minimal 
casualties. The republic of Macedonia also declared independence in 1991 without bloodshed. 
(The latter was recognized internationally as the “Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” or 
FYROM until a dispute with Greece over its name was finally resolved in 2019. The country is now 
officially called the Republic of North Macedonia.) Conflict between ethnic Albanians and 
Macedonians brought this independent state to the brink of civil war in 2001. On this conflict see 
Neofotistos 2012.   
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Communists of Serbia. The first nominally multiparty elections in December 
1990 affirmed Milošević as president of Serbia and gave SPS a huge majority of 
parliamentary seats although the party won only 46.1 percent of the popular vote 
(see Gordy 1999, 24–43; N. Vladisavljević 2008).  
The level of popular support enjoyed by Milošević—and the motivations of 
his supporters—are still somewhat disputed among scholars. Eric Gordy 
characterized Milošević’s rise to power as “untainted by popular participation” 
(1999, 25) while Marko Živković claims that Milošević enjoyed enough votes, and 
on the basis of the narrative he offered about Serb victimization, to be kept “more 
or less legitimately in the saddle” for a decade (2011, 249). Robert Hayden, in 
turn, counters that “in 1990 he stole the elections that he probably would have 
won” (2014, 190), attributing this relative success to the promise of stability, 
rather than nationalism, Milošević peddled.  
Part of the challenge was the presence on the political scene of others who 
made Milošević’s rhetoric and political program seem tame. On a comedy talk 
show in 1991, Vojislav Šešelj, leader of the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) was asked 
if he really thought that Croats should be murdered. He responded, “yes, and 
even more—with a rusty spoon, to make [their suffering] last longer” (quoted in 
Pribićević 1999, 199). While Šešelj was known for incendiary rhetoric, this “rusty 
spoon” comment achieved a unique symbolic afterlife in the political cartoons of 
Predrag Koraksić (known as Corax), one of the country’s premier political 
commentators. I return to this afterlife below. But in the early 1990s, the political 
program promoted by SRS rested on the realization of a Greater Serbia, a goal 
which necessarily entailed the destruction of Croatia and Bosnia and 
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Herzegovina, and the assumption by Serbia of large portions of the territory of 
these neighboring republics (Bakić 2009, 197). In the December 1992 
parliamentary elections SRS won 22.6 percent of the vote while Milošević’s 
Socialist Party of Serbia won 28.8 percent (see Gordy 1999, 47).  
With Šešelj around, the wartime politics of Milošević may have seemed 
moderate at times but both relied on the resonance of a national narrative of 
heroic victimization (Bakić-Hayden 2004; Čolović 2002) with which all historical 
conflicts became wars of self-defense or liberation waged against forces seeking 
to destroy the Serbian nation (see Obradović-Wochnik 2009a; Yerkes 2004). 
Throughout the 1990s Milošević alternately denounced Šešelj and cooperated 
with him, depending on what was most politically expedient (Irvine 1995). Šešelj 
created paramilitary units to fight in Croatia and BiH and Milošević provided the 
arms (Pribićević 1999, 197). Šešelj’s units augmented the Yugoslav People’s Army 
weakened by purges of Croats, Slovenes, and Macedonians and desertions by 
Serbs and Montenegrins. SRS leaders regularly performed service in the 
volunteer units, imbuing them with a special legitimacy as war heroes (Irvine 
1995, 161). Milošević’s determination to remain in power led him to remake his 
image several times over, renouncing support for the Bosnian Serbs in 1993, 
recognizing the independence of Macedonia in 1994, and launching his 1998 
ethnic cleansing campaign against Kosovar Albanians not as a nationalist project 
but as an “anti-terrorist” one (Markotich 1999, 277–284). (I discuss the NATO 
military campaign launched in response in the following chapter). 
But the trouble with the question of popular support for Milošević is also 
rooted in the extent to which he exceled, in Eric Gordy’s (1999) apt phrasing, at 
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“the destruction of alternatives” in the realms of politics, media, popular culture, 
and sociality. Politically, “the Serbian regime…survived by systematically 
destroying the crucial elements of a normal parliamentary system—autonomous 
and viable alternative centers of power—while ostensibly maintaining, and even 
claiming the credit for introducing, the formal aspects of a plural political 
system” (Gordy 1999, 1). Regime control of most media outlets combined with 
the isolating effects of international sanctions to foster a sense of resignation 
among the impoverished population of Serbia.  
Despite these conditions, various forms of opposition to the Milošević 
regime remained active throughout the 1990s, especially in the capital city of 
Belgrade. Student-led anti-Milošević protests in 1991 and 1992 “established mass 
public protest as a counter-response to Milošević’s increasing consolidation of 
power through institutions of state, including state-controlled media, parliament, 
and the university” (Greenberg 2014, 1999n7). An opposition coalition formed 
under the banner Zajedno (Together) won significant victories in the 1996 
municipal elections. The government’s annulment of these results sparked daily 
protests that continued for four months. The coalition would fall apart until 
uniting again in 2000 as the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS). DOS won 
the 2000 presidential election, spurred by the organizing of the student-led and 
USAID-funded movement Otpor (Resistance).14 When Milošević refused to 
accept the election results people poured into the streets for several days of 
                                                   
14 Otpor was celebrated internationally as a model of peaceful revolution. After Milošević was 
deposed in 2000 the movement’s leaders found themselves in demand as consultants on “color 
revolutions” throughout the region and beyond (see Greenberg 2012). 
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protest that reach a zenith on October 5, 2000, with the authoritarian nationalist 
officially resigning two days later. This event became known as the “October 
Revolution”—a pivotal historical moment that has accrued layers of ambiguous 
significance in the ensuing years.       
 
All that Chaos: Reflections on the Milošević Years 
My interlocutors did not directly discuss the history sketched above. The 
Milošević years mostly entered my research in the form of telling omissions, odd 
euphemisms, and imprecise conspiracy theories. More than once, the decade of 
the 1990s was hastily skimmed over in conversation as “all that chaos” (sav onaj 
haos). Daca and her peers were young children who, indeed, had little to no 
ability to influence the geopolitical events that would mar their childhoods and 
shape their future possibilities. As I discuss in the next chapter, this has 
generated a great deal of intergenerational tension between the children of the 
1990s and their parents’ generation, with members of the latter regarded by the 
former as those more-or-less responsible for all that chaos.    
But I first learned this history not through the sources cited above but as a 
volunteer activist with the feminist antimilitarist network Women in Black 
Belgrade (WiB) from 2003–2005.15 Along with a handful of other groups, WiB 
became, during the 1990s, a safe haven for those who felt affinity with the “other 
Serbia” (druga Srbija)—a term that came to designate those marginalized 
                                                   
15 WiB activists ground their protest in theories of feminism that explicate the linkages between 
nationalism, militarism, and patriarchy. 
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citizens who stood firmly against the Milošević regime and its warmongering 
politics.16 As Maple Razsa observed of antiwar groups across the former 
Yugoslavia, “those who resisted the overwhelmingly dominant logic of ethnic 
war…were a small minority swimming against a riptide of nationalist exclusion” 
(2015, 4). In 1991 WiB began to hold a weekly silent vigil on Republic Square, in 
the heart of Belgrade, in protest against the wars being waged in their name, the 
nationalism used to fuel the conflicts, and the complicity of an apparently 
indifferent population. They were screamed at by passersby, harassed by the 
regime, and branded as the nation’s greatest traitors. But they continued to hold 
space—literally occupying urban space—throughout the decade (and still today) 
for those opposed to militarism and insistent on acknowledging Serbia’s leading 
role in the wars of the 1990s.  
My former affiliation with Women in Black and affinity for their 
antimilitarist stance aligned me with a segment of the Serbian population that 
“has no illusions about crimes committed by the Serbs, and believes that the 
nation has to confront them” (Obradović-Wochnik 2009b, 33). This is, by all 
estimates, a quite narrow segment. During my initial two years in the country the 
controversy over how the wars in the former Yugoslavia are to be remembered 
was percolating just below the surface and occasionally bursting into public life. 
Women in Black were still protesting in the early 2000s (among other reasons) 
because no collective reckoning with the past was taking place. In fact, the denial 
                                                   
16 Other key groups include: the Center for Antiwar Action, Belgrade Circle, Cinema and Cultural 
Center Rex, the Center for Cultural Decontamination, the Women’s Studies Center, the 
Humanitarian Law Center, the Lawyers’ Committee on Human Rights, and the Helsinki 
Committee for Human Rights in Serbia (see Fridman 2006, 96–105).  
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or relativization of war crimes committed in the name of the Serbian nation 
showed no sign of abating. While outright denial that certain war crimes occurred 
at all, such as the Srebrenica genocide, may have declined among the Serbian 
public, a broader “culture of denial” persists to this day (see Obradović-Wochnik 
2009b; K. Ristić 2014; Subotić 2009).  
During my dissertation fieldwork a decade later I was, therefore, attuned 
in a particular way to those telling omissions, odd euphemisms, and imprecise 
conspiracy theories about the Milošević years that emerged as I tried to work out 
the political subjectivities of my interlocutors. I was steeped in the distinction 
explicated by Orli Fridman (2006, 2011) between anti-Milošević and antiwar 
activists during the 1990s and the October Revolution. As Fridman discusses, by 
the end of the 1990s most everyone in Serbia wanted Milošević gone. Not only 
had his level of popular support been underwhelming to begin with, but even his 
supporters became disillusioned as the decade of poverty dragged on. Yet, “the 
reality was that it was not anti-war sentiment that brought out the masses to 
march in the streets for months….The wish to live in a normal country created an 
urgent need to get rid of the man who was seen as the one who brought this 
abnormal country upon his people” (Fridman 2011, 514). Picture the scene, then, 
as right-wing nationalists joined the same crowd as Women in Black and student 
activists on October 5, 2000, and together, forced Milošević to resign. Even the 
police, crucially, did not act against the protesters.   
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First as Radicals, then as Progressives 
The euphoria of the 2000 October Revolution was premised on the 
expectation that the end of the Milošević regime would engender rapid change 
and a return to the good graces of Europe and the wider world. These 
expectations were quickly frustrated. When reformist Prime Minister Zoran 
Đinđić was assassinated in 2003—in the middle of the day, in the center of 
Belgrade, at the hands of security forces with ties to Milošević—many interpreted 
the shocking event as a return to the darkness of the war years and as the key 
moment when the country began to “backslide.” In her analysis of popular 
representations of his assassination, Jessica Greenberg shows how Đinđić was 
portrayed as a family man of integrity as well as “a vanguard of democracy, a man 
with European sensibility and sense, who represented the future of Serbia as a 
respected, democratic state” (2006, 132). In hindsight the Đinđić assassination, 
as one interlocutor put it, cast the October Revolution as a “missed opportunity” 
(promašili smo priliku).  
Besides the Đinđić years, there were other times in the first “post-
revolutionary” decade when it seemed that democratic reforms would take 
stronger root, and some interlocutors implicitly linked these periods with a 
downturn in emigration. As Sofija explained:  
There was one period, 2000 to 2005, 6, 7, when migration, including brain 
drain, was significantly reduced, because people stopped to see if 
something would actually happen....So it was a moment of calmness that 
everyone felt…when people, you know, [said] “ahh”—took a breath and 
waited as though underwater, just to see if we would swim. That simply 
didn’t happen...people can’t hold their breath forever...so they started to 
go again—in the past five years it’s really pronounced. 
 
 28 
The first term of Boris Tadić’s presidency (he served from 2004–2012) 
seemed promising to many. From the Democratic Party (Demokratska Stranka) 
and pro-Western, expectations were high for Tadić. Yet his party was forced to 
form fragile coalition governments with political rivals—destabilizing his 
presidency through divisions on the issues of EU membership, cooperation with 
the ICTY, and the status of Kosovo (Subotić 2017, 170–171; see also Listhaug, 
Ramet, and Dulić 2011). These divisions softened with the passage of time, the 
substantial pressure of the international community, and the eventual 
convergence of public opinion that EU membership would probably be better 
than the alternative.  
But in a recent survey by political science students at the University of 
Belgrade, eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds most often responded that—besides 
the internet—it is the coming to power of the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) 
that has defined their lives. The same cohort named Aleksandar Vučić as the 
personality that has most defined the life of their generation (Milosavljević 2018). 
Who are Vučić and the SNS, and how did they come to hold such significance? 
This question requires a brief return to Vojislav Šešelj, wartime wielder of the 
rusty spoon.  
While the hatemongering Šešelj was indicted for war crimes and 
surrendered to the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 
2003, his far-right party remained the largest for some years, then led by 
Tomislav Nikolić.17 In 2008, Nikolić and other SRS members broke with Šešelj to 
                                                   
17 The United Nations Security Council established the ICTY in 1993 with a mandate to prosecute 
violations of international humanitarian law on the territory of the former Yugoslavia during the 
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form a new party, the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS). (Note that “progressive” 
here should not be read as having any of the connotations it does in Western 
political theory.)18 After some years with the Democratic Party at the helm, 
Nikolić was elected president of Serbia in 2012, a post he occupied until 2017. 
Following Nikolić, in 2017 another SNS member was elected president: 
Aleksandar Vučić. Minister of Information under Milošević, Vučić was also a 
member of the Serbian Radical Party until he joined Nikolić in founding SNS. He 
became a powerful party figure and in 2014 was elected prime minster (generally 
regarded as the most powerful position in Serbia’s parliamentary system).    
When I conducted my research the democratic opposition was fragmented 
and marginalized and the Radicals-turned-Progressives had a firm grip on power 
under a remade image. As Vučić gained power he established himself as a 
vigorous partner of EU diplomats and technocrats. For a domestic audience he 
has also been appropriately pro-Russia (for example, in 2014 authorizing a 
massively expensive military parade on the 70th anniversary of the liberation of 
Belgrade in World War II that included a visit from Russian President Vladimir 
                                                   
wars of the 1990s. It finally completed its work in 2017, transferring eight remaining cases to local 
courts. The work of the court was incredibly complex and its reception across the former 
Yugoslavia mixed. It was generally regarded in Serbia as biased against Serbs, and many of its 
rulings were also immensely disappointing to the Muslim population of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
The trial against Milošević ended without verdict when he died in custody of a heart attack in 
2006. And in a ruling that shocked many, in March 2016 the ICTY acquitted Vojislav Šešelj of all 
charges and he returned to Belgrade a free man. See: http://www.icty.org/en. On Šešelj’s 
trajectory see: https://www.france24.com/en/20180411-vojislav-seselj-unrepentant-serb-
ultranationalist. 
 
18 In Serbian: Srpska Napredna Stranka. Jelena Subotić notes that while “Serbian Progressive 
Party” has become codified as the English translation of the name of this political party, a more 
faithful translation would be “Serbia Forward” (2017, 186n20). “Forward Serbia!” (Napred 
Srbijo!) was the name of the parliamentary group formed by prominent SRS members who would 
later join the SNS.   
 30 
Putin). Vučić has the political astuteness to sound at once like the most 
committed European and “transitologist,” while simultaneously evoking tired yet 
effective nationalist tropes and engaging in decidedly undemocratic practices (see 
Greenberg and Spasić 2017). Besides the occasional reprimand for his systematic 
repression of the media, his increasingly authoritarian tendencies have not had a 
noticeably negative impact on the good relationship his government has enjoyed 
with Western powers.19 Most significantly, since the creation of the Serbian 
Progressive Party in 2008 all major political parties in the country have endorsed 
membership in the European Union, which Serbia formally applied for in 2009. 
As anthropologist Tanja Petrović has argued, “this ideological unity across the 
Serbian political spectrum has resulted in the production of a standardized, 
performative discourse on Serbia’s accession to the EU that overpopulates the 
media space” (2015, 293). As I elaborate in chapter 3, the EU accession process, 
and the myopic focus maintained by the political elite on this process, has had a 
sweeping impact on the economic and other policies that structure the life 
chances and choices of my interlocutors.   
Post-Đinđić politics are thus perhaps best characterized by the endurance 
of the metaphor of the rusty spoon. As Nikolić and Vučić gained power—first as 
Radicals, then as Progressives—a rusty spoon began to appear behind their 
caricatured ears in the scenes of political cartoonist Corax, serving as a reminder 
of the political genealogy of these and other politicians. In the cartoon 
                                                   
19 See, for example, the 2014 country progress report of the European Commission: 
https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-
enlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/key_documents/2014/20140108-serbia-progress-
report_en.pdf as well as subsequent reports.  
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reproduced in figure 3 Vučić attempts to sweep this pedigree, symbolized by a 
pile of rusty spoons, under an EU flag. As prominent anthropologist Ivan Čolović 
elegantly prefaced a new volume of Corax cartoons,  
When we assess the extent of their [Vučić, Nikolić, and others] 
transformation, their peacefulness and Europeanness—even when we 
optimistically and in good faith believe that they have really changed—we 
must not forget that their careers began in the sign of the rusty spoon; that 
their first political lessons were sourced from Šešelj’s hand, from these, his 
spoons. (Čolović 2016, 6–7) 
 
 
Figure 3: Corax cartoon 
Aleksandar Vučić sweeps a pile of rusty spoons under the flag of the European 
Union. ©Predrag Koraksić. Published in Danas, December 15, 2015.20 
 
 
 
Post-Milošević Political Subjectivities 
The unsavory political genealogies of key officials were widely known and 
conditioned the responses of perhaps a few of my interlocutors who topped the 
                                                   
20 See https://www.danas.rs/corax/corax-2015-12-15-0902_ocp_w500_h343/. A gallery of 
Corax cartoons published in the daily Danas since 2004 can be viewed here: 
https://www.danas.rs/corax/. 
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age range of my target demographic (and thus had more prominent personal 
memories of the 1990s). It is difficult to confirm the specific influence of the 
wartime past in the present on how my younger interlocutors viewed politics and 
evaluated individual politicians. There are two related reasons for this: First, 
because the country as a whole has not undertaken any collective process of 
coming to terms with Serbia’s role in the breakup of Yugoslavia—which would 
include public recognition of the most egregious war crimes committed in the 
name of the Serbian people—this reckoning has had to take place on an 
individual level only (see Fridman 2011, 515–517; Fridman 2018). Second, 
electoral politics in the region are more broadly regarded as fundamentally dirty, 
corrupt, and immoral (see Greenberg 2014, 147–178; Helms 2007). Such an 
understanding of politics as a (dirty) game that one best stay out of was 
widespread. As one promoter of entrepreneurship put it, “that game, the political 
game, we don’t know how to play, and they will certainly beat us. I mean, if we 
now began to play that game. But if we play our own game of ‘empowering the 
individual,’ or ‘new skills,’ then yes, maybe we can manage to do something.” 
While my interlocutors held a variety of specific political views, they sought 
agentive action outside of what they held to be a separate political realm (see 
Greenberg 2010). 
While such distancing from politics resonates widely, in Serbia political 
cynicism flows more specifically from a revolution that was, as a former Otpor 
activist named Jovan put it, “all for nothing.” As Greenberg argues was the case 
for student activists in the early 2000s, navigating the lived reality of post-
revolutionary democracy bred “a politics of disappointment” that helped the 
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reform-minded to manage expectations (2014, 39–44). This idea of 
disappointment captures how students were invested in idealized notions of 
Europe and normative visions of democracy but ultimately turned to decidedly 
pragmatic approaches to reform. Throughout her book—which this dissertation 
builds on—Greenberg illuminates the outcomes of disappointment as 
manifestations of “presentist” politics by which activists operated between 
cynicism and hope. Specifically, she lays bare the logics of how anti-Milošević 
student activists turned to promoting university reforms in line with the 
European Bologna Process. While Bologna was decidedly neoliberal, students 
championed the reform process as a tool for challenging entrenched university 
hierarchies and for producing themselves as intelligible European subjects.21   
Conducting fieldwork a few years earlier than Greenberg and among 
radical anarchists in Croatia and Slovenia, Maple Razsa (2015) points to the 
relevance of temporal and geopolitical fault lines as well as family biographies in 
shaping political subjectivities. In 2001, it was mostly Croats and Slovenes on his 
train to the G8 protest in Genoa (Razsa 2015, 8). Serbian citizens would have just 
deposed Milošević and were still under a strict visa regime. Taken together, 
Greenberg and Razsa’s research demonstrates how the postsocialist era bred very 
different political subjectivities even among those within a few years age of each 
other. It also demonstrates how ideologically distinct forms of activism can 
sometimes look rather similar in practice. For example, much like Greenberg’s 
                                                   
21 The Bologna Process seeks to more closely align systems of higher education across Europe in 
order to facilitate, among other things, the mobility of labor. See: 
https://ec.europa.eu/education/policies/higher-education/bologna-process-and-european-
higher-education-area_en.  
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student activist interlocutors, Razsa’s anarchist collaborators also embraced 
presentist action. “They shifted away from an emphasis on a future utopia and 
toward a commitment to forms of practice, away from ends and toward means” 
(Razsa 2015, 11). In chapters 5 and 6 I probe this resemblance of form to consider 
how the promotion of entrepreneurship and the digital economy—among non-
activists—may relate to political activism, as it draws on the vocabulary and spirit 
of social change if not its critical underpinnings.  
Such scholarship prompts a reconsideration of the border between 
engagement and disengagement. In this context I will also show how the 
widespread disavowal of politics among my interlocutors both emerges from and 
comments upon postsocialist expectations of the state. As Jovan told me, “it’s 
only important to people here that the state doesn’t bother them.” Yet he added: 
“It’s only important that the state doesn’t bother them—and that it creates the 
conditions for a better life.” Even after the disappointments of a revolution that 
wasn’t revolutionary, disgust with the corruption and cronyism of electoral 
politics, with the same people in power as were responsible for the wars, poverty, 
and isolation of the 1990s, even so: the state desired by my interlocutors was a 
moral, responsible, orderly one that takes care of its citizens.  
Such expectations of the state resonate with those of Stef Jansen’s 
interlocutors in a Bosnian apartment complex for whom “a projected ‘normal 
state’ was at the heart of their yearnings for ‘normal lives’” (2015, 8–9). Jansen 
proposes the concept of “gridding” to capture this sense of how normality in 
everyday life was perceived as necessitating systemic state-level order. The 
absence of such gridded normality gives rise to the widespread sense of lives lived 
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“in the meantime.” While young potential migrants in Serbia shared the 
expectation of an ordered or orderly state (that nevertheless did not “bother” 
them too much), they did not share the condition of suspended action implied by 
Jansen’s phrase “in the meantime.” Rather, they lived their lives briskly, despite 
the perceived absence of a state that fulfilled their expectations. As we will see in 
the chapters to come, some sought an ordered state elsewhere while others 
sought to insulate themselves from the vagaries of the Serbian state via an 
entrepreneurial turn inward or forms of “virtual migration” enabled by the 
growing digital economy. While I build directly on the work of Greenberg, Razsa, 
Jansen, and others, my research also suggests ways in which geopolitics has come 
to enable unique mobility stances and expectations for dignified work that 
distinguish the range of life chances and choices experienced by my interlocutors 
from those of their peers in neighboring republics and just a decade their senior.  
Finally, I must highlight the eclecticism that also features in Serbian 
political subjectivities. My interlocutors did not represent the full range of the 
political spectrum—I did not interview, to the best of my knowledge, any 
hardcore Šešelj fans. But the notion of a political spectrum in Serbia is almost 
nonsensical. Politicians themselves shift positions on key ideological issues (such 
as EU integration) self-servingly, make use of contradictory rhetorics 
simultaneously, and erase their political tracks instrumentally. There are a few 
past Serbian politicians whose significance has become relatively fixed for the 
urban middle classes, namely Đinđić and, to a somewhat lesser extent, Milošević. 
But beyond these two figures there is a remarkable eclecticism to political views 
in Serbia. As anthropologist Marko Živković humorously remarked on this 
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phenomenon, “no matter how contradictory a grouping of strange bedfellows 
claimed as one’s ‘allies’ (or favourite politicians) might appear to be, it will be, so 
my hypothesis goes, encountered in somebody, somewhere in Serbia” (2007, 
602–603).  
Živković suggests that such personal political eclecticism reflects a 
generally unsettled political sphere and the effort required of average citizens to 
meaningfully follow, let alone make sense of, daily political developments. I 
would add that this is also related to the absence of collective confrontation with 
the past—a process that would supply some clear moral coordinates for the 
population. For example, my first interviewee, an entrepreneurial returnee to 
Serbia, surprised me by framing her return as prompted by Kosovo’s declaration 
of independence in 2008: She said, “I think, uh, Kosovo is an issue I feel very 
strongly about and, this was around the time that Kosovo declared independence 
in February, and I left [the US] during that summer.” I stress that I am not 
casting this stance as inherently immoral, nationalistic, or anything else. Rather, 
I wish to highlight that this otherwise cosmopolitan, intellectual, and left-leaning 
entrepreneur here voices a position that is shared by those on the far right. Her 
commentary reveals an awareness of the dissonance of this stance within her 
overall subject position as the pace of her words accelerates to add: “Kosovo was 
lost long before that and I’m 100 percent aware of everything but I felt like, you 
know—Serbia is falling apart.” ”22 Other interlocutors seemed to happily 
                                                   
22 Kosovo is considered the cultural heartland of Serbia and, for various reasons, is a symbol of 
national trauma generative of a version of the “patriotism of despair” that Sergei Oushakine 
(2009) described in the Russian context. Kosovo declared independence from Serbia in 2008 and 
Serbia will need to recognize the independent state in order to join the EU. EU-brokered 
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combine disparate positions without any sense of cognitive dissonance, though 
their default stance was an eschewal of the political.  
In the chapters to come, the subtle difference that just a few years’ age can 
make in fashioning political subjectivities will become apparent. In chapter 6 we 
hear more from Jovan, born in 1980 and active in Otpor as a young adult. 
Another interlocutor who I call Dušan mentioned, when we first met, that he had 
scanned my LinkedIn profile, noticing that I had been an activist with Women in 
Black. He told me that he had once been to a gathering at the WiB office. We did 
not discuss this further, but as my field notes attest, “that’s how I knew that he 
was politically ok.” Perhaps giving it too much weight, this offhand remark not 
only colored my perception of Dušan’s political proclivities but also piqued my 
interest in how promoters of entrepreneurship (as both Jovan and Dušan were) 
related their current activities to politics and activism.  
More typical was the musing of a twenty-six-year-old law student I 
interviewed:  
I remember that I- that there wasn’t electricity, that we did our homework 
by candlelight in the ‘90s, and that afterward there was the bombing. Of 
course, I have to blame that government. That’s natural, on the one hand. 
On the other hand, of course I blame the politics of the great powers. I 
didn’t fall from Mars, I guess I know that one plus one equals two. Of 
course the great powers are, like I said, in favor of destroying the economy, 
to reduce it; Yugoslavia was a big country, all of a sudden it was carved up, 
now there are smaller little countries. Divide and conquer, you know how 
that saying goes, fight and command (posvađaj pa komanduj). 
 
Here, my interlocutor first shares the soft memory of an innocent child: 
homework by candlelight. Only three years old in 1992 she could not possibly 
                                                   
negotiations have taken place in fits and starts, and many consider Vučić to be deliberately 
stalling, as when a resolution is reached his party will likely be punished at the polls. 
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know that Sarajevo was under siege by Serb forces or that ethnic cleansing would 
be committed in the name of the Serbian nation. Now, as an adult who could 
know (but does she?), she distributes blame for all that chaos to the government 
of the time (the Milošević regime) as well as the “great powers” who were, indeed, 
intimately involved in the breakup of Yugoslavia, though doubtfully so in order to 
“divide and conquer” its republics.23 This comment illustrates both the moral 
distance from the wartime past claimed by many Serbian “children of the 1990s” 
via invocations of their innocent status as children, and something of the 
prevailing orientation toward politics among such youth. Setting aside its 
conspiratorial overtones, this comment positions politics as an external realm, 
the domain where governments act. As Greenberg explained in relation to a 
similar interaction with Serbian youth about the NATO bombing, “If politics 
really were a site through which one could affect the country and its policies, we 
all would have been implicated in past violence” (Greenberg 2010, 44). Young 
potential migrants from Serbia, then, tended to regard themselves as apolitical 
actors in an abnormally political context. The tensions inherent in such a position 
will be traced through the chapters to come.  
Finally, this comment suggests how, in Serbia, reflections on staying or 
leaving occur in relation to a complex imaginary of the West. On the one hand, 
during the 1990s the West came to represent normalcy and potential freedom 
from stifling impoverishment and isolation. On the other hand, the West became 
associated with duplicity, betrayal, and neocolonialism (Greenberg 2010; Volcic 
                                                   
23 See Ramet 2004, 732–734 for a summary of various theories of the nature and importance of 
“external factors” on the breakup of Yugoslavia and its dissolution in war.   
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2011, 53–59). As a representative of this West, I sometimes felt this double-sided 
projection, though these specific elements were much more muted than they had 
been when I lived in Serbia ten years prior. As I discuss in later chapters, new 
associations with the West had been grafted onto old and colored my research 
interactions. And—as I will show—my young interlocutors had real-life 
experiences of travel to the West to draw on in asserting their mobility stances.  
 
The Methods of Mobility 
Throughout my fieldwork, I grappled with the issue of constructing the 
field. As James Clifford asked, “what specific kinds of travel and dwelling (where? 
how long?), and interaction (with whom? In what languages?) have made a 
certain range of experiences count as fieldwork?” (1992, 99). In one sense, my 
own response to these questions seemed clear. I had secured funding to conduct 
fifteen months of research, from October 2014 through December 2015. And 
because of my theoretical focus on the potential migration of young talent, it 
seemed self-evident that I would spend most of my time with the relatively young 
and educated. As for location, situating myself in Serbia’s capital city of Belgrade 
also made obvious sense. Nearly half of Serbia’s population is said to work in the 
capital and, as one interlocutor from a small town put it, “if you don’t come to 
Belgrade, you don’t have a ticket to go further.” Thus while in one sense I had a 
clearly defined field site, “constructing the field” nevertheless proved challenging, 
as my fieldwork was not characterized by daily engagement at one particular 
organization or with one group of interlocutors clearly bound by shared activity 
or demographic features.  
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Under such circumstances, “where is the field?” as numerous others have 
asked in recent years (e.g. Des Chene 1997; Hannerz 2010; Kurotani 2004). Most 
famously, George Marcus traced a disciplinary shift toward multi-sited fieldwork, 
characterizing work in this vein as ethnography both “in and of” the world 
system, where “the world system is not the theoretically constituted holistic 
frame that gives context to the contemporary study of peoples or local subjects 
closely observed by ethnographers, but it becomes, in a piecemeal way, integral to 
and embedded in discontinuous, multi-sited objects of study” (1995, 97). While 
the shift described by Marcus was of relevance for all anthropologists, the 
logistical and theoretical implications of conducting multi-sited fieldwork 
prompted a particularly robust conversation amongst scholars of mobility and 
migration (e.g. Hirvi and Snellman 2012). Unsurprisingly, Marcus’s (1995) 
technique of “follow the people” has been taken up and developed extensively in 
the fields of mobility and migration studies, but this most literal sense of multi-
sited fieldwork is just one of several he described. The author also outlines the 
techniques of “follow the thing,” “follow the metaphor,” “follow the plot, story, or 
allegory,” “follow the life history,” and “follow the conflict.” Rather than calling 
for physical movement between geographic locations, each of these approaches 
suggests a way of accessing broad global processes via their local manifestations 
in order to nuance and extend the implications of ethnographic analysis.  
The necessity of tracking global processes while remaining 
ethnographically situated has become “virtual orthodoxy” in the discipline since 
the mid-1990s (Starn 2015, 7). But how to actually do this remains a perplexing 
methodological puzzle that must be engaged in context. I did not encounter the 
 41 
same fieldwork dilemmas as those with would-be interlocutors scattered across 
the globe—but I did meet the challenge of studying meanings of mobility and 
migration from a fixed geographic location. These circumstances led to the 
emergence of a constellation of “micro-sites” of participant observation out of 
which I constructed my field. Traversing these sites—sometimes along with the 
young potential migrants I met, sometimes as a lone ethnographer—I sought to 
harness the dynamic power of multi-sited ethnography and engage the inductive 
side of grounded theory (Bernard and Ryan 2010, 265–267).  
 
Places 
What kinds of places were these micro-sites? One was the International 
Academic Center (IAC). A member of the network of educational information 
centers known as EducationUSA and funded by the United States Department of 
State, the Center’s mandate is to provide accurate information about higher 
education opportunities in the US. They also offer testing and advising services. 
In the course of my research I attended several group advising sessions, joining 
students interested in pursuing an American graduate degree. In cooperation 
with the Executive Director, I subsequently volunteered to conduct individual 
consultations with students preparing to apply to US graduate programs, helping 
them to identify their goals and strengths and sharing my own experiences. This 
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micro-site allowed me to meet a wider range of students than I might have 
otherwise and to better understand stances toward educational mobility.24  
During my fieldwork I also attended as many policy panels and public 
events as possible on youth (un)employment. Such micro-sites consistently 
situated the migration of Serbia’s talented youth as a consequence of high 
unemployment. They were thus rich locations for mining discursive framings of 
the issue as well as mapping the connections and fissures between relevant 
nongovernmental, governmental, and other actors. Examples of such events 
include a one-day conference on vocational schooling and youth employability, 
the promotional panel for a new publication of the statistical office on external 
migration, and several panels organized by the National Youth Council (KOMS) 
on youth unemployment as well as the new National Youth Strategy.  
One of my early fieldwork observations was that the political discourse 
which frames brain drain as a problem offers entrepreneurship as its solution. 
Pursuing this direction I attended several panel discussions on (social) 
entrepreneurship put on by the student organization Network for Business 
Development (Mreža za poslovni razvoj) as part of their “School of Business 
Skills” (Škola poslovnih veština). (Despite the name of the initiative, the events I 
attended veered inspirational rather than practical.) I also entered the 
“ecosystem” of entrepreneurship via Impact Hub Belgrade (IHB), a newly 
founded coworking space and community for entrepreneurs and part of the 
                                                   
24 I conducted six such consultations at IAC. Of a different nature than my in-depth interviews, 
these took place in English and, though they were audio-recorded, I did not transcribe or include 
the sessions in my later coding. 
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global Impact Hub network. There I attended a workshop on “impact 
entrepreneurship,” a series of workshops under the auspices of the Social Impact 
Award aimed at introducing students to social entrepreneurship, and a regular 
discussion group for an online course called “u.lab” on “transforming society and 
self.” I draw heavily on these experiences in chapters 5 and 6.  
My field was also constructed out of serendipitous encounters on busses 
and with neighbors, meals with friends both old and new, and the yellowing 
typewritten ephemera I paged through in the Archives of Yugoslavia. Engaging 
this constellation of micro-sites I made contact with many of the experts and a 
few of the young potential migrants I would later interview. And I sought to train 
an ethnographic lens on how fragments of the world system become embedded in 
the politics of mobility in Serbia.   
 
People 
Woven through this dissertation are the mobility narratives—including 
plans, aspirations, and imaginaries as well as practices—of young, highly 
educated potential migrants from Serbia. As discussed above, my target 
demographic was “the children of the 1990s,” though several in-depth 
interviewees and focus group participants were older. Including in-depth 
interviews, focus groups, and IAC consultations (but not expert interviews), my 
participants ranged from twenty to forty-three, with a median age of twenty-
eight.  
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In-depth Interviews 
I conducted thirty in-depth interviews with a total of thirty-two 
participants (I draw from one “double” interview with sisters Mina and Mirjana 
in chapter 3; the other was with a couple who planned to—and ultimately did—
emigrate together to Canada). These interviews were equally distributed by 
gender. I conducted my first two in-depth interviews in English with near-native-
level speakers of English while the remainder were conducted in Serbian. All 
were audio-recorded and transcribed.  
My approach to identifying in-depth interviewees was guided by the 
cluster of concerns raised and strategies proposed by Mario Luis Small (2009) for 
ethnographers doing research in domains—such as mine—dominated by 
demographers and quantitative sociologists. Namely, I was concerned with “how 
to produce ethnographic work that keeps at bay the critiques expected from 
quantitative researchers while also addressing the thirst for in-depth studies that 
somehow or other ‘speak’ to empirical conditions in other cases (not observed)” 
(Small 2009, 10, original emphasis). Without overstating the concerns of 
representativeness and generalizability in ethnography, I was wary that relying 
on the common strategy of “snowball sampling” for interviews, especially if I 
began with my former feminist activist compatriots, would produce quite narrow 
results. Instead, I strove to deploy what Small describes as “case study logic” by 
which each interview builds on the last until “the very last case examined will 
provide very new or surprising information. The objective is saturation” (2009, 
24–27, 25). As I discuss below, each interview was guided by a set of common 
concerns, yet my specific questions were refined in the field in response to 
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previous interviews. I frequently assessed the themes emergent from these 
conversations and sought to add an “inconvenience sample” (Duneier 2011)—
someone with experiences or demographic features that might stretch the range 
of mobility stances I was encountering.  
I thus met my in-depth interviewees in various ways. Four were friends or 
acquaintances from my previous experiences in the country. Seven were new 
acquaintances I met in the course of participant observation or daily life in 
Belgrade, and nine more were connections I made through these seven. Two 
came through my calls for focus group participants. And another ten were found 
via a public Facebook group called “Emigrating from Serbia” (Iseljavanje iz 
Srbije) with nearly 5,000 members.25  
On a wall in my Belgrade apartment I had taped together several pieces of 
paper with a line drawn across the middle. One end was marked with “leaver,” 
the other “long-term returnee.” In between were categories such as “wants to 
leave,” “ambivalent,” and “returnee lite.” As I conducted in-depth interviews I 
plotted Post-it notes along this continuum, one for each interviewee with their 
name, age, and field of education. I had expected these artificial categories to 
collapse in the field. But attending to the ways in which each interlocutor fit or 
didn’t fit somewhere on this continuum helped to both ensure that my interviews 
captured a range of relevant experiences (Small 2009, 13) and revealed the 
nuances of the mobility stances articulated.  
                                                   
25 The group was pitched as an information-sharing forum for emigration opportunities, with a 
banner that read “old age will ask you where your passport was” (pitaće te starost gde ti je bio 
pasoš). As my interview sources waned in summer 2015 I posted a recruitment message in this 
online group, explaining my research and expressing interest in interviewing those who were 
actively planning to leave Serbia. 
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When I talk about “mobility narratives” in this dissertation I am almost 
always referring to these thirty in-depth interviews and the stories and stances 
relayed through them. My use of the phrase “mobility stances” is informed by a 
sociolinguistic understanding of stance as a “linguistically articulated form of 
social action whose meaning is to be construed within the broader scope of 
language, interaction, and sociocultural value” (Du Bois 2007, 139). In listening 
for the stances of my interlocutors, I paid particular attention to the words they 
used to describe leaving (for example, “to run away”/pobeći versus “to go out, 
leave”/odlaziti, or tropes like leaving “in time” or “at any cost”), and the 
evaluations they made of these terms. Given the saturation of Serbian society 
with talk of leaving, including the ubiquity of the dominant framing of the issue 
in media and political discourse, I was interested in how “prior texts and 
discourses are both resources for stancetaking as well as inevitable frameworks 
for their interpretation and meaning” (Jaffe 2009, 20). Such texts include my 
own carefully crafted project description, which I sent would-be interviewees and 
which they often specifically commented upon.  
My in-depth interviews were guided by a set of common questions about 
my interlocutors’ educational and professional backgrounds; turning points in 
their plans or aspirations for mobility or migration and the influence of their 
families on the same; their understanding of the valuation of their field of work; 
and their vision for the future. In some interviews I asked specific questions that 
addressed each of the fields above in the given order; in others it seemed I hardly 
spoke, much less asked direct questions (yet I ensured that we covered 
comparable ground). Most interviews fell somewhere in between. The 
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pervasiveness of the topic of brain drain meant that just about everyone had 
something to say about it, and often quite a lot.  
Pre-interview communication provided interesting clues to each 
interlocutor’s personality and professional situation even if it did not necessarily 
predict how our conversation might unfold. For example, I conducted my final in-
depth interview with a young tech entrepreneur preparing to accept a job offer 
overseas. Despite contacting her through the most tenuous of personal 
connections she responded to my email within ten minutes and was similarly 
efficient in person, treating our encounter over tea much like a business meeting. 
In line with Small’s “case study logic” described above, I felt satisfied that this 
final interview was a nice chat that revealed little new information.  
In contrast, one of my favorite interviews was with a lawyer who got in 
touch via the Facebook group described above. I called him from the street as I 
waited much too long for a bus that showed no sign of making an appearance. 
Did he want to reschedule? I knew that he needed to be at work shortly. He was 
nonplussed and when I finally arrived at our meeting spot I found him in grubby 
sweats, leaning against a wall with the newspaper. I noted in my field notes that 
“our interview unfolded as a monologue, which I thoroughly enjoyed listening 
to…the fact that he sustained a narrative for over an hour tells me that he was one 
of my interviewees with ‘something to say.’” These interviews, then, ran a gamut 
of form, duration, and tenor. For at least some of my interlocutors, our interview 
served as an opportunity to puzzle out their own views on their life chances and 
choices with a sympathetic ear.      
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Focus Groups 
My in-depth interviews were complemented by four focus groups, three 
conducted in the first half of December 2014 and a fourth in September 2015 as 
my research wound down. Together, these group discussions brought an 
additional seventeen people into my research, recruited through various 
educational networks.26 Focus groups have the benefit of producing insight 
through group interaction, including bringing forth the “natural vocabulary” used 
to discuss a topic (Morgan 1988, 18). In this, they may serve as a useful 
intermediary between participant observation and individual interviews.  
My first focus group certainly fulfilled this function. It was structured 
around three broad questions about leaving and staying in Serbia plus an 
elicitation exercise on media quotes and images. The nine participants ranged in 
age from twenty-six to forty-two, all with advanced degrees in various fields: 
mechanical engineering, architecture, art history, and romance languages among 
others. Six of the nine had some experience living abroad, and all but two had 
responded to my initial questionnaire that they were actively planning to 
emigrate in the future. As became clear as the evening unfolded—and as the 
snacks I had assembled remained untouched—all had been prompted to 
participate in the evening by a genuine interest in the topic of brain drain.  
 
                                                   
26 Participants in my first focus group were involved in a social network of “repats” or were on the 
listserv of the International Academic Center. The other two focus groups I conducted at the 
beginning of my fieldwork gathered participants recruited through the A-SMYLE alumni network 
of American Councils for International Education, Erasmus alumni and scholarship networks, 
and the women’s studies listserv. A final focus group conducted at the end of my fieldwork 
reconvened one participant from the first group with students recruited through Doktoranti 
Srbije, an interdisciplinary network of Serbian doctoral students.  
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Expert Interviews 
Through sixteen “expert” interviews I gathered varying perspectives on the 
topics of youth (un)employment, entrepreneurship, and economic conditions 
writ large. These experts were largely people affiliated with youth- and education-
focused NGOs or projects and technology and entrepreneurship hubs. I made 
contact with a few through personal connections. But I mostly cold-emailed each 
after reading a report from their organization, seeing them on a panel discussion, 
or otherwise encountering their work. This was an exceptionally professional 
group who efficiently replied to my emails and generously took time from busy 
days to consider my questions, sometimes for several hours. In hindsight, these 
expert interviews were also some of the most useful conversations I had. As 
something of mediators between official framings of brain drain and individual 
subjective experiences of it, such experts provided unique insight into the 
“institutional processes” that shape experience (Gubrium and Holstein 2002, 
755). My expert interlocutors spoke passionately and candidly about Serbia’s 
socioeconomic problems and the solutions they deemed necessary. I draw heavily 
on these conversations in chapter 3.   
 
Documents 
I also conducted research in the Archives of Yugoslavia, gathering data on 
the place of science, expertise, and international exchanges in socialist Yugoslavia 
in order to better contextualize the historical development of the brain drain 
phenomenon. My field note from my first trek out to the archives in April 2015 
(located in a poorly connected neighborhood) attests to the learning curve I 
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experienced. I had never stepped foot in an archive before. The collections I was 
interested in from the period after 1945 were unevenly curated. But the staff was 
efficiently helpful and by the third day I had found my stride:  
Yesterday I got my first folder (fascikle) at the archives. After signing 
something in a register book one of the staff members emerged from the 
back with a cardboard-bound mass like those I had seen others with. I 
returned with it to my desk and regarded its massiveness. I felt 
overwhelmed by the size but also excited and curious about what I would 
find. I tentatively untied the cloth ties and opened the casing to reveal the 
stacks of paper inside, all shades of white and neatly separated by folded 
half-sheets of computer paper. I was looking at F-5, a folder from one of 
the first sessions of the Federal Committee for Science and Culture 
(Savezni komitet za nauku i kulturu), and the first thing I regarded was the 
typewritten minutes from the session. As I carefully browsed the pages in 
front of me I felt lucky to have the opportunity to be present in the past in 
this way—to encounter margin notes scribbled by a secretary on minutes, 
memos about an agreement, and confidential documents that were never 
in the public eye. (Field notes April 8, 2015) 
 
Not every day would be so satisfying; my field notes also testify to tedium. 
But after about five weeks of partial days in the archives I felt confident with the 
data I had collected from three fonds related to my research: the Federal Council 
for Education and Culture (Savezni savet za obrazovanje i kulturu) from 1967–
1971, the Federal Committee for Science and Culture (Savezni komitet za nauku i 
kulturu) from 1971–1978, and select years between 1965 and 1984 of the Federal 
Employment Affairs Bureau (Savezni biro za poslove zapošljavanje).27 Perusing 
the documents in these collections gave me (however limited) insight into the 
concerns of mobility, migration, and employment in socialist Yugoslavia. I use 
this data to flesh out the history discussed in the next chapter.   
                                                   
27 The Archives of Yugoslavia follow the common “thirty-year rule” delaying release of state 
documents—meaning that at the time of my research in 2014 one could access documents up to 
1984.   
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I also traced how brain drain was discussed in the media. During my 
fieldwork I collected fifty-seven news pieces published directly on the topic of 
brain drain and around 400 others on related concerns such as unemployment, 
talent, higher education, entrepreneurship, youth, and work. (I used “tags” to 
characterize and organize this media thematically.) 
 
Data Analysis 
Data analysis was ongoing in the field. I kept a memo for each month of 
fieldwork that I organized into goals, progress and challenges, and musings. The 
“musings” section of these memos is where initial insights into the themes of my 
research emerged and suggested new fieldwork directions. I find it useful, 
following Ryan and Bernard (2003, 88), to consider themes as either inductive, 
(emergent from empirical data) or a priori (rooted in that combination of theory, 
experience, and expectation that a researcher brings to the field). The wide-
ranging discussions that occurred in my initial three focus groups were key 
sources of inductively derived themes. The first was the richest. Subsequent focus 
groups were less revelatory, yet still provided meaningful perspectives on the 
politics of mobility in Serbia. While in the field I engaged in an iterative process 
of open coding (Bernard and Ryan 2010, 271–273) on the lengthy transcripts of 
these discussions, frequently revisiting them and engaging my co-moderator in 
analytic discussions of particular exchanges. In contrast, an important a priori 
theme that I had expected to encounter in mobility narratives—that of leaving 
Serbia expressed as a matter of escape—was noticeably absent from the empirical 
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data I collected. This absence alerted me to the importance of shifting mobility 
regimes and the broader geopolitical context of my research.  
Upon returning home, data analysis and writing unfolded symbiotically. I  
would write up a key scene from my field notes, and, contemplating the 
personalities involved, turn to my interview data in one of two ways: I organized 
and coded my expert interviews in MAXQDA. But I found that a different 
approach produced sharper insights from my in-depth interviews. As my 
fieldwork became a more distant memory, I realized the need to “visit” with my 
in-depth interviewees by hearing their voices again. Depending on which section 
of text I was working on I would find myself thinking about particular 
conversations. For example, in writing about the phenomenon of “negative 
selection” that I discuss in chapter 4, I thought about Gordana. I might revisit my 
notes from our interview and any initial notes I had made on the transcript while 
in the field, and then listen to our interview again in whole, while doing the 
dishes or walking. I would pause the recording to mark a passage and continue. 
After revisiting an interview in this way I would often produce a memo that 
included a profile of the individual and emergent themes from their narrative.  
Finally, a note on transcription: as discourse analysts have shown, a 
transcript is not an objective record of a conversation. Rather, transcription is a 
process involving both interpretive and representational decisions (Bucholtz 
2000). The decision to outsource transcription of my interviews and focus groups 
involved tradeoffs, and yet it was an easy one to make. The transcriptionist I 
hired was a friend who was intimately familiar with my project and also served as 
co-moderator of my focus groups. She was thus the ideal alternative to 
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completing the transcriptions myself—we consulted on tricky phrases and her 
efficient delivery of accurate transcripts facilitated iterative analysis in the field.  
 
Chapter Outline 
In this chapter I have outlined how brain drain is constructed as a problem 
to be managed and the local inflections of this “migration problem” in Serbia. I 
have reviewed the literature on migration and mobility that informs this 
dissertation. I have included an extensive discussion of the Milošević years in 
order to introduce the “generation of the 1990s” that is the subject of this work. 
Finally, I introduced the people, places, and documents that form the empirical 
basis of my analysis.  
In chapter 2 I specify how mobility became a barometer of the 
(ab)normality of life in Serbia. I trace shifts in access to and exercise of mobility 
through three significant periods: the “golden years” of socialist Yugoslavia, the 
period of “entrapment” from 1991–2009 that generated desires for “escape,” and 
the post-2009 “normalization” of Serbian citizens’ ability to travel. I show how, 
for the majority of my interlocutors, this final phase has permitted international 
experiences that crucially shape their contemporary stances toward mobility and 
expectations of work.  
With the goal of probing the relationship between emigration and 
unemployment, chapter 3 examines the approach to youth unemployment 
articulated in political discourse, codified in official strategies, and implemented 
through government-sponsored programs. In the second half of the chapter I 
turn to the lived reality of young, educated job-seekers, exploring how staying 
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and leaving enters their aspirations not as a dichotomy but as strands in a tangle 
of possible strategies for fulfilling their expectations for dignified work.  
The next three chapters form the core of my dissertation. In chapter 4 I 
theorize the emic category of perspektiva to access how recent university 
graduates understand their prospects, what they expect from work, and how 
these expectations fit within broader visions of the future, at home or abroad. I 
focus on the most ardent potential migrants to show how meritocracy acts as a 
value-laden register for the articulation of youthful socioeconomic aspirations as 
well as critique.  
While this chapter focuses on those who most want to leave Serbia, I also 
excavate what it means to stay in a context that so many others leave—
interrupting the assumption that economic migration is reduceable to a simple 
cost-benefit calculation. Chapters 5 and 6 focus on the growth of social and “tech” 
entrepreneurship as recent efforts to coax dignified work from an inhospitable 
climate of precarity (and as key to governmental “solutions” to brain drain). I 
untangle how entrepreneurialism is promoted as a project of reforming values 
while also serving as a realm of authenticity and self-cultivation for some. And, in 
chapter 6, I show how the nascent digital transformation of Serbia complicates 
the stark dichotomy posited between staying and leaving, giving rise to strategies 
of “virtual migration” and “apolitical activism.” My conclusion draws on a month 
of follow-up research conducted in August 2018 to update the political context, 
trajectories of key interlocutors, and to summarize my main arguments.  
 55 
CHAPTER 2 
HISTORICIZING YOUTH MOBILITY 
 
The low-budget production opened on a warm night in August 2015, in the 
once industrial and now hip Belgrade neighborhood of Savamala. Steel beams 
and black fabric framed the outdoor stage. The night sky supplied a darkened 
ceiling. Cutouts of bold yellow arrows crisscrossed the set. The space buzzed with 
quiet energy as the mostly youngish and smartly dressed crowd maneuvered into 
folding chairs crammed together in tight rows, while organizers hurried to 
accommodate those still clogging the entrance. I surveyed the scene in eager 
anticipation, my attention draw to the two white banners stretched across either 
side of the seating area: “arrivals” and “departures.” Music bleeding from the 
neighboring bars supplied a discordant soundtrack.  
The hum subsides and the music is overpowered as Željko, the MC, strides 
on stage with the air of a circus ringleader: “Good evening ladies and gentlemen!” 
he booms. “Welcome to What the Fuck are We Doing Here! You must be 
wondering why the fuck am I speaking in English? It’s easy—it’s because when we 
young people of Serbia speak our own language, well, nobody listens!”  
The actor pauses for dramatic effect. “So, now we’re just trying to get the 
word out, and what we are also trying to do is: get ourselves out of here! Because 
200,000 people under the age of thirty in Serbia are unemployed. Serbia is the 
second country in the world by the number of young and educated people leaving 
it without return. So we just don't want to be the ones left behind.”  
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Another pause. “Well we didn’t know what to do about it, so we decided to 
make a performance! And what do we need for a performance? First we needed a 
director! And with us tonight is our wonderful, beautiful, and talented director, 
Maja!” As Maja enters stage right Željko prompts: “an applause, please!” The 
audience obliges, clapping as he introduces each member of the cast and begins 
to set a playful tone.  
WTF, as I’ll call this play, unfolds as something like a self-deprecating 
introspection about the predicament of youth in Serbia. As discussed in chapter 1, 
the unemployment and migration statistics cited by Željko—and their 
reverberations through public and private lives—were the impetus not only for 
this unconventional play but also for my own research on the phenomenon of 
brain drain from Serbia. WTF offers rich insight into the cultural significance of 
these figures and the ways in which the past informs the present circumstances of 
youth trying to “get out” of Serbia. But its gifts are wrapped in layers of biting 
social critique, sometimes uncomfortable references to the West, and not always 
accessible stylistic choices. Director Maja Maletković later characterized the 
genre as “ironic cabaret,” and indeed, the production is full of campy songs with 
smart lyrics.  
This unusual genre shares certain attributes with the form of irony known 
in Russia as stiob; in particular, the ambiguity of identification embraced in this 
form (see Yurchak 2006, 249–254).28 The “new stiob” that Natalia Roudakova 
                                                   
28 Yurchak describes stiob as a “form of irony that…required such a degree of overidentification 
with the object, person, or idea at which this stiob was directed that it was often impossible to tell 
whether it was a form of sincere support, subtle ridicule, or a peculiar mixture of the two” (2006, 
250). Its utility as a “portable analytic” (Boyer and Yurchak 2010, 180) notwithstanding, stiob 
emerged from the particular power dynamics of late socialism. 
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tracks in the postsocialist period is marked by cynicism and a drift toward satire 
(2017, 168–187). Similar forms of humor echo across the postsocialist region, 
often harnessed to critique the massive dislocations of the end of socialism. As 
Maya Nadkarni (2007) has shown in postsocialist Hungary, the play between 
authenticity and irony and the aesthetic of kitsch have been shaped by, and 
comment upon, dramatic political transformation and loss of a former or 
imagined “normality.” But while a cynical quality is discernable in some of WTF’s 
scenes, it is not a new-stiob-like “passionless mockery” (Roudakova 2017, 183). 
Instead, the affective register of WTF is more self-deprecating, more ambiguous. 
It is, unsurprisingly, reminiscent of a certain category of responses to the popular 
television show Mile vs. Transition that aired in Serbia in the early 2000s. 
Intended as parody, Marko Živković argues that Mile spawned, among other 
reactions, a kind of “indeterminant irony,” a “position of those who realize that 
any simple positioning is not adequate for the morally ambiguous Serbian 
situation” (2007, 600; see also T. Petrović 2015).  
While Živković does not elaborate on the source of this moral ambiguity, it 
is suggested by the presence of the “Western gaze” (see Greenberg 2010). 
Intended as a pedagogy of persuasion (albeit a light-hearted one), Mile was 
partially sponsored by USAID and aired on the pro-European channel B92. 
Viewers’ gleeful celebration of the protagonist’s expressions of inat—an allegedly 
national characteristic akin to spiteful stubbornness—was a strong statement of 
the fraught relationship between Serbia and the West. Similarly, the messaging of 
the WTF production hinges on its dual target audience of both locals and 
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foreigners.29 While Maja demurred from endorsing my suggestion that the play 
was a “conversation with the West” she did note that, aside from its performance 
in English, “if we hadn’t had in mind that we want a part of those who see the 
show to be foreigners, maybe we would have put it together differently.” In WTF, 
“the ‘knowing wink’ of shared recognition” (Nadkarni 2007, 616) that is the heart 
of postmodern irony becomes impossible to interpret. Who is winking at whom? 
But the dual audience also means that the play directly engages some of the 
shared cultural knowledge and generational experience that might have 
otherwise been left implicit for a wholly domestic audience, making it an ideal 
object of ethnographic attention.30  
In this chapter I set in historical context the contemporary politics of brain 
drain in Serbia and the mobility aspirations of the country’s youth. I draw on 
scenes from WTF as windows onto historical episodes that impinge upon current 
debates around youth migration and mobility. Two such historical periods are of 
particular relevance: the era of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia–
SFRY (particularly the “golden years” of roughly 1963–1973) and the decade of 
war that followed that country’s demise (1991–2000). Given the relative 
                                                   
29 Belgrade had recently begun to appear on lists of European tourist hot spots, becoming, as 
noted wryly in WTF’s first musical number, “a cheap substitute for Berlin.” The city now has a 
well-established community of foreign-born residents as well as, especially during the summer 
months, a steady stream of tourists, particularly from Western Europe. 
 
30 The cast performs scenes and songs developed out of their own responses to questions 
formulated by Maja on broad topics like “what I think about Belgrade and Serbia,” “the 
relationship of foreigners to Serbs,” “the influence of war on our personal development,” “my 
relationship to time and money” and “reasons why I would leave the country or not.” Željko 
Maksimović is the only professional actor who performs in the play. For the other three, Director 
Maja Maletković, Dramaturg Katarina Janković, and visual identity guru Dunja Sabljić, the acting 
role is secondary to production. Some of the low-budget flavor of the performance can be 
attributed to the fact that it indeed featured amateur actors. Fittingly, in the course of the play’s 
run Sabljić moved to Germany and was replaced.  
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prosperity and peace of the first and the marked absence of either in the second, 
these two periods form a stark contrast. In this juxtaposition, mobility is an oft-
evoked symbol of the lost Yugoslav Good Life that included material wellbeing for 
many and respectable geopolitical standing for all (Duda 2005; Greenberg 2011; 
Jansen 2012; Patterson 2010, 2011). Drawing on primary research I conducted in 
the Archives of Yugoslavia as well as secondary sources, in this chapter I detail 
shifts in the possibilities for mobility and migration in socialist Yugoslavia, the 
1990s and 2000s, and finally, during the “white Schengen” period that began in 
2009. Through scenes from the play, my field notes, and in-depth interviews, I 
also begin to consider how my interlocutors relate to this history. I map how the 
context of the lost Yugoslav Dream followed by an extended period of wartime 
entrapment shapes contemporary understandings of what it means to leave and 
stay. In other words, I probe how and to what extent this history informs the 
youthful question: “what the fuck are we doing here?”  
 
Mobility, Migration, and the Good Life of Socialist Yugoslavia 
The Yugoslav Good Life 
When the four WTF actors—all between the ages of twenty-five and 
thirty—turn to discuss the socialist Yugoslavia they are too young to have known, 
Maja introduces the scene: “One of the biggest stories we've been told in the past 
hundred years in this region is the story of the magnificent land of Yugoslavia!” 
The actors alternately recite the lines that follow, a series of contrasts between life 
in “the magnificent land of Yugoslavia” and their generational experience: 
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“They lived in unity, and we grew up in a country falling apart.”  
“They believed in equality, and we grew up in the rise of nationalism.” 
“They were a strong industrial force, and we live off loans.”  
“They could live off what they make, and we can barely cover basic 
expenses.”  
“They could travel anywhere, and we need a visa to go to the bathroom.”  
“They had one of the biggest film industries in the world, and our film’s 
kinda been dying lately.”  
 
In unison they conclude, “and their children grew up safely.” These 
differences are ticked off matter-of-factly, in the voices of those who have heard it 
all before. The framing of the history of socialist Yugoslavia as a “story” of a 
“magnificent land” fits with the sardonic tone of the play as a whole. But it also 
hints at the unsettled status of this historical period.  
The history of Yugoslavia has been rewritten in Serbian textbooks 
numerous times. According to historian Dubravka Stojanović (2017), the image of 
socialist Yugoslavia in post-2000 textbooks is overwhelmingly negative and 
serves primarily to attribute blame for the wars of the 1990s to the communist 
system rather than nationalist elites. While the Museum of Yugoslavia is the most 
popular in the country, it receives no funding from the state. As elsewhere across 
the region, Yugoslavia’s socialism has been delegitimized in the public sphere, 
leaving this history to be relayed through intergenerational kitchen-table 
conversations and commemorated by networks of “Yugonostalgics” across the 
former country (see Kurtović 2011; Palmberger 2008; T. Petrović 2007). And 
these family memories tend to highlight that which was best in the Yugoslav 
Good Life.  
The Yugoslav way was one of the more unique experiences of socialism in 
the region. In the immediate postwar years “the country looked much like any 
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other communist state” (Patterson 2011, 19). Companies were nationalized and 
planning centralized. External migration was severely restricted. As the country 
began to industrialize and urbanize the early years of socialist Yugoslavia were 
characterized by large-scale internal migration. But after breaking with Stalin in 
1948 beloved benevolent dictator Josip Broz Tito began to remodel Yugoslav 
socialism based on the principles of decentralization, worker self-management, 
social (rather than state) ownership of the means of production, and a more 
relaxed Marxist ideology than that found in the countries of the Eastern bloc. As 
one of the founding leaders of the non-aligned movement, Tito skillfully managed 
relations with both East and West, and Yugoslavia accrued great geopolitical 
significance for the promise held in this delicate Cold War position. Socialist 
Yugoslavia also gained unique access to Western capital. As part of an effort to 
encourage its distancing from the Soviet Union, in 1949 the United States 
provided the first of many loans to the country (see Bockman 2011; Ramet 2004).  
During the 1960s and 1970s the country’s economy grew and the standard 
of living enjoyed by most ordinary Yugoslavs rose markedly. With disposable 
income in their pockets and consumer goods available to spend it on, a wide 
swath of the Yugoslav population became “caught up in the pursuit of what may 
fairly be called the Yugoslav Dream, an embrace of the pleasures and virtues of 
material abundance that sought at once to mirror and rival the American Dream 
of postwar prosperity” (Patterson 2011, xvi). With hindsight and in relation to its 
dramatic loss, it is often the modesty and “normalcy” of this dream that is 
emphasized. As my twenty-eight-year-old interlocutor Darko explained:  
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My parents were people from the village who came here [to a town near 
Belgrade] without anything, without anyone, without any kind of help. 
That is now unbelievable, but then you could…then you could be a regular 
worker and in five years build a house, buy an apartment, or I don’t know, 
buy a car, go on vacation, and now that is nearly impossible or possible 
only with, I don’t know, some kinds of stunts (uz, ne znam, neke tako 
vratolomije životne) like taking out unfavorable loans, selling some 
inheritance or something. But then, yeah, then you could really make 
something of yourself without anything.” 
 
 
Such tales of upward social mobility mapping geographic mobility indeed 
echoed the promises of the postwar Keynesian economy of the US. Travel and 
leisure were key elements of the “experiential wealth” hitched to the material 
promises of the Yugoslav Dream (Patterson 2010, 367). By the 1960s Yugoslavs 
were enjoying regular ski trips to the Slovenian alps, summer vacations on the 
brilliant Adriatic, and weekends at lakeside cottages across the federation—
destinations that had become favorites of foreign tourists as well (Grandits and 
Taylor 2010). But it was Yugoslavia’s famous red passport that came to be 
brandished by its holders with considerable pride—regardless of how often any 
one individual actually crossed an international border.  
Yugoslav citizens were much less constrained than their East bloc peers, 
and for some time “really had topped the global hierarchy of mobility” (Jansen 
2012). Enabled by numerous bilateral agreements signed by President Tito 
beginning in the mid-1960s, Yugoslavs could travel visa-free not only to their 
fellow non-aligned states, but through most of the Western and Eastern blocs.31 
International travel thus became a key marker of the country’s geopolitical 
                                                   
31 With the notable exception of travel to the USA, Albania, Greece, China, and Israel (Jansen 
2012).  
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position between East and West, a means by which Yugoslavs satisfied their 
desire for Western consumer goods (Bracewell 2006; Mikula 2010), and an index 
of emergent middle-class subjectivity.  
 
Yugoslav Migration 
While mobility in the form of cross-border shopping trips (Mikula 2010), 
educational exchanges with both East and West, and knowledge transfer with the 
rest of the non-aligned world (Bockman 2011, 81; Bondžić 2011) were all 
encouraged by the party leadership as highlighting the openness and advanced 
nature of the Yugoslav system, emigration was not.32 As Darko’s comment above 
suggests, I frequently heard that my interlocutors’ parents didn’t leave because 
they didn’t have to—they had enjoyed the Yugoslav Good Life in all its imperfect 
glory. But it was also true that “in the communist era the notion of emigration 
was the condensation of evil and something to be carefully monitored, controlled, 
and regulated by all available means” (Kovačević and Krstić 2011, 974). Economic 
reforms in the 1960s led firms to shed jobs and unemployment to rise. As a 
temporary solution, Yugoslav leaders decided to liberalize the country’s visa 
regime to allow a certain number of “unqualified” (unskilled) workers to accept 
temporary work abroad. While the highly skilled were not strictly prohibited from 
                                                   
32 As historian Dragomir Bondžić discusses, the exchange of Yugoslav professors with the 
Western world during the early years of the Cold War took place amid, and despite, a climate of 
ideological distrust. At the same time, “relations with the socialist block varied between 
rapprochement and cooperation and confrontation and cooling” (2011, 305). Student exchanges 
were less fraught and were facilitated by a range of organizations and private contacts (see 
Bondžić 2011, 165–222). Dispatches of experts to help develop the so-called Third World, and the 
training in Yugoslavia of experts from such countries was also robust, as “Yugoslavs saw their own 
economic system as different and as a potentially helpful model for other developing countries” 
(Bockman 2011, 81).  
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leaving, the policy suggested that such departures were to be exceptions and 
required additional approval from the authorities (Dobrivojević 2007, 93–94). 
Spurred by the growing economies and labor deficits of Western Europe, 
SFRY signed agreements on worker recruitment with France, Austria, Sweden, 
and the Federal Republic of Germany between 1965 and 1968. Just two years 
later there were over 800,000 Yugoslavs working abroad in these countries and 
others, according to official estimates.33 While the majority of Yugoslav workers 
remained in Europe, around 20 percent of those who went abroad through 
official channels crossed the ocean to such destinations as Australia, Canada, and 
the US (Dobrivojević 2007, 97). Of course, Yugoslavs also made their way abroad 
through the unofficial channels opened by kin networks, overstaying tourist visas, 
or crossing the border illegally. By some accounts, the number of Yugoslavs who 
became employed abroad through such “private initiative” was even greater than 
the number who did so through the bureau of employment (see Brunnbauer 
2009, 32–34; Dobrivojević 2007, 95).  
While the visa liberalization policy initially eased the effects of economic 
recession and rising unemployment, the increasing number of Yugoslavs seeking 
routes abroad had to be reconciled ideologically: if the Yugoslavia Dream was so 
accessible, why would emigration be attractive? Ideological reconciliation was 
accomplished by stressing the temporary nature of such migration, reflected in 
the official designation of such migrants as “workers temporarily employed 
abroad” (radnici na privremenom radu u inostranstvu) (see Bernard 2012, 3). 
                                                   
33 “Preko 800.000 Jugoslovena na Radu u Inostranstvu” (Over 800,000 Yugoslavs Working 
Abroad), Arhiv Jugoslavije, collection Savezni Savet za Obrazovanje i Kulturu, AJ-319-60-76. 
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However, as anthropologist Dragana Antonijević notes in her recent study on the 
cultural identity of Yugoslav guest workers, those recruited to Western Europe at 
this time muddied the conceptual distinction between temporary and permanent 
migrant (Antonijević 2013, 20). In the Yugoslav case, 43 percent of “workers 
temporarily employed abroad” through official channels remained abroad longer 
than five years, considered by the Yugoslav authorities as the critical tipping 
point beyond which the category of temporary worker blended into that of 
permanent migrant (Dobrivojević 2007, 97). As sociologist Vladimir Stanković 
put it, in particular in relation to overseas destinations, “it is clear that under the 
cloak of ‘temporary’ migration/stays abroad hides the phenomenon of our ‘new 
emigration’” (2014, 10).  
Not only did Yugoslavia’s labor migrants fail to remain only temporarily 
abroad, but they were also not overwhelmingly drawn from the ranks of the 
unemployed. The better-off regions of Slovenia and Croatia sent the most 
migrants, and according to official figures, in 1971 only 7.2 percent of workers 
abroad had been unemployed at home (Brunnbauer 2009, 31). This was not what 
officials had intended. The archives of the Federal Council for Education and 
Culture (Savezni savet za obrazovanje i kulturu) attest to growing concern with 
tracking and controlling migration. A 1969 Council document concedes that there 
was no realistic prospect of constricting migration in the near future, and,  
bearing that reality in mind, our task is to suppress what is bad in 
migratory movements abroad, what is negative for our country and our 
society, and to secure ground in favor of that which is positive. In this it is 
a fact that waves of emigration are widening and taking on dimensions 
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which we don’t know are fully in line with our aspirations in terms of 
foreign employment policy.34  
 
This statement demonstrates remarkable continuity with the contemporary 
concerns of migration management—reflecting recognition of the limitations of 
the state’s ability to effectively control the movement of people coupled with a 
pragmatic desire to “make the best” of these circumstances for the national good.  
To this end, the Council began to emphasize the political dimensions of the 
“problem” of migration, call for the establishment of a federal body to ensure the 
interests of the country in relation to external migration, and warn of the need for 
better accounting of trends so that both the “quality and quantity” of external 
migration could be followed and brought into line with the overall needs and 
interests of the country.35 As further testimony to mounting concern that the 
nature and scale of Yugoslav migration was spiraling out of federal control, the 
Council called for the implementation of a long-term policy in relation to 
Yugoslav workers abroad that would be based on a projection of the country’s 
future economic needs and human resources.36   
The feasibility of such a policy became negated by the geopolitical 
consequences of the first global oil crisis. The 1973 oil shock effectively halted 
recruitment of foreign workers by the West. At that time, at least 1.1 million 
                                                   
34 “O nekim aktuelnim i drugim pitanjima u vezi sa našim radnicima u inostranstvu” (On some 
current and other questions in relation to our workers abroad), p.1, Arhiv Jugoslavije, collection 
Savezni Savet za Obrazovanje i Kulturu, AJ-319-60-76. 
 
35 Ibid, pp.4–8. 
 
36 “Neka Pitanja i Problemi u Vezi sa Zapošljavanjem Jugoslovenskih Radnika u Inostranstvu” 
(Some Questions and Problems in Relation to the Employment of Yugoslav Workers Abroad), p.1, 
Arhiv Jugoslavije, collection Savezni Savet za Obrazovanje i Kulturu, AJ-319-60-76. 
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Yugoslavs, and likely many more, were living abroad (Dobrivojević 2007, 96).37 
Migration continued, but “deindustrialisation [in Yugoslavia] and restrictive 
entry policies in Western Europe favoured the flourishing of seasonal and 
informal recruitment of low-skilled migrants, mainly in the service sector, 
tourism, and construction” (Bernard 2019, 10). The unique circumstances that 
had permitted the flourishing of the guest-worker phenomenon meant that they 
“represent a specific, numerous, though heterogeneous group of people with an 
awareness of themselves and their status, and who others in their country of 
origin and work perceive as particular” (Antonijević 2013, 37–38). The Yugoslav 
guest worker had become a cultural as well as economic and political 
phenomenon. The Serbo-Croatian colloquialism gastarbajteri—from the German 
“gastarbeiter”—became synonymous with labor migrants and the rural 
sensibilities they were purported to possess. These connotations still resonate in 
popular culture and public consciousness across the former Yugoslavia. And, as I 
discuss below, gastarbajteri become drawn into the contemporary politics of 
brain drain as young potential migrants set their own plans and aspirations in 
opposition to this historical phenomenon.   
 
The Cultural Connotations of Gastarbajteri 
In the course of fieldwork, my husband and I enjoyed a one-week respite 
in Gothenburg, Sweden. Weary from a year of cultural adjustment, we had 
                                                   
37 On official attempts to prompt the return of these workers see Bernard 2012; Brunnbauer 
2009; Dobrivojević 2007, 97–99. 
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chosen the Nordic destination for its imagined contrast with Belgrade—an 
orderly, polite, clean town where we could enjoy efficient public transportation 
and breathe in some clean sea air. Gothenburg proved to be all these things, 
though it is also a Serbian diasporic hotspot (which accounts for the existence of 
the discount air route we took). After a restful week, we awaited our return to the 
reality of fieldwork among a boisterous and mostly Serbian crowd at the 
Gothenburg airport. Impossible to miss was a broad-shouldered older man, 
dressed in black jeans and a black t-shirt but loudly proclaiming a Serbian 
national identity via his chosen accessories. Two large gold crosses hung around 
his neck; gilded proclamations of Orthodoxy that hit at mid-belly. Though the 
crosses were tacky and ostentatious, my gaze was drawn to his hat: a fez-style 
round with two long black cords hanging from the back, adorned with the Serbian 
coat of arms. (We would soon discover that he had at least two other hats in his 
carry-on luggage to be put into rotation during the flight, both also displaying the 
Serbian coat of arms.) 
Already disruptive before boarding, the man proceeded, for the duration of 
our flight, to hold the middle section of the plane (at least those of us without 
earphones) hostage. His diatribe, performed in Serbian, began with an argument 
provoked with the older man in front of him, continued with him insistently 
addressing the child next to him until mother and child finally asked to be 
reseated, and crescendoed with the flight attendants begging him to be quiet as 
he more and more desperately searched for an audience to engage. I could 
discern no clear theme to his running commentary. The episode ended with the 
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police called to escort the man off the plane once we mercifully landed in 
Belgrade.   
We were met at the airport by Snežana, owner of a “pet taxi” that we called 
when we needed to collect our adopted dog. Responding to her eager interest in 
our trip I said, “well, the way back was a bit difficult because of one moron on our 
flight.” “One of ours?” (Jedan od naših?) she demanded to know. “Yes, yes,” I 
confirmed. Though I hadn’t yet provided any specifics about the disruptive 
gentleman’s appearance, attire, or behavior, Snežana immediately responded: 
“Aha, those are our famous gastarbajteri. They are the ones,” she continued, “who 
literally left to go clean toilets. The lower class.” She then launched into a tale of 
“one such encounter” she had herself had with a woman on a return flight from 
Germany whose demanding behavior she assessed to be uncultured and 
presumptive.  
The knee-jerk attribution of gastarbajter identity to anyone abroad 
presumed to be from the former Yugoslavia and exhibiting bad behavior, and the 
association of gastarbajteri with rural origins and peasant sensibilities, emerge 
from the empirical realties of this wave of migration combined with the cultural 
dynamics of the end of Yugoslavia. While they were not necessarily unemployed 
or the poorest of the poor, gastarbajteri had generally been agricultural workers. 
Nearly half had worked in farming, fishing, or forestry before leaving 
(Brunnbauer 2009, 29–30). They were also less educated than the average 
Yugoslav (Marković 2005, 149).38 They became known for raucous holiday visits 
                                                   
38 For shifts in the dominant regions of origin of gastarbajteri and how such shifts mapped 
domestic economic policy see Bernard 2019.  
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to their villages and towns of origin and for building ostentatious houses that 
stood as empty reminders of their newfound earning power (see Bratić and 
Malešević 1982). The sociocultural effects of this wave of emigration were 
profound. Such effects were also profoundly commented on in the rich repertoire 
of Yugoslav films produced about the gastarbajter phenomenon as part of what 
was, as noted in the WTF play, a thriving film industry.39 
Such films tended to narrowly typecast their gastarbajter protagonists. 
Historian Predrag Marković identifies two images of gastarbajteri that emerged 
in popular culture during socialism: “patronizing and pitiful,” and that of “comic 
hero.” In the first, Yugoslavia’s labor migrants were portrayed as “tragic victims 
of social and political development, doomed to wander between two worlds” 
(Marković 2005, 148). In the second trope, the gastarbajter lifestyle was added to 
the collection of characteristics of already existing comic heroes, layering 
nouveau riche attributes onto ethnic and peasant stereotypes (Marković 2005, 
150). This “comic hero” was a country bumpkin who haplessly tries to navigate 
cosmopolitan settings and values, or even worse, dismissively refuses to try.  
It is this latter association that colored Snežana’s commentary, which also  
signals the distance between a narrow employment-based notion of class and its 
postsocialist manifestations, with which class has become unhinged from its 
materialist base in significant ways (Fehérváry 2002, 2013; Patico 2008; Rivkin-
                                                   
 
39 Exemplars of this genre include Halo München (Hello Munich, 1968) directed by Krsto Papić, 
Ludi Dani (Crazy Days, 1977) directed by Nikola Babić, and Rani Snijeg u Münchenu (Early 
Snow in Munich, 1984) directed by Bogdan Žižić.  
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Fish 2009; Salmenniemi 2012). Though a cab driver, Snežana had also completed 
some higher education and was a business owner. She draws an implicit value-
laden distinction between this work and that of those who “left to go clean 
toilets.” But the story she elaborated, and the details I provided of my own, rely 
on a notion of class as signaled more faithfully by appearance, manner, and 
proper behavior than by profession. Together we affirmed class as referring “not 
to a demographically locatable category of people but to a set of moral and 
material aspirations and orientations” (Patico 2008, 134). Such subtle alignments 
between the moral, material, and professional—and the role of mobility as a 
class-constituting process—will be highlighted in the chapters to come. But 
Snežana’s derision toward gastarbajteri demands further explanation, as it points 
to the significance of the phenomenon for current debates about migration.  
 
The Politicized Urban-Rural Divide 
Contemporary attitudes toward the guest workers of socialist Yugoslavia 
index a loaded urban-rural divide. As elsewhere in Eastern Europe, a postwar 
wave of internal migration swelled the population of Belgrade such that in 1971 
less than 40 percent of the capital city’s population had been born there (Gordy 
1999, 105–106). A growing cosmopolitan sensibility coexisted with that of 
“peasant urbanites” (Simić 1973) who lived in makeshift housing and remained 
closely tied to their villages of origin. Musical taste became a prime differentiator 
of “real” urbanites from peasant urbanites. Eric Gordy explains how the 
gastarbajter and peasant urbanite appellatives began to meld through music:  
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Neofolk music achieved huge popularity among Yugoslav workers in other 
countries, who brought a taste for the music back to the provincial towns 
from which they came. The private taxi companies and cafes that many 
returning gastarbajteri opened helped to diffuse the music, which with 
time came to define the tastes of “peasant urbanites” as well. Reaching an 
audience ranging from the domestic provinces and workers’ colonies in 
other countries to the peripheries of large cities in Yugoslavia, neofolk 
became the best-selling and most widely diffused genre.40 (Gordy 1999, 
107–108)   
 
Neofolk stood in opposition to the rock music preferred by cosmopolitan 
urban youth. As the Yugoslav federation began to experience political and 
economic crisis in the 1980s and Slobodan Milošević rose through the ranks of 
the Communist Party, such markers of class became politicized. Neofolk became 
the “favorite genre” of the Milošević regime (Gordy 1999, 130) and quickly 
transmuted into the synthesized “turbofolk” that would be the soundtrack of the 
1990s (see Živković 2012; cf. Archer 2012). “Belgrade rokeri saw the neofolk 
ascendency not only as symbolizing a new equation of power and as narrowing 
the horizons of a younger generation. They saw it as affecting them directly, 
restricting the cultural space available to them” (Gordy 1999, 142). Music became 
a fault line in the contest over ownership of the city and the future of the country, 
clearly demarcating the “other Serbia” (druga Srbija) of anti-Milošević urban 
intellectuals from regime supporters (Fridman 2011; Omaljev 2013; Živković 
2012). Gastarbajteri were implicated in the latter category.  
As socialist Yugoslavia fragmented, the country’s temporary-turned-
permanent labor migrants became members of the Croatian, Slovenian, Serbian, 
                                                   
40 Gordy describes neofolk as “a hybrid form marrying the conventions of traditional folk songs 
with contemporary themes and also increasingly with contemporary instrumentation” (1999, 
107).  
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Bosniak, Macedonian, or Kosovar national diasporas (Marković 2005, 151). A 
good deal of attention has been trained on the role of national diasporas in 
materially and symbolically supporting nationalist movements in the former 
Yugoslav republics, Croatia in particular (though note that such diasporas also 
included the so-called “political migrants” who emigrated in the aftermath of 
World War II) (Skrbiš 1999; Winland 2002; see also Colic-Peisker 2009).41 The 
Yugoslav gastarbajter was no more because Yugoslavia was no more, and the 
politics of migration shifted even as temporary work abroad from each of the 
successor states of the former Yugoslavia continued in various forms.  
The history of mobility and migration during the “golden age” of Yugoslav 
socialism continues to inflect current debates in several ways. For one, it is telling 
that none of my interlocutors opted to set their own migratory aspirations in 
continuity with the gastarbajter phenomenon. The reasons are both geopolitical 
and otherwise: Firstly, Yugoslav migration was permitted by a specific set of 
geopolitical circumstances and state maneuvers, but it was also coded in the 
classed and politicized ways discussed above. Secondly, to the extent that 
potential migrants referenced the history of Yugoslav mobility at all, it was to 
affirm the normalcy of that key (classed) aspect of the Yugoslav Good Life: the 
ability to travel on par with citizens of the Western world but also the material 
and immaterial conditions to not want to leave.  
                                                   
41 In a recent article, historian Sara Bernard puts forth a compelling argument about how 
differential migration patterns from the various regions of Yugoslavia, and the dynamics of return 
migration following the 1973 and 1979 oil shocks in particular, “served to exacerbate pre-existing 
socio-economic regional disparities, which were themselves the reason for political divisions 
between the Yugoslav republics” (2019, 2).     
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After Socialist Yugoslavia: Entrapment and Escape 
As the scene about socialist Yugoslavia in What the Fuck are We Doing 
Here? concludes, the other actors leave Maja alone on stage for a musical number 
she later described to me as in the mold of Rage Against the Machine. She spits 
lyrics into the mic and onto the audience:  
Why was everything better in the past? 
Why did you fuck up my present so fast? 
Why the hell are we paying for your wars? 
Why the hell are my neighbors my foes? 
 
Where are my ideals? 
Where is my security? 
Where is my hope? 
Where is my identity? 
 
The last four lines are repeated several times. Through her terse lyrics, 
Maja demands the apparently unattainable: a moral compass, material and 
existential security, hope for the future, and a rooted and untarnished identity. 
Coming after the scene about the fairytale of Yugoslavia, it’s clear that this one is 
addressed to the last Yugoslavs, her parent’s generation. The song simmers with 
contempt toward those who lost the Yugoslav Dream. It also holds the frustration 
of knowing that things weren’t as perfect in the past as they appear in its 
retelling. For me, the number is also uncomfortable. It ends with several rounds 
of “fuck you” followed by a defeated “fuck me too.” It’s not until much later that I 
realize the song is cleverly titled “Fuck YU,” as in, Yugoslavia. But it also feels 
aimed at me as a foreigner, an American. Given the disproportionately large 
number of foreigners in the audience and the heavy-handed involvement of the 
international community in the region, I think it’s safe to say that the ambiguity 
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is intentional. This ambiguity reflects the broader ambivalent relationship of 
Serbia to the West, to the US in particular, and in particular relation to the 1999 
NATO bombing.  
In this section I trace some of the circumstances shaping these geopolitical 
relations in the recent past. My focus here is trained on those historical aspects 
that illuminate what anthropologist Stef Jansen (2009, 2012) glossed as the 
sense of “entrapment” that permeated life in Serbia during the 1990s, shaped 
aspirations and practices of mobility until 2009, and whose effects still ripple 
through contemporary talk of staying and leaving. This sense of entrapment was 
constructed in opposition to the relative ease of travel in socialist Yugoslavia; it 
was generated from the loss of this form of “normal” mobility. It was a product of 
the multiple wars that fractured Yugoslavia, the oppression of the warmongering 
regime of Slobodan Milošević, and the sanctions that severed ties between rump 
Yugoslavia and the international community. Below, I trace how these conditions 
developed while most of my interlocutors were young children. I explore how 
they impacted mobility and migration at the time, and how they continue to 
shape stances toward mobility and migration that run an affective gamut from 
the concoction of rage and resignation that infuses Maja’s lyrics above to a 
happy-go-lucky kind of youthful cosmopolitanism.    
 
Entrapment: 1992–October 5, 2000 
The United Nations (UN) and the European Community (EC) were the 
main multilateral actors attempting to resolve what became known as the 
“Yugoslav crisis” as war broke out in Croatia and then in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
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(BiH). Intensive media coverage familiarized publics around the world with 
scenes from the conflicts: busloads of displaced families scrambling to escape the 
rapidly expanding war zones; images of emaciated bodies and reports of mass 
rape at concentration camps; and the frustrated efforts of Red Cross, EC, and UN 
representatives to take meaningful humanitarian and peacekeeping action (see 
Engelberg and Sudetic 1992; Gow, Paterson, and Preston 1996). The news-
consuming global public was also familiarized with the term “ethnic cleansing,” 
the systematic, violent, forced removal of members of a specific ethnic group 
from a given territory (see Calic 2009, 115–151). In Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
ethnic cleansing was carried out by Serb forces against Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim) 
and Croat residents. Croat forces targeted Serbian residents in certain areas of 
Croatia as well as Bosniaks in Mostar and central Bosnia. To a very limited 
extent, Bosniak forces compelled the expulsion of Serbs from particular villages 
in BiH (Calic 2009, 116–117).         
In this frightful context economic and military sanctions were key tools of 
foreign policy wielded by the United States, the countries of Western Europe (and 
later the European Union), and the United Nations in their attempts to first 
prevent and later prompt an end to the wars that broke up the former Yugoslavia. 
In the complex diplomatic climate of the time, “sanctions became the tool of 
choice for Western policymakers who sought a low-cost, low-risk, punitive 
alternative to military force” (Stedman 1998, 181). In May 1992, the UN Security 
Council voted to impose sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
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(FRY) for non-compliance with a ceasefire agreement in BiH.42 UN Security 
Council Resolution 757 banned imports and exports from the country, halted 
financial transactions, grounded air traffic, prohibited athletes from FRY from 
participating in international sporting events, and “suspend[ed] scientific and 
technical cooperation and cultural exchanges and visits involving persons or 
groups officially sponsored by or representing the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia and Montenegro)” (UN Security Council, Resolution 757, 15).  
The European Community applied economic and diplomatic pressure of 
its own. In July 1991, the EC suspended trade with FRY in response to military 
aggression against Croatia and BiH. It also imposed an arms embargo, which was 
endorsed by the US. These sanctions stacked up with others and remained in 
place until the Dayton Peace Agreement was signed in November 1995, ending 
the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. But the reprieve was short-lived. FRY faced a 
fresh round of sanctions in 1998 as President Milošević sought to shore up his 
power through aggression against the ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo (see 
Gow 2009). This time, the European Union took a leading role:  
After years of equivocating half-steps, the European Union (E.U.) took 
measures against the Milošević government in mid-1998, banning 
investment in Serbia and flights by Yugoslav Airlines, and freezing Serbian 
and Yugoslav government funds abroad. In April 1999, after the 
commencement of NATO bombing, the E.U. significantly strengthened its 
sanctions and added an oil embargo against Yugoslavia and a visa ban on 
more than three hundred of Milošević’s political, military, and economic 
allies. (HRW 2000)  
 
                                                   
42 The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was comprised of Serbia and Montenegro after Slovenia, 
Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia all declared independence.  
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UN Security Council Resolution 1160 also reinstated the arms embargo 
and urged a political solution to the crisis. A political solution did come, but only 
after international military intervention. NATO launched a seventy-eight-day 
bombing campaign against FRY on March 24, 1999, controversial first and 
foremost because the organization did not wait for approval from the UN Security 
Council (which likely would have been blocked by Russia). The bombing targeted 
Serbia’s “military command and control communications network” (Gow 2009, 
320) as well as bridges and other public infrastructure—not entirely in 
compliance with international humanitarian law (HRW 2000). The Serbian 
government cites a death toll of 2,500 (including 631 members of the armed 
forces) but the exact number remains unknown (see HRW 2000; Nikolic 2016). 
The NATO bombing was highly controversial at the time both nationally 
and internationally, and even among Serbian antiwar activists, who took a variety 
of positions on the morality of the intervention (Fridman 2006, 111–115). The 
event remains subject to drastically divergent memory narratives and practices 
within Serbia (see Fridman and Rácz 2016; Nikolic 2016). Miloš, who I introduce 
in chapter 4, was eleven years old at the time. In a recent conversation he 
remembered “feeling that the whole world has united to bomb you, your little 
country.” I empathized that members of his generation were living the 
consequences of decisions that they weren’t old enough to have any part in 
making. “Yeah,” he said grimly, “we are collateral damage.”  
The NATO mission culminated in a military agreement by which FRY 
troops withdrew from Kosovo and NATO forces moved in with a peacekeeping 
mission. Milošević survived politically another year (some say bolstered by the 
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NATO campaign) before losing re-election and being forced out of office in the 
2000 October Revolution. Relations between FRY and the rest of the world 
immediately began to “normalize,” at least in the formal diplomatic sense. On 
September 10, 2001 the United Nations voted to lift the arms embargo, the last 
remaining international sanction in place against the country. 
 
The Everyday Life of Isolation 
For nearly a decade in Serbia and Montenegro, everyday reality was 
shaped by the climate of war, increasing isolation, and restrictions imposed by 
the international and multilateral sanctions described above. While sanctions are 
broadly remembered as a primary condition of the 1990s, the cumulative effect of 
this decade of sanctions is a matter of some debate. That Serbia’s population 
became impoverished during the 1990s is clear. For many, meeting daily needs 
became an ongoing struggle that contributed to a sense of resignation to the 
regime.43 But it is impossible to disentangle the effects of the sanctions from 
those of the breakup of the former Yugoslavia writ large (and consequent loss of 
trade relations between the republics), coupled with the end of socialism in the 
country and the economic crisis that had already begun to destabilize SFRY in the 
1980s. As has been well documented ethnographically, the end of socialism and 
waves of privatization that swept across the region resulted not only in increased 
income inequality but also dislodged familiar reference points of what it meant to 
be competent, cultured, and of respectable social standing (Patico 2008; Rivkin-
                                                   
43 See Gordy 1999, 192–198 for a compelling argument about how sanctions enabled the 
Milošević regime to consolidate power.  
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Fish 2009; Shevchenko 2009). The “mass intelligentsia” in particular—teachers, 
doctors, engineers—experienced a disorienting upending of their vocational 
status (Patico 2008; Shlapentokh 1999).  
Yet the conditions of war—including international sanctions and extreme 
hyperinflation—fundamentally shaped the Serbian experience of the end of 
socialism.44 One primary effect of this context not relevant elsewhere in the 
region was isolation. As noted in a report for UNICEF, “While not part of the 
stated intentions of sanctions, cultural and intellectual isolation was one of its 
major impacts” (Garfield 2001, 13). Financial sanctions froze pension payments 
and household remittances from abroad. Serbia was cut off from the 
international mail system. And, outside urban areas, independent media was 
marginalized to the extent that state-run media became the only accessible 
source of information (see Gordy 1999, 61–101). Eastern European countries 
followed the example of the West in severing ties, the benefits of Council of 
Europe membership were rescinded (including recognition of Yugoslav 
diplomas), and educational access to the Serbian diaspora was impeded (Djokić 
1993, 11–13).  
In the meantime, the European Union was founded in 1993 (out of the 
European Economic Community) and the Schengen convention, guaranteeing 
free movement within its area, was expanded and incorporated into the 
framework of the EU. While Schengen opened up the internal borders of Europe, 
                                                   
44 See Lampe 2000, 399–404 for discussion of the interaction between international sanctions 
and hyperinflation.  
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the EU’s external borders were fortified (see Andersson 2014). Because of this 
changing context as well as the evolving conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the visa policies of countries to which Serbs might be inclined to 
immigrate were in flux as well.45 In 1995, only the neighboring countries of Italy 
and Hungary did not require visas of citizens of any of the republics of the former 
Yugoslavia. However, entry was effectively halted as in addition to flights, busses 
with Yugoslav plates or carrying Yugoslav passengers were banned from crossing 
into Europe.  
As the country hunkered down for what would be nearly a decade of war, 
opportunities for mobility as well as migration dried up—while at the same time 
the increasing isolation compelled the young and educated to leave. This central 
contradiction is highlighted by FRY’s ambassador to the United Nations, 
Dragomir Djokić, in a 1993 letter to that body:  
Almost all specialization opportunities for our experts in foreign countries 
have been suspended (particularly the most important forms of 
specialization, postgraduate studies, etc.) since these forms of cooperation 
were mainly based on international agreements….At least over 500 
Yugoslav scientists and young experts availed themselves of foreign 
specialization opportunities arising from various inter-state agreements 
and programmes....Such a situation induced a large number of young 
experts to decide to go abroad which, on the one hand, dealt a serious blow 
to many Yugoslav institutions (experts leaving their jobs) and, on the 
other, our plans for the future (emigration of students who have just 
graduated especially in industries very much needed by our economy).46 
(Djokić 1993, 16) 
 
                                                   
45 The Benelux countries introduced a visa requirement for all residents of the former Yugoslavia 
in 1992 (later lifted for Slovenian passport holders). Switzerland also introduced a similar visa 
requirement in 1992 that was soon relaxed for Bosnians with relatives in the country. As of 1995, 
Austria, Germany, Sweden, and Norway all required visas for citizens of FR Yugoslavia 
(Humanitarian Issues Working Group 1995).  
 
46 Special thanks to Tamara Belenzada for bringing this source to my attention.  
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How were “young experts” able to “avail themselves of foreign 
specialization opportunities” if “almost all” such opportunities had been 
suspended? Such departures were enabled by a patchwork of programs that 
remained accessible for the savvy and well connected. Though the UN sanctions 
appeared to clearly prohibit all “scientific, technical, and cultural” exchanges, “in 
practice each government and many organizations made their own interpretation 
of intellectual and communications policy regarding sanctions, making this 
isolation arbitrary and unpredictable” (Garfield 2001, 62).47 In this context, 
leaving increasingly became seen as a privilege of those with access to the right 
connections and funds (see Fridman 2016, 449).  
Perhaps even more significant were the illegal routes abroad, particularly 
for young men motivated by an all-too-real fear of being mobilized for war. At the 
time, a year-long military service was compulsory for every eighteen-year-old 
male. As war broke out in Croatia, BiH, and later in Kosovo, thousands of young 
men began living in fear of mobilization and either went into hiding or sought to 
avoid the fate of the battlefield by crossing the border into Hungary. Such 
movements occurred despite the fact that for the better part of 1992 as well as 
between February and July 1999 it was illegal for men of fighting age (eighteen to 
sixty) to leave the country.48  
                                                   
47 For example, while the German Humbolt and US Fulbright scholarship programs were 
suspended, Yugoslavs could still take advantage of opportunities to study abroad through the EU 
Socrates and Erasmus programs (Garfield 2001, 62). 
 
48 My gratitude goes to Bojan Aleksov for his input on this phenomenon, about which there is 
little scholarship. See Aleksov 2012 for an autoethnographic account of antiwar activism and 
military service on the eve of war.  
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If mobility and migration had not been politicized before they certainly 
were now. Emigration became a front line in the battle over what kind of country 
Serbia was and was becoming; between the Milošević regime and its political 
opposition; between mainstream society and the “other Serbia.” A New York 
Times article from May 1993, titled “Yugoslavia Losing the Highly Skilled,” ends 
with this quote from former Belgrade mayor Bogdan Bogdanović: “The 
emigrants, who are urban and sophisticated, are being replaced by narrow-
minded hillbillies from Bosnia and from the countryside. They are imposing a 
new cultural model here, not just because they want to live in an ethnically pure 
country but because they have such a limited view of society and the world” 
(Kinzer 1993). There is a parallel to be found with contemporary Putin-era 
rhetoric in Russia that posits “talent as a form of cultural patrimony that has 
been cruelly snatched” (Hemment 2015, 119) through historical waves of 
emigration. But in Serbia the party responsible for the “snatching” of talented 
youth during the 1990s is imagined as a tangle of both internal and external 
forces. This recent past has left an indelible impression on contemporary debates 
about mobility and migration. Laminated onto the dual memory of “normal” and 
gastarbajter mobilities in SFRY, it marks the topic as fraught with classed 
concern over who is left to make the future of the country.  
 
Still Isolated: 2001–2009 
Those who stayed in Serbia during the early 2000s experienced the vertigo 
induced by the country’s seemingly simultaneous backward and forward 
trajectories. As one decade stretched into the next, the sense that little had 
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changed since the Milošević years only became cemented in place among the 
urban middle classes. While sanctions had been lifted, restrictive visa regimes 
were still very much in place in the early 2000s. Those who set their sights on an 
immigrant visa made their way to the Western embassy in Belgrade where they 
deemed they had the best chance of success based on solid family connections 
abroad or language, technical, and other skills. But even scholars wanting to 
attend a conference across the border needed generous amounts of resources, 
luck, and fortitude to endure the process. Would-be travelers from Serbia—both 
those seeking temporary and permanent routes abroad—discovered that the 
weary task of waiting in line for a visa had not significantly eased. The perpetual 
lines of visa-seekers that formed outside Western embassies became a symbol of 
Serbia’s incomplete break with the past and its uncertain European future. As 
Jansen argues, the visa queues produced a sense of “entrapment” and national 
humiliation that indexed the loss of the geopolitical status enjoyed by socialist 
Yugoslavia (Jansen 2009, 2012; see also Greenberg 2010). The desire to “escape” 
such entrapment continued to serve as the dominant idiom of mobility 
throughout the 2000s (Erdei 2010). These arguments resonated with my own 
experience as an activist in Serbia in 2003–2005, when the desire to “escape 
entrapment” in the country seemed a perfect way to describe the aspirations of 
those who felt at odds with the sociopolitical climate of the time. 
Meanwhile, a campaign to abolish the wartime visa regimes was gathering 
steam in the mid-2000s. While NGOs and private citizens played an important 
role in this effort, the relaxing of Europe’s restrictive visa regime was folded into 
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Serbia’s long and ongoing path toward joining the European Union.49 In order to 
join what became known as the “white Schengen list”—the list of countries whose 
nationals are not required to have a visa to enter the EU—Serbia’s practices in 
relation to migration needed a total overhaul. In 2008 Serbia received a 
“roadmap” to visa liberalization from the EU that included forty-two criteria to be 
met over four categories of necessary reform: document security (passports 
needed to be converted to biometric), illegal migration, public order and security, 
and foreign relations in relation to the movement of people (Group 484 2009, 2). 
Given the political urgency of the issue and the diplomatic groundwork that had 
already been laid, Serbia quickly met the requirements.50 On December 19, 2009 
the first Serbian citizens since the breakup of the former Yugoslavia crossed the 
border with Hungary, now a European Union border, legally, without a visa. 
Widely narrated as a return to the “normal” mobility of socialist Yugoslavia, the 
lifting of EU travel restrictions also signaled restoration of the most fundamental 
conditions for the country’s European future. Reflecting the severity of the pariah 
status Serbia had accrued, the headline in der Spiegel declared: “EU welcomes 
‘Leper of Europe’ back into the Fold” (Mayr 2009). Three days later, Serbia 
officially applied for EU membership.  
                                                   
49 Serbia became part of the EU’s “Stabilisation and Association Process” (SAP) established in 
1999 (along with the other six states—Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Albania, 
Montenegro, and Kosovo—that became known as the “Western Balkans”). The 2003 summit of 
the European Council in Thessaloniki confirmed that all SAP countries are potential candidates 
for EU membership. See: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/countries/detailed-
country-information/serbia_en.  
 
50 In July 2009 the European Commission amended European Council Regulation 539 originally 
passed in 2001 to place Serbia (along with Montenegro and Macedonia) on the “positive” list of 
countries whose nationals do not need visas to cross into the EU. See: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32001R0539. 
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The Normalization of Mobility 
The 2009 reinstatement of visa-free travel to Europe was of historic 
significance for Serbian citizens. After more than a decade of international 
isolation, the change symbolically placed the country “on the road to normal,” as 
Jessica Greenberg (2011) put it. No longer compelled to stand in endless lines 
and explain themselves to suspicious embassy personnel, Serbs were now free to 
tour Europe and elsewhere on nearly equal status with the Western world. While 
formidable barriers to migration remain for Serbian citizens, they can now travel 
visa-free to 115 countries (Henley & Partners 2016), compared with only eighteen 
countries in 2008. 
International leisure travel is economically viable for only a narrow sliver 
of the population. But the restoration of “normal” mobility also allowed a host of 
international educational opportunities to expand that had been previously 
limited. While one has to be proactive and ambitious to take advantage of these 
opportunities, one need not be rich. To my surprise, in reviewing my data I 
realized that every single person with whom I conducted an in-depth interview or 
who joined a focus group (forty-nine in total) had traveled internationally 
(discounting travel to the ex-Yugoslav republics) regardless of their current plans 
to stay or leave Serbia. While I did not systematically collect this data point for all 
those I encountered during participant observation in coworking and 
entrepreneurial spaces, I nevertheless gained the impression that the young 
entrepreneurs and “returnees” of Belgrade were some of the most well-traveled 
folks one could meet.  
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Where had my interlocutors been and how had they gotten there? They 
had spent time in the US as high school students through the A-SMYLE program 
(now Flex) sponsored by the Department of State, or a few months in a variety of 
service positions through the Work and Travel scheme.51 They had traveled 
across Europe through Erasmus student and volunteer exchanges, AIESEC 
volunteer and internship opportunities, and other professional development 
programs specific to their interests.52 They had also visited relatives scattered 
across the globe, but the opportunities afforded by the student life featured most 
prominently. When I asked one architecture student named Filip where he had 
traveled through BEST, a pan-European network of technology students, he 
explained: “Well, since BEST is a European organization, only in Europe.” (He 
had also completed a seven-month internship in India through the European 
Voluntary Service.) He added, “I generally went to countries that are here 
somewhere close, since I personally didn’t have a lot of money to travel.” As was 
                                                   
51 A-SMYLE sponsors international students to complete a year in a US high school, and became 
active in Serbia and Montenegro (then one country) in 2005. 700 students have participated in 
the program over the past ten years. See: http://www.americancouncils.org/programs/asmyle-
program. The Summer Work Travel (SWT) program allows full-time university students to spend 
a summer in the US working, with a month built in for travel. While the A-SMYLE program is 
fully funded by the US Department of State, SWT can entail significant up-front costs (agency and 
visa fees), but participants then earn generally minimum wage at their US-based positions. See: 
http://j1visa.state.gov/programs/summer-work-travel#participants. 
 
52 Serbia began participating in Tempus/Erasmus programming in 2000. Since 2007, Serbian 
students can participate in Erasmus Mundus programs and scholarships. These multiple 
programs became folded into the Erasmus+ framework in 2013, coordinated by Foundation 
Tempus. Erasmus+ also includes the European Voluntary Service, which provides support for 
youth to volunteer in organizations around the world for a period of two to twelve months. See: 
http://erasmusplus.rs/erasmus-office-in-serbia/. AIESEC is a postwar European network focused 
on student leadership development. It has been active in Serbia/Yugoslavia since 1952. In 
addition to local activities, the organization sponsors volunteer trips abroad of six to eight weeks 
and longer paid professional development trips. See: http://aiesec.org.rs/. 
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not unusual among my interlocutors, Filip’s family could hardly be considered 
privileged: his mother was a baker, his father a craftsman, and money was always 
tight. But as he began to list the countries he had visited my face registered 
amazement: 
I, I don’t know, I went to these neighboring countries: Hungary, Bulgaria, 
I went to Lithuania, actually, Latvia, this year I went to Portugal, Greece, 
and that’s that. I passed through some other countries but those don’t 
count. Oh! And I’ve been to Poland…generally, that central Europe, but I 
didn’t travel only through BEST but also through other organizations.  
 
Filip explained that many student organizations such as BEST function 
similarly in that the organization covers room and board while the traveler pays 
for transportation. With the student discounts available for train and bus travel 
he was able to scrape together funds for these excursions. And his experience was 
not unusual. According to the 2014 survey of doctoral students conducted 
annually by Doktoranti Srbije, 68 percent of respondents had traveled abroad in 
connection to their doctoral work, with nearly half of these trips made possible by 
a scholarship from the government of the country to which they traveled. The 
remaining students reported that their travel had been supported by a 
scholarship from a domestic or foreign foundation, the Serbian Ministry of 
Education, the Erasmus program, a private company, or through their own funds. 
The doctoral students surveyed overwhelmingly considered such international 
opportunities important for their work (DS 2015, 22–23).53  
                                                   
53 Interestingly, despite the fact that such a large percentage of respondents had had the chance 
to travel internationally, an almost equal number considered their chances for participating in 
such study tours, exchanges, and conferences abroad to be “average or poor” as did “good.”  
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When I asked Slobodan Radičev, president of the network, about these 
responses he foregrounded the previous isolation that many of today’s advanced 
students had felt so acutely: 
Look, I think that for the great majority of youth in Serbia…that chance to 
go beyond the border is very important.…today’s doctoral students, those 
are people who are, let’s say, between twenty-five or twenty-six and thirty-
two or thirty-three years old, and they have spent half their lives in a 
country that was isolated from all sides. It was practically impossible to go 
further than 200 kilometers from Belgrade without needing a visa. 
 
Slobodan continued to describe how, when he began his college education in 
2001, he was compelled to amass an extraordinary number of documents, come 
up with something like 200 euros, and face the possibility of rejection, just for the 
chance to travel to a European conference. While Serbian students remained 
isolated during the first decade of the 2000s, emphasis on the free circulation of 
students—and eventually labor—began to grow throughout Western Europe (see 
Wright and Rabo 2010). As for Greenberg’s interlocutors—students pushing for 
higher education reform in the early 2000s—the emergent emphasis placed on 
youth mobility by EU institutions meant that “older associations with travel in 
the socialist period” became linked to “very new meanings of mobility as essential 
to European identity” (2011, 97).54  
 
Generation Isolation/Cosmopolitanism 
Generation is a notoriously ambiguous category. Its importance in relation 
to other categories like class, education, and gender, as well as relevance for 
                                                   
54 While academic mobility certainly acquired new meanings after the formation of the European 
Union, there is also a much longer history of Eastern European intellectuals studying in the 
centers of Europe (see Bieber and Heppner 2015; Bondžić 2011). As one friend casually reminded 
me, “all the important Serbian scientists studied abroad.”  
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understanding processes of social change, has been called into question (McCourt 
2012). But by and large, the formative generational experience of the “children of 
the 1990s” in Serbia was the 1999 NATO bombing of their country. This is a 
marker with political and affective coding distinct from the experience of peers in 
neighboring Bosnia and Herzegovina whose lifetimes were “fractured into three 
time frames: before, during, and after the war” (Čengić 2017, 60).  
These fine-grained geopolitical and generational distinctions became 
clearer as I talked to Maja from WTF about the significance of socialist 
Yugoslavia for her generation. She responded that it’s a complicated topic she 
could talk about for days. The actors had decided to include this theme in the play 
for several reasons, most notably to convey “the significance of that country for 
people who live here” to foreigners who would attend the performance. Maja 
continued, “and we thought that it was really important for them, as well as for 
our process of story development, to mention that relationship with Yugoslavia, 
that is of course somehow more now that general place to which people return 
when they talk about why things are the way they are in the country today.” As 
she mused:  
it serves more as the real framework in which we grew up, because, we 
really grew up in that—I mean, in Belgrade we were protected, but people 
from Sarajevo or Republika Srpska or Bosnia, they literally grew up in war, 
and we simply could not disregard that part of our past that impacts our 
future....I was born in a country that ceased to exist by my fifth birthday. 
And then they later bombed that new country (i onda su nam kasnije 
bombardovali tu zemlju koja je novonastala). So, in essence, it was 
important as a kind of benchmark for our positioning in relation to the 
present. 
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At the end of this comment, I’m no longer clear what “it” is that serves as a 
benchmark for Maja. In querying the importance of socialist Yugoslavia, I had 
had in mind the country’s “golden age,” cast in the play as a fairytale. But in 
reviewing our transcript I realized that this is not the Yugoslavia Maja references 
in the quote above. Her generation grew up during the Milošević years, in 
wartime Yugoslavia, as the country fell apart and “rump Yugoslavia” emerged. 
And then they were bombed. The war years of sanctions, hyperinflation, 
isolation, and international condemnation—epitomized by the US-led NATO 
bombing of Serbia in 1999—was a much closer past for my interlocutors than the 
heyday of socialist Yugoslavia. So while Maja demurred from my immediate line 
of questioning, our conversation did in fact reveal some of the significance of 
socialist Yugoslavia for the “children of the 1990s.” 
What Maja diplomatically glossed as “and then they later bombed that new 
country,” other interlocutors were more direct about. When I met with Darko I 
didn’t realize that he was born and still lived in Pančevo, and had taken the train 
(about a thirty-minute ride) to Belgrade after work just to meet with me. When I 
apologized, saying that I would have been happy to make the trek to Pančevo, he 
responded, “Well, Serbs are polite, Americans aren’t, you bombed us!” (Pa Srbi 
su polite, Americanci nisu, vi ste nas bombardovali!) We were at a street corner 
waiting for the light to change and I quickly looked over at him, startled by this 
response. I chuckled uneasily as he added, “sorry, I had to.”  
One final example illustrates how this formative experience is kept alive in 
generational memory and enters into conversations with American 
anthropologists: lingering over coffee one afternoon, a friend in her late twenties 
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described the NATO bombing with something close to nostalgia. “You wouldn’t 
believe it,” she said, “the bombings were great.” She described a sense of 
camaraderie and community—how there would be a crowd outside her apartment 
building “and we would have one pack of cigarettes and all share; one beer and 
pass it around.” She relished the humor that sustained Belgradians during that 
time—a dark spitefulness that compelled locals to sing as they crossed bridges on 
the bus. Laughing, she concluded, “we are like cockroaches, you can’t kill us.”55 
My youngest interlocutors did not quite share these same associations. 
While they were also usually swept into the generational category of “children of 
the 1990s,” those in their early twenties at the time of my research had not been 
shaped by the experience of national isolation to the same extent as their older 
peers. Take, for example, two focus group participants: Boris and Milica, ages 
twenty and twenty-two. Boris was from a town in the south of Serbia and had just 
arrived in Belgrade to study Greek language and literature, which he had become 
fascinated by on a family vacation to Greece. Milica was an economics student, 
specializing in statistics, originally from a town in the eastern part of the country. 
Both had spent a year in the US as high school exchange students—an exceptional 
experience, for sure, enabled by the A-SMYLE program sponsored by the US 
Department of State.56  
Both were cheerful, friendly, and eager to show off their English-language 
skills. When I broached the topic of how their parents see the question of them 
                                                   
55 Fridman’s 2016 analysis of memories of the NATO bombing catalogues a diversity of narratives 
that feature humor, camaraderie, and pride alongside fear and confusion. 
 
56 I had connected with them because of this experience, as the program is administered by 
American Councils, one of the funders of my fieldwork. 
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staying or leaving Serbia, Boris replied that he got the sense that many Serbian 
parents did encourage their kids to leave, his own included. Nevertheless, he said 
“what I would like to do is to live abroad, in multiple countries, and then come 
back to live here.” Milica agreed: “I’ll probably do the same thing that he said—I’ll 
leave for a few years just to experience things, to travel, to be able to work 
different things, to switch jobs until I figure out what I actually want to do, and 
then come back here and do it.” Laughing, she added, “Because, in my personal 
case, I really do love Serbia if we put aside all the bad things.”  
Such a cosmopolitan stance toward mobility is as ordinary for the younger 
“children of the 1990s” as it would have been unfathomable for those of 
Slobodan’s cohort, just ten years senior. Note that there is no mention by Boris or 
Milica of the very real material barriers to mobility. Their aspirations are lofty 
and youthful. They were aware of “all the bad things” about their country, and the 
fact that many young people, with their parents’ blessing, plan a future elsewhere. 
And yet, for them, living elsewhere and returning to Serbia—if they like—seemed 
like realistic and realizable aspirations. They had already had remarkable 
experiences of international mobility and found no reason to not expect similar 
opportunities to be open to them in the future.  
Writing primarily about conditions in the early 2000s, Greenberg argued 
that “in postsocialist Serbia, aspirations of normalcy…orient their subjects 
temporally toward socialist Yugoslavia” (2011, 89). At the time of my research, 
ten years later, the Yugoslav Good Life was not a spatiotemporal configuration 
about which my interlocutors spoke longingly. Though the loss of all that SFRY 
stood for was occasionally grieved in our conversations, it was just as common for 
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my interlocutors’ eyes to glaze a bit at my mention of the socialist past. When I 
excitedly remarked on the interesting documents I was perusing in the Archives 
of Yugoslavia, the friend who spoke energetically about the NATO bombing 
turned away with a shrug, saying “Yugoslavia was my mother’s country.”  
What I want to emphasize is that conditions in Serbia can no longer be 
described as ones of entrapment breeding desires for escape—nor as an 
“abnormal” situation informed primarily by memories of socialist Yugoslav 
“normalcy” that included relatively unfettered mobility. The 2009 shift in the 
conditions of possibility of travel also marked a shift away from the idiom of 
escape and toward more nuanced stancetaking in relation to leaving. My 
interlocutors had had experiences of travel that would have been impossible a 
decade earlier. While such adventures were still remarkable in many ways, they 
had become commonplace among the young and educated. By the time of my 
research, expectations—not only of “normal mobility” but of “normalcy” more 
generally—had become more and more often calibrated against personal 
experiences of real-life travel. In chapters 4, 5, and 6 I explore the consequences 
of this shift, drawing out the significance of prior experiences of mobility for the 
future plans and aspirations of young potential migrants in Serbia. But I first turn 
to the political economy that shapes the contemporary concern of brain drain.  
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CHAPTER 3 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BRAIN DRAIN: YOUTH 
(UN)EMPLOYMENT AND EXPECTATIONS OF DIGNIFIED WORK 
 
In late February 2015, Vanja Udovičić, the Serbian minister of youth and 
sport, began a series of visits to companies to launch a new youth employment 
initiative. In front of news cameras at Air Serbia, the recently privatized national 
airline, he explained the impetus for the nascent program: “Our wish is to find 
the right way to prevent youth from leaving the country; to prevent them after 
university from thinking to trade in their student IDs (indeksi) for passports and 
to seek happiness elsewhere, instead of staying in their hometowns and 
improving the economy of Serbia and their towns.” He elaborated that the 
purpose of such company visits was “to confirm which positions are sought after 
in Serbia, what the criteria are for employing youth, and how we can contribute 
to the creation of quality human resources (kadrovi) together” (Ministry of Youth 
and Sport 2015b). Aleksandar Vulin, minister for labor, employment, veteran, 
and social policy, added: “Our job is to keep young people here, to make Serbia 
for them a place of worthwhile effort and hope for staying (da im Srbiju učinimo i 
mestom vrednom truda, nade ostanka). That’s the job of the whole government 
and society, and we won’t succeed without companies like Air Serbia. That’s why 
we are here, so they can tell us what the state needs to do so that they can more 
easily hire young people” (BizLife 2015). In the press releases for eight such visits 
to national and multinational companies around Serbia, the purpose was always 
situated in relation to the goal of slowing the country’s brain drain.  
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The comments of Udovičić and Vulin position them—representatives of 
the state—as benevolent brokers between employers and their potential youthful 
workforce, ready to listen to the needs of the private sector and step up as 
partners in the effort to improve the quality of “human resources” available on 
the market. Such a framing establishes the main underlying cause of youth 
unemployment as a mismatch between the skills of youth and the needs of the 
market. The logical leap that Vulin makes is to suggest that were this alleged 
discrepancy resolved, Serbia would be transformed into “a place of worthwhile 
effort and hope for staying” and the migration of educated youth would be 
stemmed, as recent graduates find easy employment in the private sector—or 
better yet, start their own businesses—and contribute to the economic 
development of Serbian towns rather than foreign ones.  
This chapter will interrogate these claims. The broader context is one of 
global anxiety over the fate of “talent”—the conditions by which the skilled 
worker will reach or waste his or her full potential. Concern over talent becomes 
contoured domestically via linkages to ideologies of state and nation. In China, 
Lisa Hoffman (2010) has shown how the cultivation of talent prompted the 
emergence of an urban professional subjectivity in China. There, specific 
“reform-era” practices of governance fuse a Maoist-era ethics of care and concern 
for the national future with neoliberal technologies. In Russia, Julie Hemment 
(2015) has unraveled the multiple logics of Putin-era youth projects, including a 
state-affiliated summer camp that urged youth to “commodify their talent” for 
the national good. As these examples also demonstrate, formidable state 
involvement does not predict the outcome or reception of such projects. In 
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Serbia, the official approach to youth unemployment, including efforts to 
cultivate talent and prevent brain drain, have been ad hoc at best and universally 
derided by my young interlocutors. The series of company visits by the Ministry 
of Youth and Sport, described above, is a case in point. The project was to include 
visits to twenty to thirty companies. It appears that only eight actually took place, 
without clear follow-up.57  
The context is also one in which the intense international oversight of the 
past decades has been funneled, in recent years, toward the singular goal of EU 
membership, lending an outsized role to EU institutions, funding, and law.58 As 
Michel-Rolph Trouillot has argued, “in the era of globalization state practices, 
functions, and effects increasingly obtain in sites other than the national but that 
never fully bypass the national order” (2003, 89). So while it is important to hold 
an analytical view of the state in a “transnational frame” (Sharma and Gupta 
2006, 28), the context is such that it is simultaneously crucial to attend to how 
the state is both imagined and practiced, and thereby constructed, at the level of 
the everyday and through processes that are decidedly mundane (Mitchell 1999). 
The economic processes described below are directed from the multiple scales of 
governance that characterize postsocialist and postwar Serbia. 
                                                   
57 Press releases for just eight such visits were published on the website of the Ministry for Youth 
and Sport, and it’s not clear why further visits did not occur. The companies visited were: Air 
Serbia, Microsoft, Bambi (a snack food company), Neoplant (a meat processing company), IBM, 
Coca-Cola Hellenic, Sunoko (a sugar producer), and Holcim (producer of construction material).  
 
58 Since 2007, European Union funding to candidate and potential candidate countries has been 
channeled through “IPA,” the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance, with the goal of bringing 
these countries in line with the “European standards” detailed in the acquis communautaire, or 
body of European Union law that must be adhered to by each member state.  
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In this chapter I outline the political economy of brain drain, homing in on 
the link posited between emigration and unemployment. I examine the approach 
to youth unemployment articulated in political discourse, codified in official 
strategies, and implemented through ministry-sponsored programs. How is the 
issue of unemployment conceptualized, where is the problem located, and how 
are interventions targeted? I tack back and forth between responses to this 
question as found in official strategies and public relations stunts like the Air 
Serbia visit, local scholarship that offers a critical perspective on Serbia’s political 
economy, and discussions with employment experts.  
In the first section below, I build on the historical context established in 
the previous chapter to more specifically sketch the economic trajectory of Serbia 
since the 1990s, including the effects of privatization. I next explore the country’s 
overreliance on foreign direct investment (FDI), drawing on interviews with 
several economic experts in the field of youth unemployment in order to interpret 
the impacts of this practice. I show how the government’s focus on the 
(un)employment rate and FDI—partially attributable to the overarching political 
goal of EU accession—feeds the long-standing condition of “jobless growth.” 
These circumstances, in turn, facilitate a policy focus on “the unemployed 
individual” that allows the government to eschew responsibility for the more 
complex concern of job creation while cloaking the underlying issues in 
moralizing discourses of work. Finally, via an in-depth interview with two young 
sisters, I turn to the lived reality of youth looking for work. This section picks up 
the theme of complex mobility stances to bring into relief the expectations for 
dignified work voiced by young potential migrants and how such expectations fit 
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within broader visions of the future, at home or abroad. Here, I follow Millar 
(2017) in outlining the specific conditions of work encountered by my 
interlocutors and how such conditions give rise to particular material and 
affective responses.  
 
From Market Socialism to Neoliberal Capitalism 
The political economy of socialist Yugoslavia was a unique blend of 
socialist ideology, market mechanisms, and consumer culture—from its non-
aligned status to worker self-management, it was distinctive from the rest of the 
Eastern bloc.59 The nature of Yugoslavia’s “workers’ self-management,” the 
political and economic crises building in the country throughout the 1980s, the 
peculiar rise of Slobodan Milošević, and the context of war and international 
isolation precipitated by his rule, all set up the processes of deindustrialization 
and privatization familiar throughout the postsocialist world to play out 
somewhat differently in Serbia—even if the resulting worker disenfranchisement 
and impoverishment were similarly experienced. In the late 1980s, the 
Communist Party, under Milošević’s leadership, “brought the liberal economic 
impulses of worker self-management in line with the neoliberal spirit of the day” 
(Musić 2015, 16). Market mechanisms were allowed greater influence under the 
guise of expanding workers’ self-management.60 The free-market restructuring to 
                                                   
59 Several recent volumes have reexamined the economic entanglements of market impulses with 
socialist ideology in SFRY and their postsocialist consequences (e.g. Bockman 2011; Jelača, 
Kolanović, and Lugarić 2017; Patterson 2011). 
 
60 “Workers’ self-management” was the central principle of Yugoslav socialism that set it apart 
from Soviet and Eastern European socialisms. At least in theory, self-management decentralized 
control of the economy, with elected workers’ councils overseeing the operation of firms. In 
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come under the banner of “transition” was thus rooted in the “inherently hybrid 
system” (Jelača, Kolanović, and Lugarić 2017, 3) of socialist Yugoslavia.  
 The international sanctions imposed against the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia and the context of war would also shape the processes of privatization 
to come. While Serbia adopted its first law on privatization in 1991, modeled on 
federal Yugoslav legislation passed the year before, hyperinflation and 
generalized economic decline compelled Milošević to slow down privatization 
efforts and re-nationalize key industries (Z. Ristić 2004). State workers remained 
partially shielded from the worst effects of sanctions and hyperinflation by 
heavily subsidized bread and oil distributed through the state union, and 
discounts on medicine, electricity, and heat. Trade in the gray economy and self-
provisioning for those with village connections filled in the gaps for many (Musić 
2015, 21–22). As factories limped through the decade, the “Serbian working class 
succeeded in avoiding a direct hit from the ‘shock therapy’ that spread through 
Eastern Europe, but such that the alternative was a slow death by a thousand 
cuts” (Musić 2015, 23). As the socialist working and middle classes blurred 
together via practices of consumption and mobility (see Kojanić 2015), this 
observation is broadly applicable. With Milošević still at the helm and NATO 
bombing the country, by 1999 Serbia’s economy was half its 1989 size and 
hampered by an enormous debt burden (Upchurch and Marinković 2011, 232). 
                                                   
practice, managers tended to maintain a great deal of authority, and centralized planning was 
never completely abandoned. Self-management was implemented tentatively, and although it 
opened the door for the introduction of market mechanisms it is important to note that “Yugoslav 
socialism was…not a blend of capitalism and socialism but rather a mixture of socialist-style 
economic management with elements of a market economy” (Patterson 2011, 30n18). For a 
comprehensive analysis of Yugoslav self-management and its consequences, see Woodward 1995. 
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The “Triple Transition” 
In the former Yugoslavia “transition” thus became not only an effort to 
exorcise the ghosts of the socialist past but also those of the ethnic wars of the 
1990s. This has been referred to as the “triple transition” from conflict to peace, 
from socialism to democracy, and from a centralized to market economy 
(McMahon 2002, 18). The region became a prime site for the codification of 
democratization and nation-building practices implemented around the globe by 
multilateral agencies and NGOs (Brown 2006, 8; Coles 2007, 240–245).  
An influx of humanitarian aid first arrived in the former Yugoslavia as the 
wars in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina wound down (BCSDN 2012, 11). 
BiH, in particular, was an early site of the standardization of techniques of 
democracy promotion. Billions of dollars were pledged by the international 
community to help the postwar reconstruction effort, with more than $100 
billion spent in BiH during the 1990s (McMahon 2002, 19). Though much of 
these funds went to maintaining an international military presence, some were 
earmarked for developing the NGO sector as the humanitarian mission shifted to 
one of democracy promotion. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) was mandated with coordinating efforts to develop Bosnian civil 
society, joined by USAID and other powerful organizations (McMahon 2002, 21). 
The priorities of this constellation of actors had profound effects on the political 
future of the country. Early US assistance, in particular, was conditioned on the 
holding of democratic elections. This prompted the hasty organization of 
elections in 1996 that ushered into power politicians who cemented divisive 
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national sentiments, a deadlocked arrangement that persists to this day (see 
Evans-Kent and Bleiker 2003, 107; Jansen, Brković, and Čelebičić 2017).  
As Kimberley Coles (2007, 2008) has demonstrated, Western forms and 
norms of liberal democracy became instituted in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
through the technical practices of elections, managed by a constellation of IGOs 
and NGOs. Coles shows that taken together, the combination of electoral 
promises and practices in postconflict BiH reveals elections and democracy as a 
means through which certain notions of Europe, progress, choice, and agency 
were naturalized and codified. She argues that democracy promotion largely 
works through the presence of internationals on the ground, and that democracy 
itself has become much less about popular struggle and more about 
institutionalizing and depoliticizing representation and participation.  
Despite Serbia’s distinct role in the wars of the 1990s and tense 
relationship with the West, the underlying logics of democracy promotion 
outlined by Coles apply here as well. Namely, the US was primarily interested in 
regime change in Serbia and funneled funding to opposition activists with this 
goal in mind. After Milošević was ousted, and especially after Đinđić was 
assassinated, Western observers seemed unable to comprehend why a normative 
liberal model of democracy was failing to flourish in Serbia, and were certainly 
unable to appreciate how “apathy [could be] a productive aspect of how people 
experience and understand democracy” (Greenberg 2010, 46).   
In the early 2000s the international presence in Serbia was a thickly 
moralizing one. Serbia came under intense international pressure to extradite 
suspected war criminals to the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia in 
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The Hague for prosecution, and the country’s reluctant compliance was 
frequently coaxed by loan payments. As political scientist Jelena Subotić 
explains,  
because cooperation with the ICTY was a measurable indicator—the 
number of suspects arrested and transferred to The Hague and the 
number of documents and testimonies sent could all be classified, 
systematized, and easily counted—it soon became the major, if not the 
only, EU measurement of how far along Serbia was in adopting the idea of 
addressing crimes from its recent past. This, in turn, then became 
shorthand for Serbia’s readiness to Europeanize. (Subotić 2010, 600) 
 
Despite these conditions—and despite evidence emerging from the wider 
region about the brutal socioeconomic effects of “transition” (Dunn 2004; Haney 
2000; Wedel 1998)—optimism for an efficient return to economic and political 
stability ran high in the immediate aftermath of the 2000 October Revolution. 
With peace at least uneasily restored, Milošević finally gone, and sanctions lifted, 
the early 2000s is remembered—at least among urban intellectuals—as a time 
when “things were going in a good direction,” as one interlocutor in her late 
thirties put it. The government of Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić initiated reforms 
broadly interpreted as setting the country on a path away from the nationalist 
past and toward a democratic, European future, which crucially included 
facilitating the arrest and ICTY transfer of Milošević.  
But after Đinđić’s assassination cooperation with the ICTY stalled, and 
thus did Serbia’s trajectory toward EU membership. After some fragile years in 
which “accountability for human rights…became a trading currency between local 
elites and the EU” (Subotić 2010, 604) conditions had changed and Serbia’s 
political elites estimated that it was more in their interest to support EU 
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membership than to oppose it. By the time of my research, the criteria to be met 
for EU membership had become the prime guide for Serbian national policy. As 
then-Prime Minister Vučić optimistically assessed in 2016, “Successful 
completion of economic reforms, higher growth rates and finalization of EU 
accession negotiations by the end of the decade will represent the final and 
formal certification of Serbia’s success in economic, social and political transition 
to a liberal, market-oriented European democracy” (Vučić 2016). From 2001 
through 2016, the European Union has granted the country more funding—
nearly 3 billion euros—than any other donor, and the European Investment Bank 
has also been the largest supplier of loans to Serbia (Ministry of European 
Integration, n.d.).  
 
Neoliberalization  
As Stephen Collier has argued in rethinking neoliberal reforms in Russia, 
the policies of the 1990s—hinging on liberalization, marketization, and 
stabilization—were “the contingent products of specific historical circumstances” 
(2011, 136). While such policies can be associated with neoliberalism, they should 
not be reduced to it, as the complex relationship between state and market in the 
former Yugoslavia and postsocialist Serbia attests (see also Bockman 2011). 
Economic reforms instituted in Serbia at the beginning of the 2000s included 
new labor, employment, and privatization laws. Such legislation was to allow 
firms to be restructured, investments to be attracted, and “to provide incentives 
for [the] long-term growth of employment and to assist ‘losers’ from the labor 
market” (Matković, Mijatović, and Petrović 2010, 12). The number of labor 
 105 
market “losers” continued to mount as privatization ramped up, now part of 
reforms carried out under the influence of the World Bank and other Washington 
institutions. As countless other “developing” countries, the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) received structural adjustment loans from 
the World Bank, here doled out as part of a “Transitional Support Strategy.” 
(Though recall that the country was no stranger to such funding, as the economy 
of socialist Yugoslavia was bolstered by multilateral loans.) Loans amounted to 
about $397 million by the end of 2003 in addition to another $30 million in 
grants. As elsewhere, the objectives to be met as conditions for this money 
included cutting public spending in healthcare and education, privatizing or 
closing state-owned companies, and reforming the banking sector.61 By 2004 
over 1,100 firms had been sold (Upchurch and Marinković 2011, 241). US Steel, 
Philip Morris, Carlsberg, and Russia’s Gazprom came to hold majority stakes in 
the steel, tobacco, beer, and energy industries respectively; Microsoft, Coca Cola, 
and Siemens also arrived, multinational supermarket chains bought out local 
ones, and the financial sector became dominated by foreign banks. 
The postwar context of the former Yugoslavia fundamentally nullified 
what was imagined to be “an orderly, apolitical and technocratic privatization 
process” (Donais 2002, 6). As Timothy Donais (2002) shows in neighboring 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the institutional vacuum created by war coupled with 
conviction on the part of international actors in the urgency of privatization for 
                                                   
61 As has been the case elsewhere as well, A. Vladisavljević and Zuckerman conclude that the 
World Bank’s SAL program in Serbia and Montenegro failed to anticipate or mitigate its negative 
social (and specifically gendered) impacts (2004, 9).  
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economic recovery (and thus sustained peace) led to the cheap purchase by local 
nationalist elites of state-owned companies and thus the consolidation of their 
power. While the privatization process in Serbia has taken place on a different 
timeline and without the same ethnic dynamics as in BiH, the entwinement of 
economic and political goals in the context of weak institutions has created 
similar effects. Referring to those who got rich in the many shady privatization 
deals that continue to plague the country, my interlocutor Miloš explained, “the 
thing is...they were ripping apart whole companies just so that they could get a 
piece of it for themselves.” As I discuss in the chapters to come, stories of such 
deals and the morally suspect “entrepreneurs” who benefited imbue 
contemporary expectations of work with uneven moral valences. 
Major industries remain partially privatized, leading to conflicting 
accounts of the exact size of the public sector and dubious claims that Serbia’s 
public sector is disproportionately bloated in relation to its Western European 
counterparts (see Mikuš 2016, 216–217). The context has also birthed hybrid 
economic forms, such as a formerly socially owned firm that anthropologist Ivan 
Rajković argues has become a site of “mock-labor,” as the company was put on 
the state payroll but no longer produces anything (Rajković 2017). In the next 
section, I show how the practice of courting foreign investors coupled with the 
criteria for EU membership helped generate the conditions for “jobless growth” 
and individual-focused employment policy.     
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Invest in Serbia: Foreign Direct Investment and Jobless Growth 
In late 2014, a peculiar image caught my eye on Facebook. It was a still 
shot from a TV ad, with a male hand in a clean black glove pressing into a button 
on a gleaming machine. Though the background is blurred, this is enough to 
conjure the setting of a high-tech factory. A textbox in the corner confirms the 
broader context with the message—in English—“Invest in Serbia,” and across the 
disembodied arm: “high-skilled, low-cost workers.”  
This image was clipped from a commercial that aired on CNN 
International and featured voice-over in a British accent. In the full spot, iconic 
Belgrade landmarks flash across the screen, interspersed with machines in 
motion guided by youthful workers one could imagine to be smart and tech savvy. 
The narrator boasts of Serbia’s favorable geographic position, a projected—and 
entirely unrealistic—2020 EU accession date, and new labor and investment 
laws. “Right now,” says the Brit, “this is your opportunity to invest...join 500 
international companies who have already made Belgrade and Serbia their home 
in Southeast Europe.” The final frame includes a now-dead URL to 
investinserbia.rs and the logo of Serbia’s Chamber of Commerce and Industry. 
The thirty-second montage ends with the message “invest in Serbia—invest in the 
future.”62  
It’s not clear exactly where and when this commercial aired. The 
screenshot that first brought the campaign to the attention of the Serbian public 
                                                   
62 The full commercial has been uploaded by a YouTube user here: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XEpUrhGvBo0. Accessed April 6, 2019. 
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was tweeted from the account of someone who is likely a Serb living abroad. The 
post was re-tweeted at least a few hundred times and wormed its way across 
Facebook. It was picked up by popular domestic news portals whose journalists 
demanded to know how much the government had paid for the campaign and 
why it was hawking the country’s workforce as though Serbia were a “third world 
country” (M. Petrović 2014). A trade union association issued a statement 
condemning the commercial as “shameful” and a prominent economist scorned it 
as an “affront to national dignity” (quoted in B92 2014). 
This minor outcry rehearsed familiar anxieties about Serbia’s status in the 
post-post-Cold War geopolitical order and the fate of its “talent” in the global 
economy. Successive governments since 2001 have focused on encouraging 
foreign direct investment (FDI) through generous subsidies, as “[Western] 
economists continue to point to the country’s strategic location, pool of skilled 
and inexpensive labor, and generous incentives for foreign investment as its 
attractions for business investment” (USAID [2013?], 13). While Serbia’s GDP 
has increased steadily in recent years, such growth can largely be attributed to an 
influx of foreign capital rather than a real increase in salaries (see Matković, 
Mijatović, and Petrović 2010, 9). Working conditions in foreign-owned 
companies have not met initial expectations, and there has been a wave of recent 
strikes in foreign-owned companies across Serbia.63   
                                                   
63 See: http://www.criticatac.ro/lefteast/balkan-labour-reforms/. This pro-FDI stance does not 
bear the mark of any one government or political party. Postsocialist FDI in Serbia had important 
antecedents in socialist Yugoslavia, and has also been part of broader regional trends. A fresh 
2002 law on foreign investments smoothed the entrance of foreign capital (see Radenković 2016).    
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These same concerns underpin the much more heated debate that 
occurred a few months prior over reform of the labor law. While the “Invest in 
Serbia” commercial plugs the country’s “new”—and presumably better—labor and 
investment laws, the major accomplishment of this particular round of legal 
reform was to make it easier for employers to fire their employees.64 Pushback 
against such changes, a recent strike against working conditions in Fiat’s Serbian 
factory, and reaction to this commercial all highlight the public’s impatience with 
a national economic policy reliant on offering hefty subsidies to would-be foreign 
investors.  
In large part because of the country’s reliance on FDI, the 2008 global 
financial crisis set Serbia on the edge of bankruptcy prevented only by further 
borrowing from the IMF. Unemployment rose, pensions were frozen, the dinar 
fell, and bank lending constricted. Consequently, households cut spending, used 
up savings, and perhaps worked more in the grey economy (Matković, Mijatović, 
and Petrović 2010, 7). This, notwithstanding the lived experience of many as one 
of existing in a continual state of crisis since the early 1990s (Jansen, Brković, 
and Čelebičić 2017, 15–16; see also Shevchenko 2009). An ancillary effect of the 
global crisis as well as floods that devastated the country in 2014 has been to 
provide the ruling Serbian Progressive Party with external circumstances on 
which to pin stagnating wages and persistent unemployment.65 Anthropologist 
                                                   
64 For one analysis of the 2014 changes to the labor law see: http://pescanik.net/da-nam-zivi-
rad/.  
 
65 Prime Minister Vučić—famous for hyperbole—declared the floods “the greatest catastrophe in 
memory in the history of Serbia.” See: https://www.telegraf.rs/vesti/1070264-vucic-proglasava-
vanrednu-situaciju-ovo-je-najveca-katastrofa-u-istoriji-srbije. 
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Marek Mikuš also argues that the Progressives have successfully cast “their 
political enemies, a select handful of ‘tycoons’ facing showcase lawsuits, and the 
public-sector ‘parasites’” as responsible for the local effects of the global 
economic crisis (2016, 221).  
 “Invest in Serbia,” critics argue, has amounted to little more than 
“outsource to Serbia,” advancing the economic condition of “jobless growth” by 
which foreign direct investment inflates the country’s GDP without durably 
increasing employment. Banners reading “we don’t want to be a cheap labor force 
(jeftina radna snaga)” featured in the spring 2017 protests against consolidation 
of power by Prime Minister-turned-President Aleksandar Vučić, reinforcing the 
primacy of this issue for youth fed up with a political elite seemingly unable, 
unwilling, and uninterested in creating decent jobs.66 In the next section, I detail 
the government’s approach to youth unemployment before turning to how young 
people themselves understand their life chances and choices for dignified work. 
 
Locating the “Problem”: Youth as Targets of Employment Policy  
Just during the fifteen months of my fieldwork from October 2014–
December 2015, a dizzying array of policies, strategies, and programs targeting 
the young and unemployed were being implemented. Programs directly 
sponsored by the Ministry of Youth and Sport included trainings titled: 
“Education to work,” “Knowledge to work,” “Knowledge to the goal,” and the new 
initiative for youth employment that set Ministers Udovičić and Vulin on 
                                                   
66 For more on the recent protests see Fridman and Hercigonja 2016.  
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company tours. Such programs were ostensibly guided by and funded within 
broader governmental strategies, most notably the National Employment 
Strategy for 2011–2020 (NES) and the National Youth Strategy for 2015–2025 
(NYS), and these strategies’ respective “action plans.” Though national in scope, 
such strategies have been drafted in close consultation with representatives of 
international organizations and with the explicit goal of aligning with European 
Union policies and economic targets.67  
Reducing the unemployment rate—and raising the employment rate—
feature as prominent priorities in Serbia’s latest employment and youth 
strategies. Serbia has significantly lower rates of activity and employment than 
the EU average (see Bradaš 2017, 2). The official 2015 unemployment rate for 
those aged fifteen through twenty-nine was 33 percent, the inactivity rate 51 
percent, and the employment rate a mere 32 percent. Of particular concern are 
those in the so-called NEET category (not in education, employment, or 
training), which in 2015 for Serbian youth was 24 percent (Marjanović 2016, 2).68   
Such labor statistics are important and powerful indicators. As Sarita 
Bradaš (2017) argues in a recent NGO report, the quarterly publication of these 
                                                   
67 The National Youth Strategy for 2015–2025, for example, was developed with input from UN 
agencies, OSCE, the Council of Europe, USAID, and German (GIZ) and Swiss (SDC) development 
agencies. See Ministry of Youth and Sport 2015b, 6 for a list of European Union documents 
consulted in the preparation of the strategy. Further, as stated in the National Employment 
Strategy 2011–2020, “the Europe 2020 agenda does not impose additional criteria for EU 
membership, but the targets established will certainly define the EU policy toward candidate and 
accession countries” (Ministry of Economy and Regional Development 2011, 20).  
 
68 NEET has become a popular measure of youth exclusion that captures more than the 
unemployment rosters. NEETS “are more likely to have a low educational level, difficult family 
environment or immigration background, as well as having a status where they are not 
accumulating human capital through formal channels of education, training or employment” 
(Eurofound 2014, 5).  
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figures provokes heated debate as both experts and laypersons doubt the veracity 
of employment data. In the relevant national policies and programs there is a 
“noticeable focus—in analysis as well as planned measures—exclusively on two 
labor market indicators: the rate of employment and the rate of unemployment, 
whereby increasing the first and reducing the second are considered sole 
indicators of labor market performance” (Bradaš 2017, 1).69 This myopic focus 
can be partially attributed to the goal of joining the European Union, as without 
improving the “employment-to-population ratio” Serbia will not meet the 
required Copenhagen criteria (Ministry of Economy and Regional Development 
2011, 20).  
There are several reasons why these figures are the subject of debate, 
however. For one, methodological changes were introduced with the 2008 Labor 
Force Survey in order to more closely align the methodology used to gather 
Serbian labor statistics with the Eurostat standards of the EU. These changes 
resulted in an apparent decrease in the unemployment rate, but only because a 
number of people who had been unemployed long-term were recategorized as 
“inactive” (see Matković, Mijatović, and Petrović 2010, 13). Such changes make 
comparison with pre-2008 figures difficult. Broader demographic trends affect 
the employment rate as well. The country’s working-age population is shrinking, 
while the number of those over the age of sixty-four is growing (a long-term trend 
of great national concern). If the number of employed persons were to hold 
                                                   
69 Bradaš is a researcher with the Center for Democracy Foundation: 
http://www.centaronline.org/en/. My translation from the Serbian; note that there is also an 
English version of this report.  
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steady at its 2016 level and the negative population trend continue at its current 
rate, by 2020 the employment rate of the working age population would increase 
by a remarkable 6.9 percent, to 62.1 percent (Bradaš 2017, 5). A policy focus on 
the employment rate is coupled with concern over the “quality” of the labor force. 
The next section describes how this latter concern manifests.  
 
Human Capital and the University 
One of the ways in which the frenzy over (un)employment manifests is in 
calls to develop the human resources (or “human capital”) of the country. As 
stated in the NES, “Human capital development is at the core of the employment 
policy. Raising the quality of the labour force through education, training and the 
inclusion of socially excluded individuals and groups will contribute to economic 
and social development of the country” (Ministry of Economy and Regional 
Development 2011, 30). Improving the “employability and employment” of young 
Serbs is also the first of nine strategic goals outlined in the National Youth 
Strategy for 2015–2025, which was in a final round of public comments when I 
arrived in the field (and which I discuss further in chapter 5). 
Concerns about the “quality” of Serbia’s human capital and the 
employability of its youth drive governmental and nongovernmental efforts to 
identify the skills needed by employers and educate future workers accordingly. 
The perception that there is a significant mismatch between the qualifications or 
“profiles” of youth entering the workforce on the one hand, and the needs of the 
labor market on the other, was voiced not only by Minister Udovičić in his 
company visits but on every panel about youth unemployment that I attended 
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during my fieldwork. Prestigious faculties like law and architecture are 
overenrolled, the argument goes, given the limited number of lawyers and 
architects that can be absorbed by the internal market. Meanwhile, as I discuss 
further in chapter 6, there are not enough spots in the IT track for all prospective 
students. One suggestion for steering youth to faculties with greater 
employability prospects—which I often heard from youth themselves—is actually 
a socialist-style quota system. The “mismatch” is also behind calls for more, and 
more effective, career guidance counseling, particularly at the high-school level 
and in vocational schools, as well as proposed implementation of a “dual” 
education system in which vocational students would spend as much time in 
hands-on workplace training as in the classroom.70   
These seemingly mundane matters acquire a moral charge in the highly 
contested and politicized space of the university in Serbia. The university was a 
key ideological institution during Yugoslav socialism, especially during the 
waning of this system as Slobodan Milošević deliberately sought to repress 
academic freedom, requiring oaths of loyalty from faculty and stacking 
administrative positions with his supporters (see Greenberg 2014, 81–94; Popov 
2000, 303–326). As Greenberg elucidates, after the October Revolution student 
activists saw university reform as a continuation of their struggle to depose 
Milošević: “reform was not merely a technical exercise, but a fundamental 
restructuring of power and decision-making authority at a highly politicized 
institution” (2014, 95). Popular skepticism of university reform abounds—
                                                   
70 See, for example, the many publications of Belgrade Open School on this topic, available at 
http://www.bos.rs/uz/publikacije. 
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skepticism both about Serbia’s participation in the Bologna Process meant to 
standardize educational qualifications across Europe, as well as about the patchy 
implementation of this process. My student interlocutors frequently complained 
about faculties that had been only “partially Bolognized”—meaning that their 
program requirements remained in a state of limbo between old and new 
systems—in addition to the perennial complaints of mediocre and disinterested 
professors, overcrowded classes, and subjects that were too general to be of any 
practical use. 
In this fraught environment, university enrollment numbers, the nature of 
the skills gained by students, and the practical experience or lack thereof to be 
gleaned from higher education are complex issues that were matters of great 
concern in the course of my fieldwork. Many savvy young interlocutors 
recognized the systemic nature of the problem of “mismatch.” The expectation 
still prevailed, they told me, that one would work in one’s immediate field of 
training (struka). That is, rather than recognizing someone with a law degree as 
having critical thinking, public speaking, and writing skills, on the job market 
such a person would be evaluated only as a potential lawyer. Or, as one focus 
group participant put it,  “it just seems like the state tries to tap us into these 
boxes.”  
Many of the interlocutors I introduce in chapters 5 and 6 were vocal 
advocates of shifting the educational system toward an emphasis on transferable, 
entrepreneurial skills. While this was a point of general consensus, it was 
frequently undercut by official proclamations of those professional profiles most 
needed in Serbia, a list limited to manual labor and service-sector jobs such as 
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welder, auto mechanic, baker, and those in the hospitality industry.71 It was also 
undercut by the forceful governmental promotion of dual education. Bojan, a 
promoter of entrepreneurship education in high schools, articulated the 
contradiction between these two positions. “It’s not the point to teach someone 
how to make sausage,” he explained. “If we are talking about butchers, [it’s not 
about] how one needs to make sausage, rather, what will he do with it when he 
makes it? You know, if you send him to train (na praksu) in a butcher shop, he 
will learn to make sausage. But what he will do with that practically—that is very 
problematic.” The organization Bojan worked for advocated for entrepreneurial 
education, or as another interlocutor put it, “future-proof skills,” rather than a 
reshuffling of faculty slots and the funneling of more students into vocational 
schools. The touting of European-aligned educational discourses by the likes of 
Bojan may seem to cast him as performing an overdetermined ideal of 
entrepreneurial subjectivity. Yet such focus on entrepreneurial habits and 
competencies makes sense for youth trying to gain a foothold in an economy that 
would otherwise hold space for legible professional profiles like tilers, plumbers, 
and, most recently, computer programmers. It is also an assertion of agency and 
the right to develop, to reinvent oneself, and to have such efforts recognized and 
affirmed by society.  
                                                   
71 See, for example: https://www.kurir.rs/vesti/biznis/3098155/djordjevic-upozorio-da-nam-
nestaje-radna-snaga-srbija-bi-za-nekoliko-godina-mogla-da-ostane-bez-prodavaca-vozaca-
pekara-ugostitelja. 
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The Unemployed Individual 
Much of the public discussion on the development of human capital is 
animated by the assumption that interventions in the education system can and 
will positively affect the (youth) unemployment rate. But my expert interlocutors 
challenged this assumption, even as they nevertheless advocated for educational 
reforms. I was talking to Žarko, a researcher at an NGO involved in the issue of 
youth employment. His organization has a project focused on the transition from 
school to work.72 When I asked him about the main challenges in this transition 
he responded bluntly, “There is no work in Serbia. So the fact that what is being 
taught in higher education does not meet the needs of the economy—because 
these needs do not actually exist—that’s the problem.” Žarko further identified 
three interrelated issues that are the focus of a great deal of the attention on 
youth unemployment: first, the educational system is outdated and does not 
adequately prepare students for work in the modern economy, second, university 
enrollment in specific faculties is not aligned with the needs of the domestic 
economy, and finally, these two points are essentially irrelevant because “there is 
no work in Serbia.”  
While Žarko was exaggerating for comic effect (at least he had a job!) he 
highlighted a key paradox. Why is so much attention focused on the (lack of) 
skills or “mismatched” profiles of youth entering the workforce? I was talking to 
                                                   
72 The 2008 financial crisis collapsed the employment prospects for youth across Europe and 
beyond and prompted continent-wide policy initiatives. The European Commission’s 2012 “Youth 
Employment Package” brought the “school-to-work transition” of young people into policy focus 
as tightly linked to broader life course markers such as independent living and having children 
(Eurofound 2014, 2).  
 
 118 
Irena, an economics expert, about the government’s efforts to increase 
entrepreneurship. She explained: 
One of the greatest policy failures in relation to support for 
entrepreneurship is that entrepreneurship is exclusively seen as 
employment and not as job creation. Because when you focus on 
employment in the policy sense, then you center the unemployed person 
and say: “Okay, let’s see why this person is unemployed. And then we say, 
aha, maybe he or she doesn’t have all the knowledge and skills. And then 
follows a set of policies toward gaining skills, knowledge, blah blah blah, 
that doesn’t match the needs of the market. 
 
Irena had sprinkled her response with English, and now switched 
languages permanently as she continued:  
On the other hand, if you have job creation as a policy goal, then your 
focus is on those who are creating jobs. And then these are companies. 
And then you are thinking: “What do they need in order to create jobs?” 
Then you, if you think like that, then you would end up, aha, the 
environment is not functioning, access to finance is poor, the regulatory 
framework is not uh- procedures are complicated. Then your interventions 
are going towards- then you’re asking yourself: “Why are companies not 
creating jobs? What is the obstacle?” 
 
Irena is skeptical of the government’s promotion of entrepreneurship, 
which I elaborate in later chapters. Because the government has not adequately 
addressed systemic issues like poor access to finance, the punitive consequences 
of bankruptcy, the burdensome tax structure, and overly complex regulatory 
procedures, would-be entrepreneurs are hampered and/or pushed into the gray 
economy, and those who do start small businesses which manage to stay afloat 
cannot expand (see Hutchinson et al. 2012, 12–19). Despite such views, and 
despite the fact that job creation is indeed drafted into the National Employment 
Strategy as a main priority, more effort—and pubic rhetoric—is consistently 
devoted to the issue of employability, thereby shifting the level of intervention 
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down to the individual. As Prime Minister, Aleksandar Vučić regularly chided the 
Serbian population for not working hard enough, positioning himself as “worker-
in-chief” and urging citizens to follow his example. He held up the “difficult 
measures” passed by the Serbian government (at the behest of the IMF) as 
evidence that “Serbia has changed, and that through work the future and oneself 
can be changed” (quoted in Mastilović Jasnić 2015).73  
Irena’s summation echoed Žarko’s perspective:  
The problem is not in youth, the problem is that there are no jobs. If there 
are jobs, then the private sector will train people, it’s not a problem, if they 
need them. But if they don't need them, you can train them as much as you 
want. If I cannot pay you, an employee, you can be the best person in the 
world...[but] if my business doesn’t grow I cannot employ. And this is what 
they’re not getting. I mean, all these active employment measures are 
important, but they’re not, they’re not solving the key problem in the 
economy, which is the jobless growth that we had for the past fifteen years.  
 
My conversations with Irena and Žarko reveal how the government’s 
myopic focus on unemployment allows it to eschew responsibility for the more 
complex concerns of job creation. While improving the economic climate and 
creating conditions for “doing better business” are also strategic goals, progress 
in these areas has been markedly slow. This is not least because serious attention 
to this goal would require rooting out corruption and cronyism, which are 
embedded in the highest levels of government. A focus on (un)employment shifts 
attention to the individual, her (lack of) skills and qualifications, and rationalizes 
                                                   
73 For an example linking work and national pride/victimization, see: 
http://www.dnevnik.rs/politika/vucic-srbiju-da-zgazite-necete-otpor-prema-rezoluciji-politicki-
miran. For an example that illustrates Vučić’s fetishization of work, see: 
http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/9/Politika/1640948/Vu%C4%8Di%C4%87%3A+Nasu%
C5%A1na+potreba+zemlje+da+se+promeni.html.  
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a host of programs to tackle these ostensible problems. Following such logic, 
enterprising Serbian youth should ideally create their own jobs, and their failure 
to do so can be traced to skewed values and lack of initiative rather than a 
fundamentally dysfunctional economy. As we will see, the talented youth I spoke 
with have gone to extraordinary lengths to find work, but the work they have 
found has been unregulated, degrading, and not meeting their minimum 
expectations. In the final section below, I outline the expectations for dignified 
work of my young interlocutors, contours that will be fleshed out in the chapters 
to come.  
 
“I Have to Start Something”: Expectations of Dignified Work 
Mirjana and Mina, ages twenty-four and twenty-five, were sisters from a 
town in the northern region of Vojvodina who had come to Belgrade to study. 
Mina was completing the final required practicum for her degree in special 
education. Mirjana had earned a degree in political science. As we talked outside 
at a bustling café in the city center, they outlined their joint struggle to jumpstart 
lives as independent adults. Despite volunteering in the nonprofit sector 
throughout her studies, Mirjana confronted grim employment prospects upon 
graduation. She decided to enroll for a Master’s degree from the Faculty of 
Organizational Sciences (Fakultet organizacionih nauka—FON), “known as the 
only one whose graduates find jobs.” But even this additional qualification did 
not give her the hoped-for advantage on the job market. Instead, Mirjana was in 
the midst of yet another in a series of short-term internships, this time in the 
human resources department of a major international hotel chain.  
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The sisters had peppered our conversation with references to “the way 
things are” in the West. After Mina left for another engagement I finally asked 
Mirjana how the pair had managed to travel so much. She replied: “most of the 
time we traveled as tourists. We have some cousins abroad, so we went to visit 
cousins, but my sister, she [also] went to a few volunteer camps and I spent a 
month in Berlin studying German...twice I won a scholarship to travel, one time 
to Germany for two weeks, one time to France and Switzerland.” 
When I asked what her current plans were she responded bluntly: “My 
plans? I’m trying to find work.”  
I was confused—weren’t we talking about staying and leaving? I was trying 
to figure out if the sisters planned to go abroad. “Aha. And you want to stay here, 
and...?”  
She firmly steered my focus back to employment: “At the moment I’m 
trying to find any kind [of work]. The problem is just that, for example in the 
hotel where I work, there aren’t real entry-level positions.”  
“Really?” 
“Yes, because”—she paused to clarify—“there aren’t entry-level positions 
for educated people. I could, for example, get a job in the housekeeping 
department...to wash laundry, to make-up the rooms—except that they wouldn’t 
take me for that because I have a Master’s degree, I speak two foreign languages, 
and I would make 15,000 dinars a month [about 150 dollars].  
“Damn,” I responded lamely.   
“But entry-level positions for educated people don’t exist anywhere, not in 
finance, not in marketing, not in HR—there’s nothing open.” 
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Mirjana had a theory about why this was the case. As she explained, there 
was a cohort of professionals who took positions in the private companies that 
opened after Milošević was ousted in 2000, prompting economic reform and a 
surge in foreign investment. While these workers are not yet old enough to retire, 
there is also a glut of college-educated youth in Belgrade. In addition to the 
nearly 15,000 annual graduates of Belgrade University, the capital absorbs newly 
minted graduates from Serbia’s other university towns because, as Mirjana and 
many others assessed, “there are no jobs anywhere else but here.”74 Thus work in 
the private sector, which Mirjana was oriented toward, was hard to come by, at 
least in the form of “entry-level positions for educated people.” Mirjana was living 
the reality of Serbia’s long-term “jobless growth” described above, but the 
economic trends tapped into by her theory and personal predicament are also 
global ones; namely the expansion of the low-wage service sector, a global 
increase in the number of college graduates, and the eagerness of companies to 
squeeze as much productive labor as possible from interns without offering a 
realistic shot at long-term employment in return (Gershon 2017; Lane 2011).  
Of course, I had been trying to tease out where the sisters wanted to 
work—whether they had concrete plans, or abstract dreams, or any intention of 
going abroad long-term. But “here” and “there” were hopelessly entangled in the 
sisters’ narratives. Mirjana continued:  
If you are an educated person who is a recent college graduate, you have 
no chance of finding work here....In principle, I’m looking at whatever. For 
example, I just saw that there is an open position at the reception desk of a 
                                                   
74 Over 50,000 terminal degrees were awarded in Serbia in 2016; 14,716 by the University of 
Belgrade. See: 
http://webrzs.stat.gov.rs/WebSite/repository/documents/00/02/52/78/AS21_177-2016_srb.pdf 
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hotel in my chain in Dubai. So I’ll probably send [an application] for that. 
So I’m literally looking for whatever, just to do something because time is 
passing—I have to start something.   
 
Along with many others, the sisters also emphasized how corruption and 
“the connections you need to find any kind of job” hindered their ability to find 
work in Serbia. But as we continued talking, Mina—who had a degree in special 
education—related an experience that seemed to contradict many of points we 
had covered, namely the notion that there is no work to be found outside 
Belgrade, that there are no entry-level jobs, and that work comes only through 
strong political connections. Mina actually had secured an entry-level job in her 
field—in her small hometown, no less—in a child development center. (She later 
rather uncomfortably acknowledged that the position had come her way through 
a personal connection.) But from a promising start she only lasted two months, 
mainly because she was frequently asked to work double shifts that left her spent. 
Mirjana broke in to defend her sister’s quitting: “Employers are very aware that 
people want to do anything, and they just don’t want to follow regulations 
because they don’t have to. People will work no matter what...” But Mina gently 
challenged this view, noting: “I think there is also another group of people, of 
students that just graduated, like me, for example. I don’t want to work, to do any 
job, like, I don’t want to work that way. I was totally exhausted, I wasn’t 
productive at all, I wasn’t motivated, plus the salary wasn’t that good, so why 
would I?” 
The desires voiced by Mina for reasonable work hours, a living wage, and a 
profession that would make use of her talents and skills might not strike as 
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remarkable, but they sit uneasily with the prevailing notion that Serbian youth 
suffer from inertia and incessant complaining. They also highlight the 
inadequacies associated with what were generally differentiated by my 
interlocutors as the three realms of possible employment: the public sector, the 
private sector, and self-employment/entrepreneurship. To the limited extent that 
one could choose to focus one’s job-seeking efforts on one realm or the other, 
each involved compromises. Public-sector employment was invested with 
multiple meanings. Despite the stagnant size of the public sector (Mikuš 2016; cf. 
Kurtović 2017 on the burgeoning public sector in BiH), it held the promise of a 
minimum standard of living and a certain level of existential security and daily 
predictability. But it also became “identified as a mechanism of unfair 
redistribution” (Mikuš 2016, 220); considered morally compromised in ways I 
describe in the next chapter. The private sector was sometimes separated into 
foreign employers and Serbian ones, was sometimes seen as holding the potential 
for meritocratic employment practices, but was generally considered exploitative, 
subject to the creeping influence of clientelism, and ruled by personal 
relationships in any case. As I discuss in later chapters, multivalent value-laden 
meanings were also layered onto entrepreneurship—from association with the 
informal sector, to a risk-laden option of dubious likelihood for success in Serbia, 
to a realm of personal authenticity and independence.    
I was still trying to pinpoint the sisters’ stances toward mobility: “So, if you 
each found an ideal job in your field, like one that’s not two shifts, and paid 
decently, would you want to stay here or would you still want to travel, or...?” 
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Mirjana’s response surprised me: “Honestly, I would stay here to gain 
experience and then leave because, um, Serbia is a place where you are never 
safe, where you never know what will happen next. A company may be open for a 
day and then close another day. Nothing is for sure here.” 
I probed: “Would you mean, when you say that are you talking about the 
economy? Like it’s...?” Mirjana responded,  
Yes, economy, politics, everything. And, we have traveled a bit around 
Europe, to see that people are just happier in other places. They live 
normal lives, they have families, they have friends, they have school, job, 
whatever—they have time for everything. It’s not like, people like to say 
here, “yeah, they have money in the West but they never hang out with 
their friends.” That’s just not true! And, I just like it better in the West, 
because I traveled, I saw how people live there, and, this culture is just, it’s 
too small for me. So I would stay here to gain experience, but then I think I 
would start looking for opportunities abroad. 
 
Mina elaborated that while the cliché prevails that the German work ethic 
precludes the rich social life enjoyed by Serbs, in reality they are working all the 
time too, “but it's just that you have a very bad salary and you know, you are 
demotivated, and then they’re there, happy, they can live normal lives. I mean, I 
don't expect anything like, you know, a big house, gold and stuff-”  
Mirjana broke in: “Fairytales and everything-”  
“No, I just want a normal life. To work, to get a salary, to have money to go 
to the seaside in summer, to have friends-”  
“Plus, I would like a country with a normal health system-”  
“Yeah.” 
“With a normal education system. Serbia does not have that. So I don’t 
want to have kids in Serbia.” 
“Yeah, for sure.”  
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“I don't want to go to the doctor's one day in Serbia. I want to like, be safe 
in those terms, to pay my taxes and know what I get in return.” 
This dialogue about security initially surprised me. It was one of a few 
instances in the course of my research when an interlocutor invoked “security” or 
“safety” in broad, oblique, or unexpected ways. Here, while my first association 
was with physical safety, it quickly became clear that Mirjana and Mina craved 
the security of having confidence in the future—of having a reasonable 
expectation that one’s life course will play out as one expects. Further, the sisters 
understood this security to be something that exists elsewhere, either temporally 
or spatially, or both. And these expectations were nested within a broader vision 
of a normal, good life.  
Joining many others young potential migrants, the sisters’ tale exemplified 
not a willingness to accept any kind of work, but rather a willingness to go 
anywhere in the world for work that would feel like a step forward. Building on 
their experiences of travel to somewhat unexpected places like Ukraine and the 
US in addition to Western Europe, the sisters were more than willing to cast wide 
geographic nets while discovering the limits of what work, under what 
conditions, they were willing to accept. While I was initially surprised by talk of 
potential destinations such as Dubai, I soon heard of plans from other 
interlocutors to teach English in China and Abu Dhabi. What was more important 
than destination for these interlocutors was securing work that fulfilled their 
expectations for dignified work: labor for which they would be valued and 
challenged, and that held the promise of propelling their lives forward.  
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I hadn’t asked this question directly often, but I now ventured: “I mean, do 
you guys feel disappointed, that, you don’t feel like you can make a life here 
and...?” 
Mirjana responded: “Yes. I do feel disappointed, honestly. That like, I feel 
like I did everything right. I went to school, I had good grades, I volunteered, I 
interned, I did everything what I was supposed to do—and nothing.”  
The disappointment comes through as she says this final word and her 
sister interjects, “exactly.”  
“If I hadn't done all that, then maybe I wouldn’t feel so disappointed right 
now, but I feel like I deserve more than this, that’s all.”  
Mina added: “Yeah, true. I agree.”  
This conversation highlights the wide gap between governmental 
assertions that youth do not have marketable skills, that they do not work hard 
enough, and that the employment rate is improving on one hand, and the lived 
experience of the young and educated on the other. It renders absurd the 
ministerial trek through companies to ferret out the needs of the private sector, 
as well as the endless series’ of trainings that promise to bring participants a step 
closer to employment. In the narrative of Mirjana and Mina, such efforts to 
individualize the problem of (un)employment are exposed as misplaced. What 
the sisters center in their expectations for dignified work is a sense of existential 
security that they ultimately suggest is fundamentally unrealizable in Serbia. 
This, then, is a very different story about brain drain than the official framing 
which simplistically casts the migration of the young and educated as an outcome 
of unemployment.     
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At certain moments in our conversation the sisters adopted a framing of 
brain drain as opportunity, as when Mirjana noted, “If you have the opportunity 
to see other cultures, why not?” But this stance is modulated by an awareness 
that mobility is not quite the choice it ought to be. There is a sadness just below 
the surface of their words, as the young women reckon with the realities of 
securing meaningful work that might fulfill their expectations.  
Members of the generation who have grown up with the post-2009 
mobility regime have expectations of normalcy shaped from a bricolage of 
sources that include not only demands for existential and social security 
reminiscent of the expectations of their parents, but also aspects of life 
encountered during travel to foreign lands. Here, mobility is not the marker of a 
middle-class lifestyle and geopolitical normalcy that is was during socialist 
Yugoslavia, and it’s not necessarily the escape route that it was during the 1990s. 
Mobility here becomes a substitute for a normal life at home. A consolation prize 
sponsored by agencies and foreign governments concerned about the 
abnormality of life in Serbia and the limited life chances and choices for youth 
there. In the next chapter, I elaborate on these themes, exploring the aspirations 
of those who most wanted to leave Serbia forever.  
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CHAPTER 4 
LEAVING SERBIA: HORIZONS OF POSSIBILITY AND THE PROMISE 
OF MIGRATON 
 
Jelena was a fiery blond brimming with enthusiasm. We had connected 
through a mutual acquaintance. From her online presence I thought she seemed 
approachable, the ideal first interviewee. As she had been a long-time resident of 
the US—a Serbian returnee, or “repat”—I guessed that our cultural divide would 
be narrow and that our meeting would serve as a gentle ethnographic induction. I 
was right. When we met on the street in the center of Belgrade she whisked me to 
one of her favorite nearby cafés, chomping on a bakery snack and peppering me 
with questions about my research.  
As we settled in, Jelena sketched her path to the US and back. Hindsight 
and maturity had smoothed the edges of a jagged trajectory. She had woven her 
personal history into a coherent, compelling tale, situating her migratory 
narrative in the context of broader family and geopolitical dynamics. She was 
from an intellectual family, she told me, one with a long history of mobility. 
Encouraged by her well-traveled parents, Jelena left Serbia for the US in 1998 to 
experience her final year of high school as an exchange student. “To learn 
English, see how the US is—that kind of stuff,” she said. 
Returning home after an unexpected eleven years in the US she found 
work in her field of public relations, first at an international agency then in the 
large state-owned bank. She took a deep breath as she launched into the tale of 
her six-month review at the bank:  
 130 
So for the first couple of months I was, you know—I’m a very enthusiastic 
person. So every week I would do a new presentation: how we can improve 
this, how we can do this, how we can blah blah blah, you know, because I 
thought that this is why they want me here. So, after six months my boss 
tells me: “You know Jelena, I mean, you’re pretty cool. I like that you’re so 
enthusiastic, and you know, when you go through the hallway the whole 
building knows that you’re going through the hallway...But you know, 
Jelena, you’re never satisfied—everything for you can be better. Let’s 
modernize this, let’s improve this, this is not good enough, we can do this 
better...you always have some new idea about something.” 
 
Eyes fixed on me she delivers the punchline. “He was like: you know Jelena, he 
who looks at the sky steps in shit.” She leans back, laughing, waiting for her final 
words to register. I exhale a slow “wow” as she continues: “And I’m like, I look at 
him, and I’m like: well, you know, Eleanor Roosevelt said ‘always shoot for the 
stars—even if you miss you land on the moon.’ And he looks at me and says: 
maybe in the US, but in Serbia you step in shit.” I gasp as she laughs.  
This story consolidates a cluster of oft-discussed themes in the Serbian 
capital: the tamping of ambition, non-recognition of hard work and initiative, 
devaluing of expertise, and the resultant “negative selection” said to be endemic 
to Serbian society by which the unqualified and morally suspect rise to the top. 
Challenging the simplistic model favored by government ministers that 
prioritizes the (un)employment rate—and in contradistinction to the moralizing 
discourses of work favored by Vučić—some combination of these elements 
frequently ground the migratory aspirations of the country’s educated youth. But 
as Jelena’s story attests, such forces are also decried by those who intend to stay 
and even those who have returned from abroad. In contrast, the young potential 
migrants I encountered imagined the countries of the West as manifesting the 
inverse of this state of affairs. Almost without exception and with only the 
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occasional qualification, the West was considered to be a collection of 
meritocracies where talent was recognized and hard work rewarded. Where not 
“everything works backwards” as it was said to in Serbia.  
In this chapter, I explore the real and symbolic geographies invoked in talk 
of leaving and staying in Serbia. By centering the “imagined lives” of migration I 
read mobility narratives such as Jelena’s as proxies for commentary on a host of 
other socioeconomic issues (cf. Dick 2018). As discussed in chapter 2, access to 
and exercise of international mobility can become a barometer for the “normalcy” 
of the national order of things (Dzenovska 2013; Partridge 2009; Roseman 2013), 
and nowhere is this more true than Serbia (Greenberg 2011).  
Those I profile here illustrate the range of short-term mobility experiences 
of my interlocutors as a whole. Jelena had lived and worked in the US for eleven 
years. Miloš and Gordana, who I later introduce, had spent a summer in Alaska 
as a work-study student and had traveled to Western and Eastern Europe as a 
doctoral student, respectively. Thus while Jelena’s story was in some ways 
exceptional, the experience of international travel she enjoyed no longer is. For 
members of a generation who experienced the trauma and tumult of the 1990s as 
children—coming of age at the close of the first decade of the new millennium—
aspirations for mobility are no longer primarily expressed as desire to escape 
entrapment, nor are they anchored to lived memory of Yugoslav mobility. This 
chapter (and the ones to follow) elaborates how the 2009 shift in the conditions 
of possibility for travel also marked a shift away from the idiom of escape toward 
more nuanced stancetaking in relation to mobility. I argue that renewed access to 
travel has provided fresh material out of which youth in Serbia construct 
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authoritative, yet imaginary, “contrapuntal lives” lived elsewhere (Dick 2013, 
2018). Below, I elucidate how these imaginaries both color how potential and 
return migrants narrate the forces of “suffocation” (gušenje) or 
“hampering/blocking” (sputavanje) experienced in their everyday navigations in 
the “here and now,” and give moral weight to migratory aspirations for, and 
experiences of, lives lived in the “then and there.” 
 
Imaginaries, Horizons, and Meritocratic Aspirations 
Rooted in a variety of theoretical traditions, the concept of imaginaries as 
‘representational assemblages that mediate the identifications with Self and 
Other’ (Salazar 2010, 6; see also Harris and Rapport 2016) has been fruitfully 
taken up in relation to tourism. Recent literature in this vein demonstrates how 
experiences of tourism shape cultural imaginaries of global peripheries (Herrero 
and Roseman 2015) and converge with mass-mediated images and geopolitical 
hierarchies (Mostafanezhad and Promburom 2018) to produce particular effects. 
These effects include the production of romantic notions of authenticity among 
tourists (Bryce, Murdy, and Alexander 2017) refracted by the tourism industry 
itself (Forsey and Low 2014; Simpson 2017). Such analyses resonate with now 
classic excavations of the “invention” in the Western imagination of the region of 
the Balkans (Bakić-Hayden and Hayden 1992; Todorova 2009; Wolff 1994). This 
latter work foregrounds the role of Western journalists and policymakers, in 
addition to historians and travel writers, in constructing a discourse in which ‘the 
Balkans stand as Europe’s resident alien’ (Fleming 2000, 1229).   
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Linking these literatures together highlights the loaded geopolitical terrain 
on which Self–Other mediation occurs, as well as the salience of specific 
moments of encounter rich with “relational processes” (Simoni 2015, 5). This 
juxtaposition also draws attention to the expansiveness of “imaginaries” as 
concept and its resemblance to other anthropological mainstays such as cognitive 
schemas or even “culture” itself.  As such, the concept has come under well-
warranted critique (most notably by Damien Stankiewicz) as a “stuck-together 
assemblage” that has lost analytic utility; a concept that “tends to overgeneralize, 
to elide scale, and to gesture toward without pointing at” (Stankiewicz 2016, 797, 
807) nuanced debates about agency, possibility, and aspiration.   
Taking seriously such critique, in this chapter I privilege vernacular 
expressions of (the limits of) aspiration and possibility, nuancing anthropological 
understanding of these as not just conceptual categories but also ones of 
experience (cf. Murphy 2017 on “social destiny”). Beginning with the concept of 
perspektiva, akin to yet exceeding Crapanzano’s “imaginative horizon” (2004) or 
Appadurai’s culturally inflected “capacity to aspire” (2013, 179), I show how my 
interlocutors evoked aspirational imaginaries of a primarily symbolic (Western) 
“then and there” only secondarily projected onto or claimed representative of the 
specific site of their migratory aspirations or previous mobility. I argue that the 
foundational motif of these varied imaginaries is a deep investment in 
meritocracy, that “idea that whatever your social position at birth, society ought 
to offer enough opportunity and mobility for ‘talent’ to combine with ‘effort’ in 
order to ‘rise to the top’” (Littler 2018, 1).  
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In centering vernacular expressions of meritocracy and its absence, I join 
both classic ethnography of the region and more recent works (e.g. Rajković 
2017) in foregrounding the moral frameworks through which postsocialist 
subjects make sense of the global economic transformations that have scrambled 
their lives and expectations of the future. This work also contributes to the rich 
literature on discourses of “the normal” across the postsocialist region (Fehérváry 
2002, 2013; Greenberg 2011). To this end, I flesh out local inflections of a 
broader normative vision of the post-Fordist/postsocialist good life (Berlant 
2011) and the role of mobility in animating convictions of how the “abnormality” 
of Serbia can be transcended, subverted, or left behind. 
 
Perspektiva:  
Tracing Possibility and Aspiration in the “Here and Now”  
I often heard the word perspektiva in the course of my research. An 
unremarkable term of Latin origin to my interlocutors, I was struck by the 
different contexts of its usage. One sense of perspektiva translates simply into the 
English word “perspective,” in the sense of “point of view.” In both languages the 
word has a spatio-temporal dimension, conjuring the sense of standing still and 
surveying what lies ahead. This quality suggests the term’s secondary meaning: it 
is something you can have or lack (imati/nemati perspektivu), something you 
can see (videti perspektivu), or something you can be in (biti u toj perspektivi). 
Here, perspektiva is more like “prospect(s).” In this sense it can be individual or 
collective.  
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Many evoked perspektiva in relation to particular fields of work, as in “the 
job prospects for architects”; or in terms of a certain cohort, as in “the prospects 
of youth.” At the end of my interview with Žarko, the youth employment expert 
introduced in the previous chapter, I asked if he was sympathetic to those who 
leave the country as a way out of the pessimistic predicament in which he had 
situated Serbia’s youth. He responded:  
“Well, hmm. I mean, that’s an existential question.”  
“Yes, it is,” I agreed.  
“And everyone who can live better, to have better work, wherever, 
whenever, will accept it, right? And that’s that. Youth in Serbia—the problem is 
that they don’t have perspektiva.”  
I murmured encouragingly.  
“They don’t have- young people talk-”  
I interrupted: “And how should I understand perspektiva in this sense?” 
Žarko elaborated:  
Well, that’s like…if you remember in high school, at the end of school there 
is a graduation ceremony. And then everyone is talking: “Oh, what will you 
do? What college will you go to?” And so on. And so people think about 
what they will do with themselves, what they what to be in life, what they 
want to do. And family has a bit of influence, society has a bit, college a bit, 
all that has impact, but young people don’t think about that.... Young 
people think a whole lot about what they want from themselves (šta hoće 
od sebe). 
 
Here, Žarko situates perspektiva as a question arising within the life 
course of an average, educated person. A young person’s perspektiva initially 
appears to be molded in her own hands, out of personal desires, aspirations, and 
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ambitions, with some measure of (unrecognized) impact from his or her social 
circle. But as he continues the concept thickens:  
And then someone thinks about family—will they be able to have a wife, 
husband, kids, to buy an apartment? What will they drive, where will they 
work, what will they study? And when you think about these things you see 
that the possibilities for all of that are small. There are no possibilities 
(nema mogućnosti). To study…more and more you have to pay. Plus, 
possibilities abroad are offered—scholarships, exchanges—that are very 
attractive. Study in Spain for six months? Wow, yes, I want to! In 
Barcelona? Wow, I want to! To buy an apartment? Not a chance. Buy a 
car? If mom and dad give it to you, because you probably don’t have your 
own money. And to earn it yourself? How? I mean, there is no work.  
 
With Žarko’s inventory of markers of a “normal” life—the choice to form a 
marriage and have kids, to separate from one’s parents and establish one’s own 
household, to own that apartment along with a car—it becomes clear that 
perspektiva is about not only what youth want from themselves but also what 
they want for themselves, both materially and immaterially. My interlocutors 
consistently emphasized the modesty of their ambitions in outlining perspektiva 
and how it comes to be limited. As one said, “I don’t have to have five houses, but 
I can go on summer vacation, right?” 
The point I want to emphasize is that such modest material trappings of a 
middle-class lifestyle were imagined as flowing naturally from its immaterial 
features. To have perspektiva meant having options, in work and life more 
broadly; that the possibility of self-development (razvijati se) was not 
preemptively foreclosed, that fulfillment was a reasonable expectation, or more 
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profoundly, that “one’s existence means something” (da tvoje postojanje nešto 
znači).75 Žarko ended his elaboration of perspektiva pessimistically: 
Whatever you want to do with yourself is a “no-go” story. There are no 
possibilities. And then a young person realizes, “Uh, what kind of country 
is this? What is this? Wherever I want to do something, I can’t do 
anything.” And then of course, people say to each other: “You should get 
out of here, here’s Canada, here’s America, here’s Australia, here—
wherever you don’t need a visa.” And that’s that. That’s how it goes. And 
that’s understandable, that’s normal. 
 
In this final quote and the one above, mobility and migration enter into 
perspektiva in ambiguous ways. Žarko highlights newly available options for 
study abroad as well as the way in which youth urge one another to take 
advantage of visa-free international travel. But he also suggests that only 
permanent migration—to “wherever you don’t need a visa”—broadens one’s 
perspektiva to encompass the full range of life chances that include travel as a 
normal feature of life. In other words, I read Žarko’s commentary as suggesting 
that brief forays abroad on scholarship or excursion are experiences that are 
(now) attainable, but that serve to highlight the modesty of youthful expectations 
as well as the perceived abnormality of home that makes the fulfilment of middle-
class aspirations—including both the material and immaterial features outlined 
above—unattainable. In the contemporary Serbian context, where in his words 
“there is no work” to propel youth through the life course, mobility takes on this 
peculiar character. My interlocutors who sought to leave Serbia forever had 
indeed had experiences of short-term mobility. For those to whose stories I now 
turn such experiences provided material out of which to construct imagined lives 
                                                   
75 Thanks to Nikica Strižak for providing a linguist’s perspective on this analysis. 
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of positive contrast with ones lived in Serbia, supplying a moral register through 
which to critique the national order of things. I focus on the stories of two twenty-
somethings whose talent, persistence, and clarity of purpose left a lasting 
impression. Both were resolved to leave Serbia forever. 
 
Hampered by the “Anti-System”: Miloš 
Miloš was someone who managed to sound simultaneously upbeat and 
deeply cynical. He entered my research just two months in, as a focus group 
participant.76 The first in the group to speak, he announced with conviction that 
“perseverance and vision” (istrajnost i vizija) are the main attributes needed to 
realize one’s professional goals. As discussion became animated, Miloš asserted a 
view of Serbian society as guided by an “anti-system” with the majority of the 
population mired in a struggle to meet their basic needs.  
When I interviewed him over tea we talked about the paradox that even 
though “most people in Serbia are poor,” as he put it, in Belgrade at least poverty 
is cloaked by “normal” dress and full cafés. But the cityscape serves as a façade on 
a deeply unequal society. In Miloš’s view, the poor majority are locked in 
relationships of serfdom with an elite cadre of corrupt businessmen and 
politicians. The unjust “anti-system,” ruled by these greedy and corrupt few, 
constrains what is possible for an individual to achieve in Serbia. As he explained:  
You cannot do much more than your surroundings allow you to…obviously 
a society that does not produce, does not develop, does not innovate, is 
gonna always be holding you down. Because if you wanna innovate, you 
                                                   
76 Along with several other participants, Miloš learned of the focus group via a recruitment email 
sent on my behalf to those on the listserv of the International Academic Center, an organization 
(sponsored by the US Department of State) that assists those interested in pursuing higher 
education in the US. 
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know, you can’t do that. If you wanna...change something, no, you can’t do 
that. If you wanna improve, if you wanna grow, ok, you can grow up to a 
point, then after that, well, [you] gotta get out. 
 
Miloš’s assessment of the material conditions of life in Serbia is hardly 
controversial. As discussed in the previous chapters, a decade of international 
isolation and war compounded by waves of privatization in the early 1990s and 
2000s left the Serbian people impoverished in multiple senses of the term, as 
many experienced such socioeconomic ruptures as “a personal humiliation and a 
loss of dignity” (Vetta 2011, 50). But these losses have not been equally 
distributed. The chaotic and unregulated environment of the war years allowed 
unscrupulous businessmen to amass fortunes as inequality swelled. While similar 
processes were experienced across the postsocialist region (Hann 2002; Ost 
2015), Eurostat statistics confirm that Serbia has the inauspicious honor of 
harboring the most extreme income inequality in Europe (Eurostat 2019).   
As I spent more time with Miloš—our interview spawned a sometimes 
puzzling friendship of sorts—I learned more about how his biography informed 
his dismal view of contemporary Serbian society. Like so many others, he had 
come from a small town to study at Belgrade University. Back home, his parents 
owned a hardware shop that he described as once solidly profitable but struggling 
since the 2008 crisis. In the city, he drank tea and beer and ate like a student, 
frequenting a fast-food stand that served nothing but variations on fried potatoes. 
When I walked with Miloš to this stand one day he grimly assessed its existence 
as indicative of the state of Serbian society. “We didn’t have such places before 
the crisis,” he said. I had passed the potato purveyor regularly and without 
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inspecting the menu had imagined it as a Turkish-style baked potato bar—in 
other words, a shop signifying the appearance of a new, interesting, 
international street food in Belgrade. Miloš disabused me of this delusion. 
Rather, “potatoes are the cheapest food and people don’t have any money,” he 
explained. (It was, he noted, also tasty.) 
When we met he had just finished his MA in architecture and was in a 
sensitive and uncertain phase of plotting his next move while hoping for the right 
opportunity to materialize. In the meanwhile he was underemployed, working 
part-time on a poorly paid three-month contract at a small architectural studio (a 
position for which he had been recommended by a professor) and as an unpaid 
teaching assistant (saradnik u nastavi) a few hours per week at the faculty. His 
parents paid his rent while his meager income kept him fed and funded the 
various application and exam fees required to set his migratory plans in motion. 
Though far from unusual, Miloš found this situation untenable. These 
conditions—and conviction that he was fundamentally unable to effect change in 
the “anti-system”—fueled his desire to emigrate. “I don’t want to sacrifice my 
whole life for the sake of a system that doesn’t appreciate me,” he said poignantly. 
“I really don’t see the point. That’s why I see…my next step outside of Serbia. And 
then after that maybe I’ll come back and start changing things, the way I can.”  
This last statement is perhaps the most optimistic that I heard from Miloš, 
whose commitment to the dimmest of views of Serbian society was matched by 
an equally rosy view of his chances for success in the US—an imagined future 
with an expansive perspektiva. I return below to Miloš’s story, to how his views 
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on society informed his stance toward migration and how his preparations to 
leave Serbia played out. But I first introduce another would-be migrant, Gordana.  
 
Meant for Something More: Gordana 
Connected through a mutual acquaintance, I got an email from Gordana, a 
second-year PhD student of Slavic languages, during the slow days of August 
2015. My initial impression, pieced together from her rather formally worded 
email and her university profile, was of a serious and accomplished academic. 
Her message promised the perspective of someone who saw emigration as “the 
only possible option” to work in her field of choice. How could this be for 
someone specializing in Slavic languages in Serbia? My curiosity piqued, I took 
the bus out to her neighborhood of Zemun to hear more. 
As we settled into the outdoor patio of a café in the center of Zemun, we 
compared notes about the systems of study and funding in our respective 
programs. When I shared that I “somehow just thought that things would work 
out” when I began my PhD program as an unfunded student, Gordana nodded in 
recognition. Disappointment colored her own story of adjusted expectations, but 
she spoke in the clipped voice of someone who had already processed the 
experiences she was sharing but for the residue of anger. She had long known 
that her work as a Slavist was at the center of her sense of self. As she explained, 
“I chose the profession that interests me the most, that I’m good at, that inspires 
me, in which there is nothing that I despise doing and for which I have the will 
and enthusiasm. I have experienced it not as work, but as a life calling.” Gordana 
was, quite simply, a spectacular student, winning awards in language 
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competitions, completing a degree in Russian alongside her chosen field of 
Ukrainian, and earning coveted scholarships that propelled her studies to the 
highest level. Her second degree in Russian was the outcome of a compromise 
with her mother, as Ukrainian is a field with fewer professional opportunities in 
Serbia. Like so many parents, Gordana’s mom worried first and foremost about 
her daughter’s existential security. But her daughter excelled in Ukrainian, as a 
Master’s student earning the highest marks recorded since the department was 
formed in 2002. And she expected this hard work and dedication to pay off, 
saying, “I believed that if I am motivated, talented, and the best, something will 
be found.”  
The “something” Gordana desired was actually quite specific: a permanent 
teaching position in her small department. Her mentor had made a verbal 
promise that she was first in line for the next spot as asistent. But when a 
position opened it went to someone else. Her mentor defended the decision and 
denied her student’s account of their understanding. Gordana, in turn, 
experienced this as an instance of the “negative selection” (negativna selekcija) 
that I heard about from many:  
I always thought that the main criteria [for advancement] ought to be 
knowledge and dedication. In the course of my studies I tried to master the 
program, to master additional things, to go to conferences, to develop 
professionally, all sorts of things, and others did so as well. However, it 
turned out that those who were the best of their cohort (generacija) were 
not considered for staying with us [for departmental positions]. A kind of 
negative selection happens, in the sense that the goal is to put in place 
someone who is average and docile (poslušan)…someone who is not overly 
ambitious, as that is not considered a good quality. 
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The perception that negative selection was a widespread problem was, 
indeed, widespread among my interlocutors. The university was seen as the 
archetypical institution supporting this phenomenon that was also 
euphemistically glossed as “the wrong people in the wrong places.” Comments 
about the degradation of the university were multifaceted—indexing global 
frustration that higher education is not the guarantor of employment it once was, 
as well as local perceptions that the university as institution had become morally 
bankrupt to the extent of no longer being able to guarantee social status either. 
Nevertheless, my interlocutors remained invested in the value they thought a 
university education ought to hold—a prestige held all the more dear because of 
its beleaguered status. The proliferation of private universities in the country 
(plagued by widespread perception that diplomas are available for purchase) was 
coupled with a series of scandals in which high-ranking officials were exposed as 
having committed plagiarism (including Belgrade mayor Siniša Mali) or having 
lied about their educational qualifications (see Peščanik 2018). Such instances 
were linked in public discourse to examples of officials appointed without any 
apparent relevant qualifications other than political loyalty to support a narrative 
of endemic negative selection and society-wide corruption as well as the 
conviction that education, knowledge, and expertise had been fundamentally 
devalued. This was the substance of Miloš’s anti-system—a topsy-turvy world of 
inverted values. 
It was also the world in which Gordana pursued her dream of becoming a 
professor. Her talent not just unappreciated, Gordana’s efforts at the university 
were met with mistreatment that she characterized as “mobbing,” “directed at 
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destroying one’s self-confidence to the greatest extent possible.” When I asked 
what such treatment looked like, she responded that “it’s nothing reportable” 
(nije nešto što ti možeš da prijaviš) but that it involved a kind of regular, and at 
least in her case, often public humiliation. She described several instances in 
which her honest and diligent efforts were met with responses seemingly 
engineered to remind her of her lowly position in the academic hierarchy and 
that she ought to be grateful for any “crumb” thrown her way (like the 
opportunity to lecture for free, in the worst classroom, at the worst time, or to 
draft presentations on behalf of the department for which she was given less than 
twelve hours’ notice). “It’s like, nothing you do right is worth anything, nothing is 
recognized, every lapse, even the smallest oversight, even when it’s not an 
oversight, is counted against you as a mistake and you get a public—meaning in 
the presence of others—you are subjected to public criticism that is not always 
founded.”  
Despite the fact that “mobbing” has not accrued the same explanatory 
potential in Serbia as elsewhere in Europe, Gordana’s use of this term overlaps 
with Noelle Molé’s analysis of mobbing as “a deeply resonant cultural concept” in 
Italy whose meaning as psychological trauma that can induce physical ills—in 
addition to being a “labor disorder”—was consolidated by occupational 
psychologists in the 1990s (2012, 3, 6). Molé positions mobbing as bound up with 
the neoliberal reforms that attacked Italy’s famously strong labor protections and 
increased the spread of temporary short-term contracts. While the labor histories 
of Italy and Serbia are distinctive, valorization of the productive worker and of 
“intense labor as satisfying and rewarding” (Molé 2012, 101) grounded both 
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Eastern and Western visions of modernity before the end of the Cold War 
“shattered an entire conception of the world” (Buck-Morss 2000, x). In contexts 
such as both Italy and Serbia, where not only memories of past labor regimes but 
actual workplaces coveted for their relative stability and predictability remain, 
mobbing appears as “a form of abjection in that it is produced by labor’s rapid 
devaluation in proximity to lived safeguards and allows actors to name the 
injustices and human costs of neoliberal orders” (Molé 2012, 9).  
The context of the former Yugoslavia, however, highlights the 
unpredictable effects of neoliberalization. It is thus significant that, in contrast to 
the private-sector mobbing investigated by Molé, the settings of such 
harassment—as well as related phenomena like the “tamping of ambition” 
conveyed in Jelena’s tale of watching where she steps—were public institutions, 
where positions are seen as doled out exclusively through nepotistic or 
clientelistic networks. This understanding was universally shared during my time 
in the field and corroborated the perception of a more generalized moral 
degradation of work and society. As Larisa Kurtović (2017) has convincingly 
shown in neighboring Bosnia and Herzegovina, political patronage (the exchange 
of party membership and electoral support for a public-sector job) comes to make 
sense as employment strategy in the job-scarce postsocialist economy where 
privatization processes have consolidated elite power. Contemporary patronage 
and other forms of corruption are experienced as distinctive from the “legible and 
predictable” (Hromadžić 2015, 161) varieties remembered to have flourished in 
socialist Yugoslavia. The ambiguous postwar and postsocialist moral landscape 
demands continuous negotiation (see Brković 2017; Kurtović 2013), and, for a 
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young, ambitious, would-be civil servant, demands moral compromise. Linked as 
it is to the vernacular concept of negative selection, I would say that in Serbia, 
mobbing is popularly perceived as a product of the devaluation of a certain kind 
of labor—the labor produced through talent, hard work, and expertise. My 
interlocutors conveyed a collective sense of alienation from a system that worked 
according to a moral logic they did not and did not want to share. In such a 
context, emigration became an attractive prospect for those who saw it as a 
realistic option.  
 
Leaving in Time: Gordana 
Until a certain moment, Gordana never had the inclination to leave Serbia, 
and she now expressed regret that she had passed up earlier paths to emigration. 
As she explained:   
I didn’t want to go abroad. I was born here, all of my relatives were born 
here.... Most Serbs have relatives [abroad], at least in the former Yugoslav 
republics, they have aunts in Germany, Austria, Canada—I don’t have 
anything like that. We are really from Serbia, from central Serbia, and I 
saw myself here. I think that if someone had told me ten years ago that I 
would be thinking about, and that I would see leaving Serbia as the only 
option, that I would have told him or her that it’s not true, that that can’t 
happen. Because I wanted to work here. 
 
I often asked those who wanted to leave if there had been a turning point 
when they made this decision. Many told me no, that they had come to the 
realization slowly; that the saturation of society with talk of leaving made it so 
that leaving was always a consideration of sorts. But not Gordana. She had been 
describing the mistreatment she experienced in her department when I asked, 
“Well, when was the turning point when you decided that emigration was an 
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option?” Without pause she responded: “January 15, 2014. At 3:30pm.” “Really?! 
What happened?” I laughingly inquired.   
Gordana relayed yet another story of departmental mistreatment and 
disrespect. While not necessarily worse than what she has already experienced, it 
was the final straw. A particularly tense conversation with her mentor ensued and 
her resolve was steeled: “I left her office and wished to never return again.” 
Elaborating, she again invoked the theme of negative selection: “I don’t want to 
work in an environment in which obedience and sucking up are the only criteria 
for advancement. I don’t want to work in a place where every initiative is 
punishable.” 
Gordana is someone who feels pushed out of Serbia. Meant for something 
more. She could earn a decent living as a translator but doesn’t want to. She 
could work in a Russian firm but doesn’t want to. She wants to be given the 
chance to pursue her singular dream of a professorial life. After carefully 
considering her options, she decided that the easiest way to fulfill her ambition 
would be to enroll in another doctoral program at an university—after completing 
her PhD in Serbia. Aghast at the commitment this represented, I sought to 
confirm that I had understood correctly. I had. As she explained:  
I would start my doctorate again because I didn’t get the chance to learn 
anything intelligent here. I mean, the thing that gets to me the most is that 
I wasn’t given the chance to develop. Because there are so many of us 
[students in the department], because the subjects are too general, 
because I had very few opportunities to learn something that would be 
useful for me, because no one works with us, and because I feel that in 
2018 I will obtain the title of “doctor of science” but I won’t obtain the 
knowledge. 
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Gordana had carefully researched programs of study abroad and—out of 
the usual amalgam of personal, professional, and practical reasons—had settled 
on Austria as her preferred destination. But as a student she had also had 
opportunities to travel within Europe that had helped to crystalize her decision. 
Through the student organization AIESEC she had twice traveled to Ukraine for 
several weeks at a time, teaching English while polishing her own Ukrainian and 
Russian-language skills. She had been to seminars in Germany as well—always at 
the expense of the organizing institution, she was careful to emphasize, as she 
would not have been able to afford to travel otherwise. Accustomed to always 
scrimping and saving, she said:  
I was shocked when I saw a completely different relationship to money, a 
different relationship to education, a different classroom structure. I saw 
how much you in the West aren’t aware how happy-go-lucky you are 
(koliko imate bezbrižnost). How much you, in your youth- to a certain 
extent this exists here as well, people who are more [materially] 
secure….But when I walked into a store as a child I never thought about 
what I want—I always had in mind the amount [of money] that I had, and 
then I looked to see what I could get. Not what you want, but what you can 
get (ne šta želiš, nego šta možeš). That’s simply how you are raised. Not 
me—whole generations were raised like that. And then, all of a sudden you 
see people who do something just because they want to. 
 
Gordana continued to describe how her peers from Western Europe would 
introduce themselves in seminars abroad as having come for the experience, to 
have fun, or because they simply felt like seeing something new, while she was 
there because she needed the professional development. The parallel she drew to 
her childhood memory of shopping with a set amount of money was lost on me 
until she spontaneously returned to it later. She was telling a rather funny story 
about an interaction with a professor at her faculty who, while Serbian, had 
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earned her doctorate and taught for several years in the US. When the professor 
encouraged Gordana to decide for herself which theoretical framework she 
wanted to apply in her work, Gordana tried, unsuccessfully, to discern the 
professor’s own theoretical proclivities because she assumed there was a “correct” 
orientation. “Again, it’s the situation from the shop,” she explained. “Meaning, I 
don’t choose what I want out of everything that is available, rather I see what I 
have and then choose within that what is possible” (biram u okviru toga što 
može). Guided by a clear and singular professional goal, Gordana’s international 
travels had illuminated just how leaving Serbia could help her ambition break 
through and broaden her perspektiva.  
 
Leaving at any Cost: Miloš 
While Gordana’s ambitions were quite distinct, her trajectory overlapped 
with that of Miloš in the significant role played by prior experiences of mobility in 
informing future aspirations. Miloš directed his time and energy with laser-like 
focus toward making his way to the US, a destination made familiar through his 
experience as a summer kayak guide in Alaska. This had been a grueling 
experience, but also transformative. He called his Alaskan boss “the worst kind of 
capitalist” who worked the international staff hard, paid them little, and didn’t 
care about the bedbugs in their cots. But he also got in the best shape of his life, 
experienced breathtaking nature, and met his current girlfriend on an excursion. 
Visiting her elite university he had marveled at the contrast with Serbian student 
life. As he explained,  
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I just turned twenty-six, and I don’t want to spend the rest of my youth in 
austerity. I would like to live, you know, properly, even to go study again. 
Studying at a US college is amazing, it’s unbelievable! You know you can 
go to the canteen and eat all you can eat—anything—and imagine me, 
coming from Alaska! Going there, to the student canteen, and there’s 740 
items in the salad bar. Ha! I mean, I would like to live that way for part of 
my life. 
 
Like Gordana, Miloš also draws on his experience abroad to evoke a 
Western “then and there” featuring an expansive perspektiva—here colorfully 
represented by a seemingly endless salad bar that overrides the exploitative 
service work available to an international student. Miloš’s aspiration for 
experiencing this version of American student life was not about acquiring an 
additional qualification per se, which he saw as superfluous. Rather, while he was 
keeping all options for legal emigration open he considered the “student route” to 
be the easiest one. At least initially—each time we talked it took some effort to 
trace the trajectory of his plans. What I expected to hear had become old news; in 
the meanwhile he had inevitably changed tactics, dismissing his previously 
carefully plotted objectives as mere whims. But his preoccupation with making it 
to the US held firm.  
On a brilliant spring day in 2015, Miloš and I set off for a coffee before 
attending an event together. Over email he had mentioned that he was no longer 
working so that he could concentrate on pulling his portfolio together. This  
unfinished portfolio was a burden that weighed heavily. While he embodied the 
perseverance that he had asserted in our focus group as being of prime 
importance, Miloš was also prone to self-sabotage and feelings of inadequacy. He 
struck me as his own worst enemy, consumed by doubt that his portfolio had 
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been perfected enough and confiding that he had trouble establishing regular 
work habits—he needed the pressure of a looming deadline and the quiet focus of 
the wee hours of the morning to produce. Nevertheless, I suspected that there 
was more to the story of his quitting a three-month contract early.  
As I scrambled to establish the pivots he had made since our last 
encounter he flippantly said, “I should also mention that I am moving.” He was 
leaving his apartment in Belgrade to move back in with his parents. “I don’t really 
need to be here all the time,” and “I decided to save that 150 euros a month [in 
rent],” he explained. Besides, “I will still be here [in Belgrade] like one day a 
week, I’ll just find someplace to sleep.” I had trouble accepting his framing of this 
development as a rational decision based on his own needs and was nagged by a 
sense that he was papering over a disappointing indicator of downward mobility. 
My heart also sank at the thought of losing a key interlocutor, as I very much 
doubted that he would come to Belgrade regularly.  
Miloš offered yet another rationale for the change: his roommate was 
leaving town as well, having gotten a scholarship to a prestigious US university 
for a Master’s program in architecture. Rather than express jealousy at his 
friend’s fortune, Miloš was resolute and optimistic about his chances for pushing 
through his own Plan B. He was buoyant about an email he had received, a call 
for applications for several open positions at an architectural firm in New York 
City. He slid his phone across the table so that I could read the message, which 
had been forwarded by a friend of a friend who worked in the firm. The fact that 
the firm seemed to work on classic old homes rather than the modern 
architecture he was interested in didn’t concern him in the least—it would still be 
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a foot in the door. He reminded me that he only had until July to apply for a J-1 
training visa and that he first needed a commitment from a company willing to 
sponsor him. As he described how the sponsoring company had to create a 
training plan (“though they don’t have to actually follow it,” he noted) and deal 
with some sort of inspection, I was skeptical that a firm would go to such trouble 
but mostly kept my doubts to myself. Miloš was matter-of-fact about the 
paperwork required, saying, “it’s good for them, because they can pay me less.”  
As for securing the necessary visa, he was confident that he already knew 
the ropes and convinced me of this as well. During our interview Miloš had 
described a vision of the ideal future in which he returned to Serbia after 
establishing himself abroad to pursue his dream job of owning his own firm that 
designed innovative social housing. But this vision now seemed far removed from 
his current concern. He ticked through the main points to touch on in the 
anticipated visa interview, which culminated in saying that he would “bring 
something back to Serbia.” I laughingly said, “You know the script! But you really 
do seem like someone who wants to come back.” Miloš scrunched his face. “I 
have to fulfill...”—he searched for the right word before continuing— “...my 
ambitions. Right now I want to go work somewhere far away—someplace where 
there are things that need to be built and where it’s not about cheating on 
contracts.” I thought there was a good chance that this was an allusion to the job 
he had just left. But I responded with an allusion to the presumed fate of the 
government’s scandal-ridden waterfront reconstruction instead: “and where 
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construction projects remain unfinished.”77 He nodded and added “and where the 
money disappears. Here, you can choose slavery or quitting.” Now laughing he 
quipped, “I chose both!” 
As we approached the circle of smokers in front of the cultural center Rex, 
Miloš greeted a woman who he told me was one of the founding members of the 
Who Builds the City (Ko Gradi Grad–KGG) initiative. The presentation to come 
was part of KGG’s “Smarter Building” (Pametnija Zgrada) project with the aim to 
“develop a prototype for a low-impact collective housing that can serve as a 
model to address housing issues in their wider social and economic context” 
(KGG, n.d.). Miloš knew the group, had attended some of their previous events, 
and noted that the person he had greeted could be a good connection for him. As 
the presentation continued into a third hour I was impressed with the 
seriousness of this local effort to imagine collectively self-built housing in the 
country. But Miloš did not directly connect the event with his own aspirations. At 
least, he did not see it as any indication that his ambitions might be realizable in 
                                                   
77 The controversy around Belgrade Waterfront–BW (Beograd na Vodi) was ever-present during, 
though did not directly intersect, my research. In many ways this ongoing scandal aptly illustrates 
the opaque (dis)function of the “anti-system” described by Miloš, the relationship toward politics 
exhibited by my interlocutors, and some of the cultural fault lines discussed in this dissertation. 
In short, the urban “revitalization” project in question was first announced by the government in 
2012 (Vučić was deputy prime minister at the time). BW was to turn the rather crumbling 
waterfront of the Sava river into a modern marina, luxury shopping mall, elite apartment 
buildings, and central “tower” with a yet-to-be-determined function; a playground for the super-
rich. The $3 billion project was shrouded in mystery and speculation from the start. It was backed 
by Abu Dhabi-based developer Eagle Hills (Belgrade Waterfront, n.d.) though it is unclear how 
much of this investment was actually secured. Of the many serious objections to BW raised by 
professional architects and ordinary citizens alike, the most fundamental is that the process was 
entirely unlawful, failing to take place in the context of a public competition (see AAS 2015). 
Robust street protests under the slogan “We won’t give up/drown Belgrade” (Ne Da(vi)mo 
Beograd) were organized but failed to achieve appreciable results (though see NDM, n.d. for 
current activities). The most recent victim of BW has been the central train station, a building of 
immense historic significance and from which the entire transportation infrastructure of the city 
unfolds (see Ilić 2018 for a summary of BW developments).  
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Serbia. This disconnect revealed his vision for the future as more like fantasy, 
realizable only in a world where Serbia is not like it is, not in the here and now. 
As we walked back to the transportation hub of Studentski Trg and prepared to 
part ways he showed me his phone again, this time open to Google Maps. “I 
looked up the location of the agency in New York,” he said. It was right in 
downtown Manhattan, near the Port Authority. “You can’t get more central than 
that,” I said. Miloš agreed, adding, “I probably won’t get it [the job]…” I 
murmured something reassuring, wished him good luck with the move, and 
wondered if I would see him again.  
The mobility narratives of Miloš and Gordana draw value-laden 
distinctions between the way things work in Serbia and the way things were both 
imagined to be and experienced in the West. While Gordana had methodically 
researched her options for emigration and plotted a course of action, she had not 
yet had to operationalize her plan. For Miloš, the messy material world of 
emigration loomed large: his unfinished portfolio, the official internship 
description, the email from a possible employer, the location of the firm in 
Manhattan. In our conversations, his vision and aspirations for the future seemed 
specifically pinned to these markers, which featured not just as narrative 
moments but as the tangible materials that brought his goal into relief or pushed 
it farther away. His breezy optimism, tenacity, and flexibility in relation to the 
broadened perspektiva he imagined in the US contrasted with a stubborn refusal 
to consider that opportunities for professional fulfilment might exist in Serbia. In 
the final section below, I return to Jelena—the fiery former bank employee whose 
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story opened this chapter—to more specifically unpack how meritocracy features 
in narratives of mobility and potential migration from Serbia.  
 
Meritocracy:  
Tracing Possibility and Aspiration in the “Then and There” 
Life as an exchange student wasn’t easy for Jelena. She was placed in a 
tiny southern town with a Pentecostal family who took seriously their mission to 
save her from eternal damnation. That final year of high school was “a disaster,” 
she told me, the worst year of her life. “So,” she said chuckling, “I never would 
have stayed had it not been for the bombing.” When the NATO bombing of Serbia 
began in the spring of 1999 returning home as planned no longer seemed like the 
smartest move. But her future in the US was far from certain—until she was 
approached at her high school graduation with the extraordinary news that the 
teachers had worked their contacts to secure her a scholarship to the local 
community college—though only for one semester.   
She moved in with the parents of a kindly teacher. She found friends to 
drive her to class. She did well, the college continued to pay her way, and when 
she earned her associate’s degree, the dean called around, saying, “we have an 
outstanding student, she has no money to go to school, what can you do for her?” 
A four-year university stepped up with a scholarship. Jelena finished her 
bachelor’s degree without paying a dime and funded her master’s in public 
relations by working in a residence hall.  
Fundamentally unable to afford the American college experience, this 
unintentional migrant was propelled forward by a combination of hard work, 
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luck, and the sheer magnetism of a personality that coaxed others into believing 
in her. This is how Jelena narrates her story but it is also hard to not see it this 
way. Jelena’s story, biography, and worldview weave together entrepreneurial 
and meritocratic values that share the terrain of conviction in the idea that 
“individuals are responsible for working hard to activate their talent” (Littler 
2018, 8) and that this hard work and talent will—or ought to—result in just 
rewards. Though highly critical of the racialized and gendered inequality of 
opportunity obscured by the ideological discourse of meritocracy (see Bloodworth 
2016; McNamee and Miller 2018), I had to begrudgingly admit that, given her 
experience, it made sense when Jelena said:  
“What I like about the US and what I miss about the US is the fact that you 
know, in the US, if they see that you’re working really hard, all the doors will be 
open for you.”  
I mumble noncommittally as she continues.  
“Because in the US, success is appreciated. And it’s pushed. So if you 
see…somebody who’s working really hard, and you can help them, you will help 
them.” She bolsters her point by drawing out the contrast with Serbia: “Here, if 
you see somebody like that you will be like, ohh, this person will grow to be better 
than me, no no, let me-” She breaks off, ending the sentence by slicing her hands 
through the air as though cutting an adversary down to size.  
Drawing inspiration from Hilary Parsons Dick’s analysis of the narratives 
of Mexican nonmigrants (2010), I argue that stories like Jelena’s, which paint the 
contrast between meritocracy and its absence in bold, broad strokes, allow the 
speaker to align herself in a particular way, to cast herself as a certain social type. 
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In this case, Jelena represents herself—through the voice of her boss at the bank 
at the top of this article—as industrious, active, and entrepreneurial, always 
interested in learning and doing better. The kind of person who would reach for 
the stars if only to land on the moon. The antithesis of the persona of the boss 
himself. As in the story of Jelena’s six-month review, the figure of the public 
sector manager is frequently called upon to represent a kind of inertia, a 
thwarting of progress and innovation. He personifies society’s defective moral 
compass, a brokenness that renders the system unknowable and unnavigable to 
those without personal or political connections and the perverse system of values 
needed to activate such networks for personal advancement. In Serbia, these 
social types are locally recognizable ones that tap into deep societal divisions.  
I further argue that the ways in which my interlocutors talked about 
staying and leaving Serbia did not directly express a desire for full-fledged 
European citizenship and the sense of respect and belonging assumed to come 
along with eventual EU membership. Rather, the geographies they invoked were 
primarily symbolic ones, constructed broadly to map different ways of being in 
the world, and about staking a claim of belonging to a world that was ordered and 
moral. The relevant moral aspirations are epitomized here by investment in 
meritocracy as an ideal of how things ought to be. As meritocracy remains “one of 
the most loved ideas in American life” (Garber 2017) it continues to nurture the 
promise for would-be migrants that social mobility will accompany physical 
relocation. Simultaneously invoked as a register of aspiration and critique, 
potential migrants like Gordana and Miloš marshalled the belief that opportunity 
is (more) evenly distributed elsewhere, and that through migration their 
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perspektiva might be stretched to match that of others. But I also found that 
those who returned or were resolved to stay drew on overlapping value 
frameworks to bolster the claim that successes achieved in Serbia were sweeter 
than American ones for the very reason of being harder to attain. It is to these 
stories that I now turn. 
 159 
CHAPTER 5 
STAYING IN SERBIA: MATERIALIZING OPPORTUNITY THROUGH 
SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
 
October 2014, my first month of fieldwork. I pause at the entrance to a 
prewar building in the center of Belgrade. The double wooden doors are 
impressive; my attempts to open them feeble. A man in white painters’ clothes 
appears, summoned by the racket. In the inner courtyard my eyes scan for a clue 
to the “open house” I am seeking. Finding none, I appeal to the elderly 
construction worker. He has no idea what I am talking about, yet leads me 
through another set of doors into an expansive room where my host, Paola, sits 
alone, huddled over a laptop.     
Though Paola was expecting me, I hadn’t expected to be the only member 
of what I imagined as a bustling crowd, eager to discover what was on offer here. 
(Later noting that the “open house” was a daily event, I realized that I had 
projected some particularly American assumptions onto this encounter.) I was 
keen on forging new connections in town and a fellow Fulbrighter had sent me 
the contact information of an “Italian anthropologist” he knew in Belgrade. 
Perusing the website of what our mutual acquaintance described as Paola’s 
“current project” I was enthralled by the high-class web design and the 
architecture of the space it depicted. But the promise of the organization is what 
fueled my eagerness to venture out to the open house. When the renovations 
were complete, this former recording studio would become Impact Hub Belgrade 
(IHB), part of a global network of coworking and mentoring spaces for social 
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entrepreneurs.78 Paola, originally from Italy with a US degree in anthropology 
and long employed in the development industry, had founded Impact Hub 
Belgrade with her Serbian husband. She now sprang into action as my tour guide.  
We strolled through the space, redolent with the smell of fresh paint and 
drywall and chilly without the heat of more than a few bodies. I was dazzled—as 
much by a sense that I had stepped into a fascinating new world as by the 
expansive whitewashed walls accented with dark wood. Though my host 
delivered her tour in English she utilized a lexicon clearly mundane in her world 
but not in mine. Repurposed terms rolled off her tongue as though I were in on 
the secret: members of Impact Hub became part of an “ecosystem,” the main 
floor would be equipped with modular furniture for “hot-desking,” and the hub 
would be more than just an “incubator.” I left the tour in a haze. Was this cutting-
edge initiative what the fusty local career politicians meant when they opined that 
“stimulating entrepreneurial spirit” was a key focus of employment policy, and 
thus the linchpin to keeping talented youth home?79 
The many lives of the building that now houses Impact Hub Belgrade—
from headquarters of the state employee cooperative to recording studio to hub, 
flanked by a youth hostel—serve as an apt metaphor for broader national, 
regional, and global economic transformations. Central to these changes has been 
                                                   
78 As detailed online, the first Impact Hub was opened in London in 2005. All Hubs belong to the 
“Impact Hub Association” which collectively owns the Impact Hub IP, Brand, and Impact Hub 
Company, a “charitable company” headquartered in Vienna that fosters connections between the 
over one hundred Hubs worldwide (Impact Hub, n.d.).  
 
79 Examples of this official discourse can be found at: 
http://www.nsz.gov.rs/live/info/vesti/preduzetni_ki_duh_i_socijalna_integracija.cid15982 and 
http://www.mos.gov.rs/vest/krenuli-razgovori-s-privrednicima-o-zaposljavanju-mladih. 
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the promotion and valorization of entrepreneurship, with the US economy held 
up as prime model to be emulated. As the very first report of the Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor asserted in 1999, “the buoyancy of the U.S. economy 
appears to be a function, at least in part, of the entrepreneurial vitality evident 
even to the most casual observer” (Reynolds, Hay, and Camp 1999, 7).80 Since the 
2008 financial crisis, global policymakers have doubled down on 
entrepreneurship as catalyst for economic recovery, citing a fetishized 
relationship between entrepreneurship and economic growth (e.g. Reynolds et al. 
2001, 12–13). The EU’s “Entrepreneurship 2020 Action Plan” put it simply: “to 
bring Europe back to growth and higher levels of employment, Europe needs 
more entrepreneurs” (EC 2013, 3). The entrepreneur has emerged over the past 
four decades as “neoliberalism’s heroic actor” (Freeman 2014, 17), stripped of 
earlier associations with ideals such as self-sacrifice (Foster 2016, 91–92).  
Though the details of its definition elide consensus, entrepreneurship is 
generally considered to be the creation of a new business by an individual or 
group. More specifically, the practice of entrepreneurship includes the 
“perception of economic opportunities, assembling the financial and material 
resources and inputs for economic innovation, recruiting personnel, and dealing 
with suppliers, purchases, and the government” (Bonnell and Gold 2002, xv). 
This understanding often overlaps—but is sometimes distinguished from—
                                                   
80 The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor is an ongoing collaborative research project between 
scholars at Babson College and the London Business School. The initial aim of the project was to 
uncover the reasons for disparate national levels of entrepreneurial activity. GEM also bills itself 
as “an ever-growing community of believers in the transformative benefits of entrepreneurship.” 
See: https://www.gemconsortium.org/about/gem. 
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entrepreneurialism. While I discuss the local stakes of these definitions below, 
the general point to note here is that entrepreneurialism encompasses the cluster 
of personal characteristics, skills, and the very subject position necessary for each 
individual to “conceive and conduct him- or herself as an enterprise” (Dardot and 
Laval 2013, 3; see also Bröckling 2016)—but not necessarily open a business. 
Though the exact content of this cluster is variously apprehended, flexibility, as 
Carla Freeman notes (2014, 19–20), is the essence of entrepreneurialism.  
The slow shift in employer–employee relations from what Ilana Gershon 
(2017), in her ethnography of the contemporary job search, describes 
metaphorically as the shift from “self-as-property” to “self-as-business,” has 
broken the link between being an entrepreneur and being entrepreneurial, with 
an entrepreneurial ethos diffused into all realms of life. This insight, attributed to 
Michel Foucault (2008), has been subsequently elaborated in further 
theorizations of Foucauldian notions of governmentality, subjectification, and the 
role of psychology in these processes (e.g. Binkley 2011; Rose 1989). 
Anthropologists have taken up and refined such interventions in the field, 
demonstrating how development became infused with entrepreneurial 
technologies like microlending (Elyachar 2002), intimate and family relations are 
transformed via entrepreneurial affects (Freeman 2014), and entrepreneurialism 
becomes blended with other value-laden logics to coax the development of “good” 
citizens (Hemment 2015; Irani 2015; Ouellette and Hay 2008).  
The particular form of entrepreneurship glossed as “social” is most 
generally defined as business activity in service of creating some sort of social 
value (Abu-Saifan 2012). Its recent flourishing is indicative of the privatization of 
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previously public services (Mulligan 2014; Zhang and Ong 2008) as well as 
renewed interest in the injection of ethics into capitalism that has been a periodic 
strategy to assuage its various abuses. (A close cousin of social entrepreneurship 
is the collection of practices that have come to be known as “corporate social 
responsibility.”) Critics argue that efforts ranging from fair trade to social 
enterprises are “part and parcel of the same apparatus with which corporations 
have monopolized and deradicalized what were once seen as alternative 
economic models and political movements” (Dolan and Rajak 2016, 5; see also 
Shamir 2004).  
In this chapter and the next, I discuss tech and social entrepreneurship as 
two realms that both illustrate the ambiguous status of this mode of economic 
activity and represent popular recent attempts to coax dignified work from the 
inhospitable climate of precarity on the European semi-periphery. Below, I 
interrogate two initiatives to promote entrepreneurship (and 
entrepreneurialism)—workshops of the Social Impact Award and the “u.lab” 
course—that unfolded on the muddy middle ground between state-sponsored and 
grassroots action. Both took place at Impact Hub Belgrade, in the first two years 
of its establishment. The ambiguity of the aims and effects of these events was 
heightened by the fact that Impact Hub and the initiatives it hosted focused on 
generating “impact” in addition to profit—an elusive criteria that tended to 
translate most clearly into support for social entrepreneurship (as in the case of 
the Social Impact Award) or more loosely as a broader orientation toward 
transforming self and society (as in the case of u.lab).  
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The infancy of Impact Hub Belgrade at the time of my fieldwork made it a 
compelling site of participant observation. Though much of the core team and a 
few of the initial members remain nearly four years after my fieldwork, the 
novelty of IHB in 2014–2015 meant that many bodies circulated through its 
doors and various events. Whereas the same handful of entrepreneurial “success 
stories” tended to be trotted out at the various institutionally sponsored events I 
attended, IHB attracted a much wider range of curious patrons with differing 
interests and levels of commitment to and experience with social 
entrepreneurship. It also “hosted” the gatherings of numerous initiatives whose 
missions it did not necessarily directly endorse. For my purposes this was mostly 
an advantage—but also means that my analysis should not be taken as applying 
specifically to Impact Hub Belgrade or the broader network of Impact Hubs. 
As I spent more time in the world of Serbian entrepreneurship I wrestled 
with my personal alignment with the critical bent of anthropologies of 
contemporary forms of work and the broader social theory they mobilize. My 
skepticism was felt all the more acutely for how it appeared to run counter to the 
expectations of my interlocutors. As an American, I was sometimes assumed to 
intuit and endorse a Silicon Valley-inspired ethos of innovation and risk-taking. 
Especially in events hosted by Impact Hub Belgrade I was sometimes hailed as 
representative of the “then and there” of an imaginary (entrepreneurial) West.81 
                                                   
81 As I discuss in chapter 1, the “imaginary West” of my interlocutors was contoured differently 
than the “Imaginary West” of the late Soviet citizens studied by Alexei Yurchak. Both emerged 
from historically specific circumstances. Most importantly, while the discursive formation of 
Yurchak’s study was predicated on the inaccessibility of the actual West, as I explore throughout 
this dissertation, my interlocutors based their expectations and aspirations on real-life 
experiences of travel (cf. Yurchak 2006, 158–206). 
 165 
In interviews with promoters of entrepreneurship, my questions were often taken 
as coming from a place of puzzlement over behavior unintelligible to me as an 
American assumed to have received a “proper” entrepreneurial induction. I failed 
to appropriately enact this role.  
While I semi-consciously tried to be transparent about my critical lens, my 
participation in workshops and interviews on entrepreneurship, and indeed the 
very energy with which I felt pulled into its orbit, was animated by an authentic 
desire to understand how this world was experienced by its inhabitants. My 
observations were also guided by anthropologies of neoliberalism that highlight 
the instability and incoherence of economic processes, rather than assuming 
neoliberalization’s totalizing effects. This literature demands attention be trained 
on how specific elements are brought into specific configuration in specific 
locales (e.g. Collier 2011; Freeman 2014; Hemment 2012, 2015; Hoffman, 
DeHart, and Collier 2006; Ong 2006; Salmenniemi, Nurmi, and Jaakola, 
forthcoming; Yurchak 2002). My critical engagements with Serbian 
entrepreneurship were thus also opportunities to remember that there is nothing 
necessarily neoliberal or negative about self-employment as such or the attributes 
of flexibility, creativity, personal responsibility, proactivity, and self-actualization 
that are so frequently clustered together and glossed as entrepreneurial. Further, 
the landscape of entrepreneurial enterprises in Serbia is dominated by 
“microenterprises”—businesses with fewer than nine employees. This category 
comprises around 96 percent of the small and medium-sized business sector, 
which in turn accounts for 99.8 percent of total registered businesses in the 
country (Ministry of Economy 2015, 10). In so far as the profits generated by 
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many microenterprises are absorbed by individuals, families, or funneled toward 
social ends, they could be considered “alternative market” endeavors constituent 
of a diverse economy (Gibson-Graham 2006, 63), rather than taken as evidence 
of neoliberal capitalism’s decisive victory.  
This is not (just) a matter of theoretical orientation. Rather, I argue that 
the expansive ambiguity of entrepreneurship—particularly in the spaces where it 
fails to overlap with entrepreneurialism—is fertile ground for sifting through the 
economic expectations and values of youth and re-specifying the nature of 
economic and political subject-formation in the postsocialist, post-2008 world. I 
thus approach this economic mode and way of being in the world as a “potent and 
double-edged drive, one both facilitating creative energies and their capitalist 
capture” (Littler 2018, 192). The aim of this chapter is thus to parse the 
promotion and appeal of social entrepreneurship for youth in Serbia. Given the 
general orientation toward social good of those attracted to IHB events, of central 
interest in this chapter (continued into the next) is also the vision of change 
discernable in this field. To what ends are the energies of these self-professed 
“active” citizens directed? Are entrepreneurs activists by another name, or are 
these the “ordinary capitalists” (Neveling and Salverda 2018) who grease the 
wheels of global capital accumulation under the radar and under the guise of 
“doing good?” My answer will be a bit of both. The central argument threaded 
throughout the sections to follow is that, despite a heightened orientation toward 
greater social good, the promotion of social entrepreneurship in Serbia remains 
fundamentally rooted in cultivation of the self. This, in turn, has multiple effects. 
Social entrepreneurship holds the potential of supplying dignified work “at 
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home” and, for some, may serve as a realm of authenticity. At the same time this 
focus on the self, as primary outcome or necessary precursor to social change, 
renders structural inequalities invisible or irrelevant, narrowing the parameters 
of and possibilities for solidarity.   
In the first section below, I sketch how entrepreneurship and 
entrepreneurialism are made locally meaningful, tracing the nuances of these 
concepts through a dense field of actors and interests. Via an account of my 
participation in a series of workshops for would-be social entrepreneurs under 
the auspices of the Social Impact Award, I next consider the entangled pragmatic 
and subjective aspects of the promotion of entrepreneurship. I then turn to the 
perplexing object of analysis that is “u.lab” and the discussions prompted by this 
MOOC’s unique approach to transforming self and society. Finally, I consider the 
moral inflections of parables of mobility and dignified work. Throughout, I 
explore how sites and subjectivities aligned with entrepreneurship also articulate 
stances toward mobility and migration, and, at times, operationalize the 
discourse on brain drain to assert the value framework of entrepreneurialism. In 
this chapter as well as the next, the fundamental question I probe is: for 
educated, urban, entrepreneurial youth, what does it mean to stay in a context so 
many others leave? 
 
Promoting Entrepreneurship, Coaxing Entrepreneurialism  
The promotion of entrepreneurship, especially among youth, women, and 
the long-term unemployed, has become a prominent feature of Serbian economic 
policy. As with the economic policies discussed in chapter 3, the influence of the 
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EU as well as bilateral donor organizations has crucially shaped this policy 
direction.82 But the global entrepreneurship agenda has also been domesticated. 
It is neither a wholly top-down governmental initiative nor simply a “donor 
discourse” or norm of global capitalism being pushed by the West. A public 
discussion I attended in May 2015 illustrates some of the range of actors that I 
gloss as local “promoters” of entrepreneurship (some of whom were themselves 
members of the target constituency of youth). The panel was organized by KOMS, 
the quasi-governmental National Youth Council of Serbia, on the topic of youth 
unemployment. The young organizers brought together representatives of several 
relevant institutions—the Ministry of Youth and Sport, the Union of Employers, 
and the National Bureau of Employment—with those from the non-governmental 
sphere, in this case from Junior Achievement, a US-based global network 
promoting workplace readiness and entrepreneurship education in schools, and 
JobFair, an annual career fair organized by students from the technical faculties. 
While each panelist spoke from a different set of concerns, leading to some 
testy exchanges (in particular around how the educational system ought to be 
reformed), all were supportive of entrepreneurship as catalyst for increasing 
employment. Such convergence around the entrepreneurial agenda is also 
evidenced by the “blended” status of several prominent organizations in the field. 
One such organization, Smart Kolektiv, works to specifically promote a “hybrid” 
model of operating that joins the profit motive of the business world with the 
                                                   
82 Key bilateral donors include USAID, GIZ (a German development agency that mostly 
implements governmental projects), and the Swiss Development Agency. Due in large part to the 
ongoing process of aligning Serbia’s body of law with the EU’s acquis, the country’s economic 
regulations are shot through with fewer apparent contradictions than elsewhere (see Julie 
Hemment’s 2012 analysis of the contradictory logics embedded in Russian social welfare law). 
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social mission of NGOs.83 The blossoming of social entrepreneurship in Serbia 
has facilitated the blurring of distinctions between governmental, nonprofit, and 
private spheres, due in part to the multi-sector professional biographies of some 
of those involved as well as shifting donor priorities. Many who were attracted to 
social entrepreneurship and attended events at Impact Hub Belgrade also had 
experience in the NGO sector. In the workshop analyzed below, participants 
easily identified the main problems with NGOs: dependence on donor funds and 
the disjuncture between the interests of donors and those of the organization 
itself. Social entrepreneurship appears to circumvent these issues, offered up as a 
pragmatic employment option for youth who also want to “do good.” 
As I arrived in the field the new National Youth Strategy (NYS)—intended 
to outline the strategic priorities of the Serbian government in relation to young 
people for the ten-year span of 2015–2025—was being finalized. Unsurprisingly, 
increasing the employability and employment of youth was the top strategic goal 
named in the document. A series of public hearings had been held, with 
interested parties invited to also submit written feedback on the working draft. In 
the draft document as well as the final version, “providing favorable conditions 
for the development of youth entrepreneurship” appears as the third of four 
specific strategies to address the top employment-related goal.84 
                                                   
83 The extensive combined list of “donors and partners” on the Smart Kolektiv website attests to 
the commitment of the organization to not be apprehended as a traditional NGO, though they are 
legally registered as such. See: https://smartkolektiv.org/o-nama/nasi-partneri-2/. 
 
84 The other specific goals under youth employment and entrepreneurship relate to improving 
and increasing access to employment programs, aligning skills acquired through education with 
the needs of the labor market, and developing a better system for career counseling (Ministry of 
Youth and Sport 2015a, 9–14). The previous (and also first) youth strategy, passed in 2008, also 
included mention of entrepreneurship, as part of a strategic objective “to encourage and stimulate 
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Entrepreneurship thus secured an important place in the strategy, and 
many of the “expected results and key activities” named reflect areas of concern I 
often heard expressed by promoters of entrepreneurship. These include an 
inadequate legal framework and lack of financial incentives, lagging integration 
of relevant knowledge and skills in schools, and lack of governmental recognition 
of and support for social entrepreneurship.  
Such systemic issues made their way into the NYS and were often 
articulated in NGO reports, at various panel discussions I attended, and in the 
expert interviews I conducted. But across these forums structural concerns 
tended to be presented as commensurate with a different kind of “problem”: the 
apparent fact that an awful lot of young people aspire to work for the state. 
According to various measures, this figure is anywhere from 40–70 percent.85 
One publication in particular had circulated widely: Civil Service? No Thanks, 
I’m an Entrepreneur! (Državna služba? Ne, hvala, ja sam preduzetnik!) 
Published in 2012 by the NGO Građanske Inicijative (Civic Initiatives—CI), the 
research presented is methodologically rigorous: findings were based on a survey 
of nearly 1,200 young people between the ages of fifteen and thirty in towns 
across Serbia. Survey results were supplemented by focus groups with young 
entrepreneurs and a “desk analysis” of the conditions for youth entrepreneurship. 
                                                   
all forms of employment, self-employment, and youth entrepreneurship” (Government of the 
Republic of Serbia 2008, 6).   
 
85 For example, see: https://www.blic.rs/vesti/ekonomija/srpski-san-evo-zbog-cega-cela-srbija-
zeli-drzavni-posao/731j1we. Another report by economic consultants claims that “today, public 
sector employment is the preferred career choice for the majority of citizens (65%)” but without 
providing a source for this figure (Nikolin and A. Vladisavljević 2013, 7).  
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The survey posed nuanced questions about attitudes, experiences, and 
perceptions toward entrepreneurship in Serbia.   
I read the report with interest but did not reach the same conclusion as the 
experts I interviewed. (One such promoter of entrepreneurship cited the CI 
report in saying that 70 percent of youth want to work in the public sector, yet 
this figure is not to be found in the report.) The executive summary includes the 
key findings that “40% of youth would choose work that is secure but with lower 
pay, 33% their own business, and 27% would choose better paid but less secure 
work.” Another finding is stated thusly: “Secure employment is regarded by youth 
as mostly in civil service, that is, the public sector: 57% of youth think that 
employment in the public sector is secure employment, and 44% think that work 
in state administration is the best professional experience” (CI 2012, 9). 
What if public-sector employment was a stand-in for a certain kind of 
good life characterized by a sense of existential security like that evoked by 
Mirjana and Mina in chapter 3? What if the particular status of this loaded term 
compelled young survey respondents to half-jokingly select it from the given 
options, out of a kind of gleeful inat? These interpretations seemed both plausible 
and obvious to me, especially in light of the in-depth interviews I was conducting. 
But much as with brain drain rankings, all nuance was stripped from the central 
message that circulated. For promoters of entrepreneurship, these figures served 
as convincing evidence of the work to be done to reform the values of young 
people (presumably out of touch with the reality of the beleaguered public sector 
and the future of work), the need to inject entrepreneurship into the educational 
system (presumably unable to prepare youth to be drivers of an innovative 
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Serbian economy), as well as the unhelpful influence of parents as bearers of a 
socialist legacy whose main feature was an expectation of the right to work. What 
was most needed, in this view, was for youth to become more entrepreneurial. To 
adopt entrepreneurialism as a mentality, a set of skills and dispositions, or even a 
lifestyle. Regardless of whether or not they would ever open a business, properly 
entrepreneurial youth, this view implies, would never respond in a survey that 
they want to work for the state.86 As with the active employment measures of the 
government, it is again the individual (here multiplied into the demographic 
category of youth) who again comes under scrutiny.   
Members of Smart Kolektiv, champion of a synergistic relationship 
between the business and social sectors, promoted a broad understanding of 
entrepreneurialism. They had (unsuccessfully) advocated for the “development of 
entrepreneurial culture among youth” to be a separate strategic goal in the 
National Youth Strategy, rather than appearing as part of one of several strategies 
for increasing youth employment. As a representative of the organization 
explained,  
When we talk about entrepreneurship, about the entrepreneurial spirit 
(preduzetnički duh), we are talking a little- we give that a little wider 
meaning. So, not just entrepreneurial spirit in the sense of starting a 
business and creating new value, profit, employment, introducing a new 
product, innovation in whichever sense of the word—rather, enterprising, 
we mean a type of enterprising spirit (preduzimljivi duh)...those are 
people who are prepared to accept responsibility for their own lives and 
who are proactive—they don’t wait, they don’t sit and wait for things to 
happen to them, rather they take the initiative and find ways to- to create 
the best path through life for themselves, and of course, along with social 
                                                   
86 For example, a report prepared for USAID states that “Entrepreneurial education allows youth 
to think in a way where they are developing personal competencies such as responsibility, risk-
taking and problem-solving, which are important for a productive workforce, regardless of 
whether or not they decide [to] start a business in the future” (Hutchinson et al. 2012, 28). 
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responsibility, meaning, with feeling for the community and their 
environment. 
 
 
The obvious implication of this intervention is that the state endorses a 
narrow understanding of entrepreneurship as activity while groups like Smart 
Kolektiv, Junior Achievers, and Impact Hub align with and advocate for an 
expansive understanding of entrepreneurialism as value system. While this is 
true to a certain extent—the main preoccupation of the state was with the 
employment rate and how employment could be boosted via entrepreneurship, 
and NGO actors did want to distance themselves from this official obsession—the 
reality was more complex. Government officials often invoked value-laden 
discourses of work in general and entrepreneurship in particular. NGOs wanted 
to help youth gain the concrete skills and support they needed to open actual 
businesses, in addition to coaxing the emergence of an “enterprising spirit.” And 
young people themselves wanted to find or create dignified work as much as they 
wanted to engage in projects of self-actualization. In the dense ecosystem of 
entrepreneurship—including coworking and mentoring spaces like Impact Hub, 
“blended” organizations like Smart Kolektiv, globally implemented projects like 
the Social Impact Award and u.lab, as well as government-sponsored trainings 
and various startup incubators—different actors appealed to different 
understandings of the term at different times and for different audiences. 
But the twin projects of promoting entrepreneurship and coaxing 
entrepreneurialism were also ones of rebranding the practice of 
entrepreneurship. As one interlocutor explained, “the legacy of communism and 
the legacy of our parents is that a business owner (privatnik) is an enemy of the 
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state, meaning, you are doing something outside the system, you are somehow 
scamming” (tu nešto muvaš). More commonly, promoters of entrepreneurship 
referred to the socialist past as having instilled the lesson that pursuit of profit 
was at best a dubious and at worst an immoral motive. The negative associations 
that accrued to the identity of entrepreneur during the chaotic 1990s were even 
more problematic. In the unregulated climate of the time, “entrepreneur” became 
a euphemism for tycoon, and a tycoon was known to be a wealthy and powerful 
businessman whose fortune was gained in circumstances of dubious legality (see 
Mandel and Humphrey 2002; Wedel 1998 for analyses of similar dynamics 
elsewhere in the postsocialist sphere).  
As a further complication, due to Serbia’s burdensome tax and regulatory 
structure, operating one’s own business often did mean, or was assumed to mean, 
some degree of complicity in Serbia’s resilient gray economy, via tax evasion or 
other forms of regulation-dodging. Such negative associations help account for 
the local appeal of what was regarded as a morally superior Western model of 
entrepreneurship and the subjectivity it was imagined to entail. In the next 
section, I describe a workshop that illustrates this point. The event ostensibly 
focused on introducing the practical business skills needed to found a social 
enterprise. While it did not explicitly position entrepreneurship as a value 
system, it nevertheless constituted a site of entrepreneurial subject-formation. 
Below, I sketch how I and other participants experienced the workshop.  
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Learning Entrepreneurship in “The Idea Factory” 
There was a fleeting moment in my fieldwork when I thought I might, 
reluctantly, become a caterer of traditional Serbian food. Through the Impact 
Hub Belgrade newsletter I learned of a series of workshops to be held under the 
auspices of the Social Impact Award (SIA). Founded in Vienna in 2009, SIA 
supports “early-stage social entrepreneurs in developing and implementing 
innovative business solutions to tackle the most important societal challenges of 
our times” (SIA, n.d.). A series of business development workshops support a 
competition for the best social enterprise ideas, with the winners receiving 
support in getting their endeavors off the ground. Active in more than twenty 
countries, SIA exemplifies the global diffusion of social entrepreneurship as “the 
new business model” (Fox 2016). But its arrival in Belgrade also illustrates the 
circulation of ideas and people permitted by the 2009 shift in mobility regime. In 
2015, SIA in Belgrade was coordinated by Nenad, a youngish self-professed “jack 
of all trades” at Impact Hub (he would later move on) with a degree in banking, 
his own nascent NGO, and a side business printing t-shirts. Nenad told me that 
the program had come to Belgrade via a friend who now lives in Vienna. A group 
of friends, all active in the student organization AIESEC, wanted to implement a 
socially minded project that would have a more lasting effect than the one-off 
endeavors they had previously participated in. His friend—studying in Vienna at 
the time—encountered SIA and proposed to implement the project in Serbia. As 
Nenad told me, “SIA was a perfect match because it was really well established, 
we didn’t have to create the project from the beginning…there’s like a very good 
case practice for it, and they were searching for partners in the Balkans…so really 
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things clicked.” In bringing SIA to Belgrade the friends were, in other words, 
proactive youth exhibiting a now idealized entrepreneurialism.  
The SIA “kick-off” came on a frigid day in early February 2015. It was a 
high-energy affair, featuring rapid-fire presentations by local social 
entrepreneurs and program sponsors. In front of an attentive audience Nenad 
also outlined how the SIA contest would unfold: a series of workshops would be 
held in Serbia’s three largest cities (Belgrade, Novi Sad, and Niš) in preparation 
for the contest itself, which would take place simultaneously in countries where 
SIA is active. The competition would conclude with an awards ceremony at the 
end of May, with three local winners receiving an incubation and mentorship 
program to include three months of membership at Impact Hub and expert 
trainings. Though the audience for the kick-off was substantial, it was hard to get 
a sense of what had drawn others in, even as I chatted about Serbia’s social issues 
(društveni problemi) with the young women seated next to me as part of the final 
agenda item of “networking.”  
A week later, I was the first to arrive at IHB for one of three scheduled 
“Idea Generation” workshops. I found Nenad and an assistant in the upstairs 
gallery ready for action: Nenad was perched on the edge of the stage, flanked by 
neatly arranged bottles of water and a projector screen. As we chatted he told me 
that the already-completed workshops in Novi Sad and Niš had been a success, 
with a total of around seventy participants in Novi Sad and eighty or so in Niš. Of 
course, Nenad added, some of the ideas generated in the workshop were better 
than others, and it’s a long way from idea to product. By the time our workshop 
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began, six women and four men had straggled into the room.87 I didn’t recognize 
anyone from the kick-off event. After a brief introduction to the concept of social 
entrepreneurship, we moved into the heart of the workshop, the “Idea Factory” 
(Fabrika Ideja). The Idea Factory comprised a series of brainstorming exercises 
for generating socially innovative products and services and introducing 
participants to the crucial questions needed to evaluate such ideas.88 
Individually, we first considered the question: “Which social problems make you 
angry and that you really want to solve?” As at the kick-off event, the next step 
was to mingle with the aim of finding others concerned with similar problems, 
this time in order to form a working group for the remainder of the workshop. 
Feeling insufficiently creative, I had jotted down “the high cost of education” (in 
the US). Noticing others forming clusters, I approached two participants sitting 
behind me, prompting them to share what they had come up with.  
Boban spoke at length about his concern: that young people in Serbia no 
longer learn traditional crafts (stari zanati). Sandra had generated a few ideas 
but was clearly passionate about one: the low rate of physical activity among 
youth. We were left to grapple with selecting one issue to work on for the rest of 
the workshop—three strangers who had been talking to each other for just a few 
minutes. It was already time to move on to the next phase. As we were directed to 
one of three small tables now equipped with flip-chart paper and markers we 
                                                   
87 When I later talked to Nenad about the disparity in attendance in the three cities he attributed 
it to the fact that there are fewer opportunities to attend “interesting things” outside the Serbian 
capital. While around 150 people had registered for the Belgrade workshops, far fewer showed up.  
 
88 Nenad confirmed that the content of the workshops was substantially the same in each country 
where SIA is active, with some minor variations according to the local context. 
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tried to circumvent the standoff by considering the next question: “What is the 
target group for which you want to create change?” Somehow—and my field notes 
offer no clues as to how—we decided our project would focus on “unemployed 
women.” With this arbitrary and uninformed decision, we were ready to begin the 
Idea Factory in earnest. Markers in hand, we moved through a series of four 
questions designed to help us home in on the distinctive traits and characteristics 
of our target group. 
“How can you make the lives of those in your target group a living hell?” 
We chuckled, re-reading the question projected behind us to be sure we got it 
right. “Well, their lives cannot get worse…” Boban mused. Sandra suggested 
raising the price of public transportation, and with that we had our first real idea 
worth recording. After intense negotiations over who would be our official scribe 
Sandra took the first turn, selecting the red marker, as Boban jovially noted, to 
signify that this was “the bad stuff.” Boban in particular began to relish inventing 
ever more outlandish examples colored by dark humor. I contributed something 
like “make it so that the kids have to stay home with them all day” which got 
translated onto the flipchart as “cancel daycare” (ukinuti vrtiće). Finally, Sandra 
and Boban laughingly arrived at the all-inclusive “officially recognize patriarchy” 
(zvanično priznati patrijarhat). 
As our joking threatened to derail the group process Nenad urged us to 
pick up the pace to consider the next questions: “How can you improve the lives 
of those in your target group? What are the special attributes and skills of your 
target group?” And: “What kinds of work can you create for your target group?” 
The “attributes and skills” we listed were limited to such things as cooking, 
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cleaning, caring for children, and sewing, and I began to feel uneasy with the 
stereotypical roles into which we were casting our imaginary unemployed 
women. Evidently reflecting the initial interest that brought him to the workshop, 
Boban kept adding obscure handicrafts to the list. Finally, with a triumphant 
laugh he announced that unemployed women can also follow numerous Turkish 
soap operas fluently! In the midst of this jovial brainstorming I tried to 
contribute “resourcefulness,” suggesting that most unemployed women had 
developed an incredible knack for making do with very little, but it didn’t make 
the list.  
We quickly moved on to the final set of questions that we would discuss for 
the remaining twenty minutes of the workshop before ever-so-briefly presenting 
our ideas to the larger group. As Nenad explained, the task was now to outline a 
social enterprise based on the brainstorming we had done. My group refocused as 
I noted that “this was a bit more serious.” We recorded our responses to the five 
questions below on a fresh piece of flipchart paper.   
 
1. What is the name of your organization?  
2. What is the aim (cilj) of the organization and how will you meet it?  
3. How will your target group be useful?  
4. What will the market buy from you?  
5. How will you earn your first 5,000 dinars [about fifty dollars]? 
 
After some discussion, my fellow group members agreed that the key 
question was the fourth—until we decided what our “product” was it would be 
difficult to respond to the other questions. In other words, which “job” to give our 
unemployed women? We settled on cooking and slowly began to develop the idea 
of a catering service for traditional Serbian food. Our collective excitement grew 
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as we talked about what the enterprise would look like. But I voiced 
a concern about the “market”: weren’t we essentially creating a business out of a 
product that people already get for free? In other words, I wondered aloud, given 
that catering is a fairly novel concept in Serbia, where do people get food for their 
parties and weddings now? From the unpaid labor of the very women we are 
aiming to employ. So why would someone call our catering service when they can 
just call their female relatives? Though the others agreed that this was a serious 
question we essentially rationalized and shelved the issue: our market would be 
somewhat different (we decided to target business events and the like), and, after 
all, this was just a preliminary exercise—we couldn’t be expected to get all the 
potential kinks worked out. We spent the last of our group time brainstorming 
ideas for the name of our organization but didn’t manage to settle on anything 
before it was time to present results. 
Boban and Sandra were both clearly enthused by the process of imagining 
a project that would both generate profit and benefit society. As we gathered our 
things to leave Boban asked me, “Are you a student?”   
“Well yes, officially,” I replied. I meant that I was not a student in Serbia. 
Boban took my comment differently and launched into an explanation of how, 
while he was technically a doctoral student at the Faculty of Organizational 
Sciences, he was unlikely to complete the degree because it’s “pointless” to get a 
doctorate from FON. I belatedly realized that he was asking because the SIA 
contest is geared toward students, and half the members of each team that 
submits an idea to the competition must be students.   
“Wait, were you really thinking of…?” I probed.   
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Boban still thought I was asking about his schooling, and went further into 
explanation of his status. I tried again: “No, I meant, were you really planning on 
submitting an idea to the competition?”   
Both Boban and Sandra responded in kind: they hadn’t necessarily 
planned to initially but both really liked our catering idea, and were thrilled by 
the thought of developing it. Raising an eyebrow I confirmed that they were 
planning to attend the “business planning” workshop next week at the same time. 
They were. “Well…” I responded cautiously, “let’s see how it develops.”  
 
Opportunity or Necessity? The Serbian Social Entrepreneur 
The giddiness of the encounter described above would fade. The following 
two workshops on business models and the business plan introduced participants 
to the very basics of mapping out the “unique value proposition,” product or 
service, resources, and so on of a feasible enterprise. By the end of the third and 
final workshop the message had been transmitted and received that opening a 
business was serious stuff.89 The members of my small group parted ways, 
mercifully without further discussion of entering the SIA contest itself.  
Boban and Sandra embodied characteristics typical of many young people 
I met in the course of my research. Boban was formally a doctoral student but 
doubted he would finish the degree; Sandra had just graduated and was looking 
at Master’s programs abroad while working part-time, tangentially in her field. 
                                                   
89 Actually, while the CI report cited above confirms the lingering misperception among youth 
that opening a business in Serbia is complicated and expensive, the country has had a streamlined 
“one-window” system for some years. Several entrepreneurs I interviewed highlighted the 
contrast between the ease of registering one’s new business and the complicated bureaucratic and 
other hurdles that later arise.  
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Both were still close to the student life and the protections it, however frugally, 
afforded. What drew them to the workshops? It struck me that, like other 
educated youth, opening “something of their own” was an option to hold in their 
minds, a future potentiality, and this workshop would give them a sense of what 
that might entail. 
The workshops I attended offered little to no domestication of this globally 
implemented program in terms of the specific opportunities and challenges of 
opening a business in Serbia. Such tailoring would, presumably, come later, 
through the mentorship offered to contest winners. But SIA did address a 
frustration of some young people I met, namely that while they considered 
themselves to be proactive, creative, and eager to take action, there was a dearth 
of resources for helping them figure out where to start. In other words, as one 
young IHB-goer poignantly asked, “what is the thing that comes right after 
motivation?” On the one hand, the SIA workshops were a refreshingly practical 
departure from the ubiquitous and largely hollow incitements for Serbian youth 
to “be more entrepreneurial.” On the other hand, the program’s pace all but 
assured that our learning of the nuts and bolts of entrepreneurship would be 
superficial at best—and the juvenile bantering engaged in by my group members 
emerged, perhaps, from a nascent recognition of this absurdity.  
While the workshops of the Social Impact Award focused on the most 
ostensibly pragmatic aspects of starting a business, they were also sites of 
subject-formation. In foregrounding the creative production of a viable 
entrepreneurial idea, I read the primary function of the workshops as inculcating 
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the “proper” form of entrepreneurship according to Western economic models, 
namely, “opportunity entrepreneurship.”  
Though they acknowledged a blurred boundary, the conceptual distinction 
between “necessity” and “opportunity” entrepreneurship was frequently invoked 
by promoters of entrepreneurship in Belgrade. This difference is just as it sounds: 
opportunity entrepreneurs recognize a market opportunity while necessity 
entrepreneurs start a business because it is “the best option available” (GEM 
2001, 4). Businesses associated with necessity entrepreneurship are those which 
are relatively cheap and easy to open (in Serbia, these include bakeries, gambling 
halls, hair salons, and cafes). The proliferation of such enterprises is not taken by 
economists as a sign of economic dynamism or ignition of the Serbian 
entrepreneurial spirit. Rather, as one local expert told the popular daily Blic, “The 
massive opening of bakeries and beauty salons is a sign of the continued 
destruction of the economy. In the small business sector we have less and less 
production, which is the pillar of all advancement” (Lakić and Leskovac 2015). 
Necessity entrepreneurship is characteristic of emerging economies, an 
interlocutor explained, and is facilitated by the Serbian government’s 
encouragement of entrepreneurship as solution to unemployment rather than 
focusing on the reforms necessary to facilitate job creation and giving more than 
lip service to the promotion of  entrepreneurialism. Ill-prepared individuals thus 
enter the market for survival and are set up to fail, “because they objectively are 
not in the market because they recognized an opportunity, nor are 
[governmental] programs conceptualized in a way that okay…you are already in 
the market, but now let’s help you to do what can be done and give you a chance 
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to succeed.” My interlocutor added, “I understand how much that for you- 
considering that you come from America which is the most entrepreneurial 
country in the world, in the sense that entrepreneurship is highly valued (se 
visoko vrednuje)…everything here is contra.”   
This highly valued form of entrepreneurship—opportunity 
entrepreneurship—privileges entrepreneurialism as value system. The 
opportunity entrepreneur is a generator of ideas, a creative problem-solver. In 
the iteration encouraged by SIA he or she is also more motivated by a desire to 
“do good” than a drive to accumulate wealth. Though SIA did not need to reform 
any “apathetic” youth who needed to be “activated”—participants self-selected as 
willing subjects—these attributes are crucially positioned as the products of 
reformed subjectivities. That the alleged Serbian ethno-national trait of 
resourcefulness (snalažljivost) would seem to fit neatly as a subjective quality of 
entrepreneurial success was a point that arose rarely in my research. 
Indeed, in the efforts to promote entrepreneurialism that I investigated 
any link with the past was broken. Despite socialist Yugoslavia’s unique market 
socialism, despite ample ethnographic evidence of the entrepreneurial acumen of 
late socialist subjects (Yurchak 2002, 2003), despite the “skilful improvisation” 
exhibited by Serbian workers during the sanctions of the 1990s (Rajković 2015, 
219), with few exceptions entrepreneurship was seen as having no local 
antecedents. I emphasize this point not to vindicate the project of “transition,” 
but to consider the work of social positioning taking place in these workshops 
and elsewhere. The most cringe-worthy events I attended were sponsored by the 
American Embassy, with titles like “Taste the Spirit of the American Dream!” 
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(For a panel discussion featuring an American culinary entrepreneur.) More 
commonly, slogans like “Silicon Valley is not a place but a state of mind” 
circulated among my entrepreneurial interlocutors. Alignment with a 
deterritorialized Silicon Valley and globally circulating programs like SIA was 
also alignment with a framework of values that foregrounds creativity, 
innovation, risk-taking, flexibility, and personal growth. Crucially, in the 
entrepreneurial ecosystem, success is assumed to blossom from these qualities.      
In this, the intended beneficiaries of social enterprise become sidelined. 
An emphasis on meeting real social needs becomes displaced in service of 
“crafting the volunteer” (Hemment 2015, 148; see also Eliasoph 2011). The 
“common good” does not emerge from a thoughtful assessment of community 
needs but rather from the random generation of essentialized target groups: 
unemployed women, disabled people, “endangered” youth, etc. As in the 
workshop above, any moments that might shift the focus to more structural 
inequalities (such as my reference to women’s unpaid caretaking labor) were 
quickly muted—cast not as precursor but as obstacle to meaningful individual 
action. The contention of a clean break with the socialist past, insistence on the 
need to learn entrepreneurialism, and assertion of the correct form of 
entrepreneurial activity here merge synergistically into a narrowing of the 
possibilities for social change. In the remainder of this chapter, I consider how a 
somewhat different kind of pedagogy of change produces similarly ambivalent 
effects.  
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Interrogating u.lab 
“Imagine a leap from our current self to our emerging future Self. We are 
facing that threshold, gap, chasm or abyss on all levels of scale: as 
individuals, groups, organizations, and as a global community. How can 
we activate our deeper levels of humanity in order to bridge and cross that 
divide? This is the organizing question and journey of Theory U” 
(Presencing Institute, n.d.-b). 
 
 
A year after my initial tour of the space, I participated in an unusual event 
at the still-young Impact Hub Belgrade: a moderated broadcast of “u.lab” that 
took place over the course of ten weeks. U.lab was a MOOC (Massive Open 
Online Course) that promised an introduction to “leading profound social, 
environmental and personal transformation” based on the Theory U method of 
change described in the quote above and depicted in figure 4 (edX, n.d.). U.lab is 
the brainchild of C. Otto Scharmer, Senior Lecturer at the MIT Sloan School of 
Management and founder of the Presencing Institute, created in 2006 as an 
“action research platform at the intersection of science, consciousness, and 
profound social change” (Presencing Institute, n.d.-a). The ideas encountered in 
u.lab are elaborated in two books published by Scharmer as well as various other 
programs offered by the Institute.90 These materials offer sweeping diagnoses of 
the “systemic divides” (ecological, social, and spiritual-cultural) that afflict our 
contemporary world and the “outdated mental models” of economic theory that 
underwrite these divides. The “change framework” of Theory U launches from the 
                                                   
90 The course is offered through MITx, a program launched in 2011 as part of MIT’s Office of 
Digital Learning to develop and deliver massive open online courses, and to research this and 
other forms of learning technologies. See: https://openlearning.mit.edu/about.  Scharmer’s books 
include Theory U (2009 and 2016) and Leading from the Emerging Future: From Ego-System to 
Eco-System Economies (2013, with Katrin Kaufer).  
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premise that we are living through a time of disruption that demands responses 
connected to the “emerging future” rather than reactions rooted in past 
(dysfunctional) behaviors (Scharmer and Kaufer 2013, 4–11).   
 
 
Figure 4: Theory U91 
 
 
The u.lab course and related books are pitched broadly, to “change-makers 
in all sectors, cultures, and systems, including business, government, civil society, 
media, academia, and local communities” (Scharmer and Kaufer 2013, 3). 
Though not exclusively aimed at social entrepreneurs, they seem to particularly 
resonate with the communities that gather in Impact Hubs globally. After 
                                                   
91 Attributed under Creative Commons License CC-BY-SA to Otto Scharmer. Accessed July 5, 
2018 from presencing.com/permissions. This site is no longer active, but similar depictions of the 
Theory U process can be found at https://www.presencing.org/resource/images. 
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meeting Scharmer at an international conference, the IHB team signed on as one 
of forty-two formal hubs—and many more self-organized groups—that would 
gather participants to collectively follow the u.lab course in the fall of 2015. The 
fact that dozens of Impact Hubs around the world hosted such gatherings attests 
to the fact that the course had broad appeal among social entrepreneurs in 
disparate contexts, including more and less developed “ecosystems.”  
In Belgrade, Paola and her colleagues wanted to create an interactive 
learning experience while concretizing and localizing the course concepts, which 
they noted could be a bit “Western.” Intrigued but perplexed by the emails I had 
received about the course, I looked forward to the introductory session organized 
in early September. It turned out to be quite promising. Paola and two facilitators 
led those gathered through a fun and interactive exercise dubbed the “stock 
exchange of values” (berza vrednosti). We received three slips of paper, each with 
a kind of value typed on it (I got “growth,” “money,” and “time”). Participants 
circulated to trade values. The goal was to end up with a set most closely aligned 
with our personal value system. We jokingly haggled, trying to convince each 
other of the virtue of values we wanted to dump and visiting a facilitator acting as 
the “bank of last resort” when no one would take them off our hands. As we 
shared our resulting configurations the facilitators explained that the exercise 
was a fitting introduction to u.lab given that the series would focus on self-
reflection (preispitivanje) in service of personal and professional development.  
Participants in this localized u.lab course would be organized into two 
small groups (the first was organized to allow for the four “live” sessions to be 
watched in real time, while participants in the second group would watch 
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recordings of these sessions). Despite the sizeable crowd that gathered for the 
introduction—and despite incentivizing participation—I sensed that organizers 
were disappointed in the small number of regular participants.92 Along with three 
others, I joined the core of the second group. Zoran was in his forties, the spouse 
of a social entrepreneur, a creative type with a day job teaching graphic design to 
high school students. He was deep into self-improvement and was, I later joked, 
an “idea generator,” bubbling over with incipient projects each time we met. 
Marina was also in her forties, with a stable job in a large company. She had 
nascent plans to open her own business but seemed to attend u.lab mostly out of 
interest in learning something new and for the social aspect. I consider both 
Zoran and Marina to be “promoters of entrepreneurship” in that they had the life 
experience and social status to be particularly invested in pedagogical projects 
aimed at a younger set. Two such younger participants, who I would later 
interview, rotated between the two u.lab gatherings. Milan, twenty-five at the 
time, had recently completed his IT degree and had seamlessly transitioned into 
full-time work as a software developer at the large Serbian company where he 
had interned. He was an avid consumer of TED Talks and listener of motivational 
podcasts, with a close circle of friends who shared his orientation toward 
exploring new ideas and ways of thinking. Filip was twenty-four, finishing his MA 
                                                   
92 In contrast with many of the one-off events hosted in the space, u.lab was only open to (paying) 
members of Impact Hub Belgrade. I had joined for the final three months of my fieldwork at the 
lowest level of membership offered, which cost something like sixteen euros per month. At the 
time, IHB had few such “member-only” offerings, and I got the sense that u.lab was, in part, an 
experiment in member recruitment. While the cost of membership represented a barrier to 
joining the course—Zoran (introduced below) and I were the only participants in the intro session 
who were already IHB members—there were also five subsidized spots offered for youth between 
the ages of eighteen and thirty-five.  
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in architecture and active in various student organizations. Other participants, 
generally students (most frequently from FON) or IHB hosts, would also join us 
on occasion. Paola facilitated our discussions.  
The u.lab journey I embarked upon with these fellow travelers was as 
perplexing as it was ethnographically rich. From the soaring promises of the 
polished trailer video and the fun engagement of the intro session’s “stock 
exchange of values,” all air from the buoyant u.lab balloon seemed to seep out 
with the first meeting, at which we watched a recording of the live session. 
Though it integrated some high-tech production logistics (multiple cameras and 
thousands of people plugged in from across the globe) the first session began in 
plodding fashion, with Scharmer sitting behind a desk in front of a chalkboard. 
He explains the global network of participants and gestures to the core team 
members, who shimmy into the camera’s frame for awkward introductions. The 
audio cuts out at crucial moments and the slides aren’t visible. It’s as boring as 
the first day of classes on any university campus, dominated by obligatory rounds 
of introduction and the distribution of syllabi. My field notes from the evening 
are soaked in the disappointment of an educator as well as ethnographer. The 
other participants gathered in Belgrade listened respectfully but also voiced 
discontent. A leap to “our emerging future Self” hardly seemed imminent. More 
significantly, I struggled to make sense of some of the phrases used without 
further elaboration, especially the contention that the u.lab community was 
meant to be an “awareness-based action-research community.” The resonance 
with participatory anthropological methods was striking, but appeared without 
the discipline’s critical foundations. (Another moment of acute discomfort came 
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later in the course when Scharmer embarked on a “sensing journey” to China that 
struck me as a caricature of the ethnographer’s craft.) 
The trailer video for the course illustrates something of the perplexing 
amalgam of ethnographic and therapeutic methods that were being recast in the 
service of something entirely different. Like almost all of the various u.lab 
materials, the video opens with the contention that “we live in an age of profound 
disruption, where something is ending and dying, and something is wanting to be 
born.”93 Against a background of tinkling piano keys, accelerated scenes of city 
traffic, and sweeping skylines, Scharmer soon appears with a serious yet earnest 
expression and urgent voice: “How can we build the capacity to sense and 
actualize a future that we feel is possible, that we know is possible, but that isn’t 
quite there yet?” The second half of the video roots “Theory U”—the method of 
change to be taught in u.lab—in the philosophy of Henry David Thoreau, the 
social movements led by Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr., and the 
massive changes of the twentieth century: the fall of the Berlin Wall, the end of 
apartheid, the rise of China as an economic power. But Scharmer believes that 
the greatest transformation—the transformation of capitalism—has yet to come. 
Prompting this change is the overarching goal of u.lab, to be accomplished by 
“empower[ing] change-makers to co-sense and co-shape the future” (Yukelson 
2015). 
The premise repeated throughout u.lab and Presencing Institute materials 
that “we live in an age of profound disruption, where something is ending and 
                                                   
93 See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gF8wV9OlUHc. Accessed April 8, 2019. 
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dying, and something is wanting to be born” bears an unsettling resemblance to 
Antonio Gramsci’s description of the political crisis of his day.94 Yet here, the 
different social justice movements mentioned appear in the video flattened. 
Gandhi and King Jr. turn up adjacent to the end of socialism and apartheid, all 
decontextualized and demoted into inspirational resources for “change-making.” 
An uneasy proximity to both ethnography, as a practice that “tolerates, indeed 
cultivates, open-endedness” (Fortun 2012, 451), and political activism is also 
discernable in the overarching frame of “leading from the emerging future.” This 
rhetoric curiously echoes shifts in practices of direct democracy from 
prefigurative politics (encapsulated in the slogan “be the change you want to see 
in the world”) to “the politics of becoming-other-than-one-now-is, toward forms 
of open-ended subject making that are embedded in and constitutive of collective 
struggle” (Razsa and Kurnick 2011, 240–241; see also Biehl and Locke 2010; 
Hardt and Negri 2009). The difference is that in u.lab the collective struggle 
appears entirely depoliticized and not entirely collective.  
I noted above that social entrepreneurship is enjoying a moment of glory 
as one response to the shake in free-market confidence meted out by the 2008 
financial crisis, even as such enterprises fill needs created by the privatization of 
the public good. This phenomenon implicitly affirms the classic anthropological 
contention that the economy is a social institution. U.lab takes up this insight and 
marries it to the “therapeutic culture” (Illouz 2008) that permeates the social 
                                                   
94 “The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born, in this 
interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear” (Gramsci, quoted in Bauman 2012, 49). 
This is one of Gramsci’s more famous observations, recorded while in prison and now found in 
various collections of what have come to be called “the prison notebooks.”  
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institutions of modern life. As Roger Foster argues, this permeation has had a 
broadly negative influence on the possibilities for collective action:  
In the neoliberal era, the healing, self-reorienting power of therapy has 
been harnessed to the larger political project of transforming individuals 
from, broadly speaking, collective subjects, linked to other citizens in 
relationships of solidarity embodying social commitments and moral 
bonds, to self-governing individuals who must enterprise themselves by 
way of their own aptitudes and talents. (Foster 2016, 96) 
 
In u.lab, the project of social change begins with the self. Phrases signaling the 
underlying “therapeutic ethos” of Theory U are scattered across the depiction in 
figure 4: deep listening, intentional silence, connect with your source.  
My central critique of u.lab was with the fundamental contention that 
capitalism can be transformed, made kinder—and with the individualization and 
depoliticization of collective problems that the Theory U method facilitates, all 
while co-opting terms, methods, and figures of political activism. The u.lab 
materials viewed as a group included a model of the “systemic divides” afflicting 
our world, but this model was curiously devoid of any analysis of power. In print, 
the same issues are glossed as “systemic disconnects” with which “positive 
externalities tend to flow to the top, while negative externalities tend to flow to 
the bottom of the socioeconomic pyramid” (Scharmer and Kaufer 2013, 8). This 
discussion is infused with power relations: the economic playing field is “tilted,” 
and special-interest groups enjoy an outsized role in governance. Yet the authors 
conclude that it is outdated “mental models,” characterized by an inability to walk 
in the shoes of another, that perpetuate broken structures (Scharmer and Kaufer 
2013, 5–13). 
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Similarly, while u.lab attracted Belgradian youth who were “socially 
conscious,” it seemed that any structural critique they might voice quickly 
became sidelined. During discussion of a videoclip in which Scharmer explains 
his model of systemic divides, the following exchange unfolded (in English, for 
the benefit of an IHB guest visiting from Malaysia):  
Young man: “I think the underlying issue is politics. From there comes 
economic problems, then education, then consciousness, then self-
responsibility.”  
Paola: “But when you put it like that, we can’t change anything.”  
Young man: “Not as an individual, maybe, but as a group, yes…”  
Zoran: “If we think we can’t do anything we are just being lazy.”   
Young man, apparently accepting Zoran’s reframing: “And confirming that 
we can’t do anything.”  
Zoran: “Are we changing, or just lazy and want to change?”  
A Hub host who had been trying to jump in for some time now got her 
chance: “I think this is where it all comes back to the self. People today, kids, are 
so lacking in confidence….”  
And just like that, discussion looped back to transforming the self. Barring 
a radical critique of power, I was nevertheless perplexed by what struck me as a 
refusal among promoters of entrepreneurship to recognize the “specific ways that 
socio-economic and political institutions distribute the conditions of life 
unequally” (Millar 2017, 4). Such refusal appeared all the more baffling among 
social entrepreneurs who were pursuing meaningful and “impactful” work and 
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who would seem to necessarily recognized the symptoms if not root causes of 
systemic inequality.   
 
Who is My Self? Who is My Work?  
My interactions with Paola had mostly taken place in the context of u.lab 
discussions and other IHB workshops and events. She had shown interest in my 
project, helpfully connected me with others in her deep network, and welcomed 
my skeptical comments about the Theory U process. In short, I felt we had 
developed a good rapport by the time we met for a brief interview near the end of 
my research. We talked in English, and, knowing we would not have much time, I 
cut to the chase pretty quickly: “So, um, I mean I guess this is, this is kind of like 
the big question I wanted to ask you.” I chuckle a bit and take a deep breath:  
I feel like the current system of neoliberal capitalism that rules this world 
has meant economic insecurity for a lot of people, and especially in this 
region, where you know, the ways in which privatization has been carried 
out has been completely non-transparent, has, you know, gotten a lot of 
people fired, you know, those companies haven't been replaced, um, with 
anything viable, and you know, a lot of people call this region a semi-
periphery of Europe. 
 
Paola: “Sure.” 
D: “And a cheap, a source of cheap labor, essentially.”  
P: “Sure!”  
D: So, um, it’s hard for me to not see like, entrepreneurship as part of that 
system of global capitalism that um, I mean I don’t, I think that 
people…that I’ve met, who you know, who are entrepreneurs who start 
their own businesses, um...don’t see themselves this way, but I see them as 
like little fish in this big pond, that is eventually going to kind of swallow 
them up…but clearly you don’t see, you know, entrepreneurship as kind of 
contributing to that system… 
 
P: “On the contrary.”  
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D: “Yeah, ok.”  
P: “But I do see your point, definitely.” 
D: “I guess it’s, it’s about like, can like capitalism be changed? You know 
what I mean?” 
When I ask Paola directly if capitalism can be changed, her initial response 
is unexpected. Capitalism and socialism are two systems that are now coming 
together “but they’re the same thing” and so “they kill each other,” she says. I’m 
puzzled but intrigued. She continues in a seemingly different direction:  
So I very much do appreciate in entrepreneurship exactly that attitude that 
you go out and do things. So, ok, then you can discuss the objective, but 
the approach and attitude to go out and do things is something that we all 
need, especially at this point in time in this world, where there’s no ready-
made solutions anymore. You cannot follow any path or system because 
they are failing, and they’re demonstrating that they’re not realistic 
anymore, they’re not feasible, so you have to just sort of, try, and 
prototype, and go on.  
 
 
With this interview I finally began to understand why so many of those I 
talked with in the course of my research understood entrepreneurship as a third 
realm of economic activity and potential employment, distinguished not only 
from the public sector but also the private. In my mind, entrepreneurship was the 
poster-child for capitalism. But Paola saw entrepreneurship as an alternative to 
the dogmas of capitalism and socialism, understood as monolithic systems 
offering “ready-made solutions.” It is just the failures of these systems in the 
region that have created the need to “try, prototype, and go on.”  
In dialogue with Paola I also began to understand how attraction to a 
process like Theory U, rooted as it is in the self, in change emanating from within, 
might emerge from recognition (if not open acknowledgement) of the failures of 
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capitalism rather than an uncritical embrace of its ethos. This is not entirely 
unlike the argument made by Michele Rivkin-Fish, in the very different context of 
reproductive health activism in Russia, that “change directed at the self and 
interpersonal relations represented a realistic and desirable means of improving 
the physical and moral health of society” (2004, 283).  
In the course of our first u.lab gathering, we watched a videoclip that 
posed the questions: “Who is my Self?” and “What is my work?” The linking of 
these two questions would continue as a central theme of the course, and when I 
later interviewed Paola it became clear that the merging of these two questions 
was also central to the way in which she understood the raison d'être of Impact 
Hub Belgrade. In my broader participant observation at IHB I had often heard 
that the mantra of the community was to “bring more life into work.” For Paola, it 
was of fundamental importance that, in contrast to her previous work lives, 
Impact Hub was a place where she could be her whole self, where her children 
could hang out. She wanted her work there, the actual enterprise itself and all the 
effort that went in to it, to serve as an example that she could be proud of. The 
merging of self and work demanded by entrepreneurship and an entrepreneurial 
lifestyle was, for her, a realm of authenticity. “Bring more life into work” was an 
invitation to connect with one’s creative passion, one’s calling, and was also a 
branding of IHB as a friendly and inviting community. Similar notions were 
marshaled in the glossy self-brands of social media professionals profiled by 
Brooke Erin Duffy (2017). Yet, as Duffy shows, “the attributes of the enterprising 
subject are marred by work patterns that are less than idyllic” (2017, 212), 
including the expectation to be “always on.” In the next section, I explore how the 
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tensions  inherent in the “Do What You Love” mantra were resolved in parables 
of mobility and work relayed by my interlocutors.  
 
Do What You Love (Here): Parables of Mobility and Dignified Work  
As the weeks unfolded our small u.lab cluster followed the “u” of Theory U, 
arriving at the topic of “prototyping” toward the end of our collective journey. A 
camaraderie had developed within our group, even as we sometimes strained to 
understand each other’s perspectives. Participants in each session had varied, but 
Marina and Zoran joined me and a Hub host at our seventh gathering, with Paola 
moderating. The small group clustered around Paola’s computer to watch the 
course videoclips, occasionally breaking for commentary.   
Through Paola’s computer screen Scharmer explained the sixth and final 
prototyping principle as a matter of integrating the intelligence of the “head, 
heart, and hands.” He elaborates: “This is what Sue Borschardt talked about in 
her videoclip about the interior castle: how to access the creative capacity of our 
heart. This is what Steve Jobs talked about in his Stanford commencement 
speech: that the only way to do our best work is to do what we love and love what 
we do.”95   
                                                   
95 Sue Borschardt was a u.lab participant who animated a reflective story on her experience in the 
(in-person) course. The Jobs commencement speech in question is from 2005. These videos were 
part of the course materials shared the previous week, which I had missed to attend an 
international workshop. Having not realized this at the time, I don’t know if our group in Belgrade 
watched these specific clips together or not. Even if they did not watch it in full, the Jobs speech 
received much publicity at the time and continued to be praised years later. It is quite likely that 
many of my main interlocutors in the entrepreneur community were familiar with it. The speech 
can be found at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UF8uR6Z6KLc. The videoclip we watched 
on the sixth prototyping principle can be found at: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dAOqs9Dq_0s. 
 
 199 
I interject, “oh, how I hate that!” and Zoran and Marina glance at me, 
chuckling. We continue to listen as Scharmer drives home his point: “So 
essentially, the sixth principle is about bringing together two of the most 
powerful forces, which is the power of entrepreneurship, and the power of the 
awakening intelligence of the heart.” Paola turns to me as she pauses the clip on 
her computer. “Why did you say that you hate that?” she asks.  
I was familiar with the “Do What You Love” (DWYL) directive and its 
association with, among others, Steve Jobs. It’s possible that I had viewed his 
popular speech a decade ago, and it’s probable that those in the room were 
familiar with it as well, as they were voracious consumers of motivational 
material. Jobs’ address is simple and inspirational, structured around three brief 
stories. The moral of the first and third can be summarized as “have the courage 
to follow your heart and intuition.” The second story also reiterates this theme 
while emphasizing another. Jobs recounts the low point of getting fired from 
Apple after a falling out with his cofounder. As he tells it, his professional 
recovery was facilitated by luck. That is, he was lucky enough to find what he 
loved to do early in life, and to realize that he still loved his work even after being 
fired. 
This is when Jobs implores the audience, the graduating class of Stanford 
University, to discover their passion in life. “You’ve got to find what you love,” he 
says. “The only way to be truly satisfied is to do what you believe is great work. 
And the only way to do great work is to love what you do. If you haven’t found it 
yet, keep looking, and don’t settle.” As appropriate to the genre, the speech does 
not directly address “the thing that comes right after motivation”—how to do this. 
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Rather, it offers inspiration for tapping into your inner self and allowing the 
knowledge gained to guide you through the challenges of work and life.   
Back in the small conference room in Belgrade I switch from Serbian to 
English to explain my objection to the DWYL mantra, drawing on an article that 
had recently circulated on social media (see Tokumitsu 2014). “Well, sorry, but I 
find that idea to be very problematic,” I explain. “It devalues other people’s work. 
We don’t all have the same opportunity to do what we love. In fact, probably like 
99.9 percent of the world’s population doesn’t get that chance. Steve Jobs’ ability 
to do what he loves depends on the work of others working eighteen-hour shifts 
in a Chinese factory to make my eighty-eight dollar computer cord. And if I’m 
scrubbing toilets for a living….”  
As I trail off Zoran jumps in: “Yes, but I know people who love that kind of 
work!”  
“Well, ok.” I fumble as he launches into a series of examples to support 
this assertion.  
“Listen,” he says, “I know this guy who was working as a doorman here in 
Belgrade. All day, just opening and closing doors for people. He was making 
1,000 euros, which was a lot at the time.”  
I am dubious—this is an excellent salary in present-day Belgrade, and 
hardly one earned by an average doorman. Zoran continues: “But after a while he 
quit; he was going crazy from boredom and just couldn’t do it anymore.” I 
anticipate vindication.  
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Zoran: “But you know, his replacement was this guy from a small town 
with a high school education, who was like, ‘ooh, I’m in the big city!’ And he loved 
it!” 
As I appear unconvinced, Zoran tries again, this time with an example 
from a documentary he recently watched in which a resident of a South American 
trash dump apparently declares that he has no regrets in life and can die happy 
because he is “king of the dump.”  
I try to clarify: “So, you think it’s about learning to love your job, no matter 
how shitty it is?”  
Zoran: “No, no! It’s about having the courage to look inside and figure out 
what makes you happy.”  
Marina’s response was more measured. “Well,” she said, “I think that 
when he [Jobs] said that he was trying to motivate students.”   
Zoran and I agreed on one point: the pursuit of meaningful work is a 
laudable goal. Indeed, filling in the contours of this pursuit, for contemporary 
Serbian youth, is at the heart of this dissertation. But I could not endorse Zoran’s 
obstinate refusal to concede that not everyone has equal access to this quest. His 
version of DWYL struck me as myopically classist, especially in the implication 
that there is someone “suited” for even the most odious of occupations. My 
alignment with the critical social science scholarship remained unwavering on 
this point: “Do What You Love” is a way to mask the precarity of entrepreneurial 
life, to valorize it, to co-opt the post-Fordist temporality of the always-on gig 
economy and recast it as “lifestyle” of choice. Or, as Gershon put it, “not all 
passions have equal outcomes. If your passion is to figure out how to make 
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money on the stock market, following it will yield different social and structural 
consequences than if your passion is to build beautiful houses or to take care of 
other people’s physical or psychological needs” (Gershon 2017, 220). 
As our discussion crescendos Paola also attempts to intervene. Addressing 
Zoran she says: “I used that quote you shared the other day, and I think you 
should tell it to Dana too.”  
Zoran did not immediately grasp what she was referring to. Paola 
prompted him: “You do what you don’t want…” 
“Oh, yes!” Zoran jumps in, finishing the phrase that he had shared on 
Facebook: “Because you do what you don’t want, you say what you don’t think, 
you kiss who you don’t love—that’s why you are unhappy, not because you live in 
Serbia.”  
With this, Paola pulls the trope of leaving Serbia into a conversation about 
conditions and aspirations of work. The quote acts as a final authoritative stamp 
on Zoran’s unlikely examples. While they were derisive of governmental efforts as 
well as narrow understandings of entrepreneurship as activity, my interlocutors 
here also relied on the key assertion of the political discourse of brain drain: that 
through entrepreneurship the young and talented can be persuaded to stay in 
Serbia, provided they provide for themselves. This is implicit in Paola’s act of 
reframing the conversation as well as the first part of this quote: “because you do 
what you don’t want to do.” An entrepreneur is someone who innovates, forges 
their own path, or, as many a government minister has said, one who is ready to 
“take control of their own life.” There is some subtle social positioning happening 
with Paola’s invocation of this quote. It is a gentle affront to the caricatured youth 
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who complain, search for excuses, and blame external conditions for their 
personal predicament and inability to take meaningful action. In other words, 
there is an interesting convergence here, where the government’s unloading of 
the responsibility for job creation onto individual shoulders is taken up by 
promoters of entrepreneurship as something of a value-laden challenge.  
But what is added in the context of our u.lab discussions is an inward turn 
that defines the locus of meaningful action as the self. Whether or not the 
doorman was really so well paid and whether the dump dweller really thrived is 
beside the point.96 For promoters of entrepreneurship like Paola and Zoran, the 
point is that work and self are necessarily entwined, and must be aligned in order 
to produce true happiness. Further, the pursuit of such alignment does not 
depend on external conditions and was thus possible anywhere, even in Serbia. 
The inertia so often attributed to Serbian youth was not, in this view, a physical 
condition of immobility, and it didn’t correlate with staying in Serbia. While 
many of my interlocutors who most wanted to leave Serbia would disagree, for 
those like Paola and Zoran, forces often glossed as “suffocation” or “hampering” 
were not caused by the structural constraints faced by youth seeking dignified 
work. Rather, they amounted to an affliction of the self, an unwillingness to 
traverse the “u” of change, a refusal to conjure the courage to look inside and 
discover one’s true calling in life. 
Probably befuddled by my obtuseness, Zoran switched tactics, and also 
switched back to Serbian for one final parable.  
                                                   
96 And, as Kathleen Millar (2018) has shown in her ethnography of a Brazilian garbage dump, 
such work can be productive of dignity and autonomy.  
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“Ok, I’m going to tell this story slowly because I want you to understand,” 
he begins.   
I smile as he launches into the tale at full speed.   
Z: “I have a friend who graduated from the engineering faculty. There was 
this company that bought a bunch of medical machines.”  
I picture CAT machines as he continues. 
Z: But the company could only acquire them if they had someone on staff 
who was qualified to fix them. So they hired my friend. But the machines 
were new, so they never broke down. They just told him: “come in, drink 
coffee with the secretary, and that’s all you have to do.” Everyone tells him 
it’s a dream job—work little, get paid a lot. So he shows up and drinks 
coffee. And drinks coffee. And drinks coffee. But he had nothing to do. And 
one day he realizes that he wants to be a photographer. 
 
Paola, listening intently, murmurs “great” (sjajno).  
Z: “So he quits his job and moves to New York City.”  
P: “Great.”  
Z: But he had overestimated his English-language skills, and he wasn’t 
able to find a good job. So he worked on his English, and was eventually 
hired by a company to fix their medical machines. But there the machines 
were old, and he was really busy all the time. And he hated it. He didn’t 
come to the US to do what he did in Serbia, and what’s worse, to actually 
do the work! He came to New York to be a photographer. But since 
arriving, he had sent his CV to over 1,000 magazines, newspapers—every 
place he could think of that might hire a photographer.  
 
P: “Super.”  
Z: “And he didn’t hear back from a single one.”  
Paola raises an eyebrow. “Not one? Hmm.”  
Z: “He gave up on the idea, but started to get up at five a.m. every day and 
work from five to eight a.m., teaching himself how to be a web designer.”  
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At our expressions of puzzlement, Zoran clarifies, “At least it was 
something visual, so he figured he’d be happier doing that.” As we silently 
incorporate this plot twist he concludes: “And just in the course of practicing web 
design, he put some of his photographs up on a website. And you know what? 
People saw it and he started to get work. And now he’s photographed for Nike, 
had exhibitions all over the place—he’s a huge success.” 
Paola appeared thrilled by this tale. I thought to myself that we had just 
heard a classic “American Dream” story and was itching to ask Zoran what the 
moral of this story was for him. Without prompting he summed up: “He should 
have given up but he really didn’t” (Morao je da odustane, ali nije zaista). We 
ended the session by looking at the photographer’s website together, as if such 
documentary evidence would change my mind—about what, exactly, I was no 
longer sure. The photographs were dark, aggressive, evocative. The site included 
work for numerous well-known companies beyond Nike. Zoran’s friend certainly 
appeared to be both talented and successful. His “About” page does not mention 
drinking endless coffees in a boring job or the obstacles he likely overcame in 
journeying to New York City in 1998. But why should it? These details are not 
relevant to his professional brand as a photographer, only to Zoran’s recasting of 
his biography into a parable whose moral is that success will surely follow when 
one pursues what they love with endless persistence.  
In this final story, the protagonist’s move to New York City initially 
appears key to unlocking his potential—expanding his perspektiva—but is then 
rendered irrelevant. What facilitates his eventual success is the act of returning to 
his true self, of looking within. As he shifts his energies to web design his work 
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and self align in closer proximity, allowing serendipity to intervene. I had heard 
similar stories from others. My first interviewee shared a blog post that conveyed 
a story she strongly identified with. A parable about an entrepreneurial Bosnian, 
its message can be summed up as “believe in yourself, success takes time, and 
disregard the haters in your midst.” In this as well as Zoran’s story the 
protagonists embody the idealized traits of entrepreneurialism, most 
significantly: dedication and discipline, risk-taking, creativity and vision but also 
authenticity and remaining true to one’s self, talents, and calling.  
The globally resonant value frameworks of entrepreneurialism and 
meritocracy are domesticated in these parables that figure, perhaps, as modern-
day “stories Serbs tell themselves about themselves” (Živković 2011). The self-
effacing “Serbian dream” of finding work that is well paid but not demanding is 
here derided. These are not subjectivities that can settle into drinking coffee all 
day with the secretary. But the glorification of doing work that you love, 
especially in the creative industries, obscures both the insecurity and mundane 
nature of much of the labor necessary to maintain creative pursuits (Duffy 2017,  
185–215) as well as the systemic inequalities that underwrite DWYL as an 
aspiration more attainable for some than others. In the next chapter, I turn to an 
overlapping lifestyle and entrepreneurial subjectivity, but where the virtual 
nature of work in the digital economy complicates the politics of mobility for 
young potential migrants in Serbia. 
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CHAPTER 6 
STAYING AND LEAVING: DIGITALIZATION AND THE POLITICS OF 
MOBILITY 
 
 
In October 2015 an unusual Kickstarter campaign was the talk of the 
Serbian startup scene. There were several compelling reasons for the attention: 
the scale—the goal was to raise $100,000, and the medium—no one had 
successfully crowdsourced such a large initiative in Serbia before. The group 
behind the campaign was SEE ICT, an NGO formed in 2010 with a mission to 
“provide meaningful, deep support to [the] Serbian technology and startup 
scene in order to foster higher employment and economic growth” (SEE ICT, 
n.d.). The group had recently drawn on its experience running a small coworking 
space for startups and freelancers to begin construction on a much more 
ambitious project in Belgrade’s Savamala neighborhood. The aim of this new 
space, Startit Center, is ambitious: to provide free tech education for 100,000 
people by 2020 in order to “create an army of people ready to create and take on 
the jobs of the future” (Kickstarter, n.d.). The small group of youthful twenty- to 
thirty-somethings behind SEE ICT/Startit (hereafter Startit) planned to use the 
funds raised through the campaign to finish renovations on Startit Center 
Belgrade, open three of a planned twelve such centers in Serbia’s smaller cities, 
and build a new platform for online tech education.  
A few months prior I had run into Nenad from the Social Impact Award at 
a panel on youth unemployment. He oozed enthusiasm not for the event we were 
at but for one he had just attended at the cultural center Dom Omladine. There 
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had been something like 700–800 young people there, he told me, all excited 
about startup culture. The event was equal parts inspiration, celebration, and 
education. Part of Startit’s “We Know we Can” (Znamo da Možemo) initiative, it 
featured energetic pitches by teams who had completed Startup Academy, 
Startit’s comprehensive education program for would-be startup founders. Nenad 
was also enthused by the announcement at the event of a significant new regional 
investment fund focused on tech companies.97  
In contrast, the panel we sat through together was dominated by 
institutional representatives—the union of employers, the employment bureau—
interesting in its own right, but hardly a cauldron of youthful energy. As panelists 
entertained questions a young man in the audience spoke who had also come 
from Startit’s gathering. He reiterated the contrast between the two Saturday 
happenings: “I’m really sorry that you all weren’t at Dom Omladine two hours 
ago to see the other Serbia—to see a thousand young people who really believe in 
themselves, in their ideas, and who want to do something, to change something. 
So, those people do exist and we need to listen to them.”98  
Such startup enthusiasm and the ambitious goals of the Kickstarter 
campaign belie the slow development of Serbia’s tech scene. To better understand 
this development—how it intersected the promotion of entrepreneurship more 
                                                   
97 See: https://sc-ventures.com/. The challenges of attracting investments—venture capital in 
particular—is an evolving concern in the Serbian startup and entrepreneurship scenes.  
 
98 In Serbian: “Žao mi je da niste bili u Domu Omladine pre dva sata da vidite drugu Srbiju….” 
Here, druga Srbija could also be translated as “another Serbia.” I don’t think that this young man 
intended, in using this phrase, to invoke all of the political connotations that druga Srbija 
accrued as it was used in the 1990s, even if the subject positions of anti-Milošević urban 
intellectuals and the youth he was referring to could be expected to substantially overlap, were 
they contemporaneous. 
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broadly and interacted with Serbia’s shifting mobility regimes—I sought out an 
interlocutor from Startit. I met Dušan, a lanky man in his early thirties, on a 
broiling summer day. As I gulped water he explained how the growth of the 
broader tech scene was closely linked to that of the organization he would come 
to found, with his own work history woven through.  
During the chaotic 1990s, Dušan told me, some young programmers were 
able to find work with foreigners in a “classic form of outsourcing.” “In that way,” 
he continued, “they made enough [money] to survive and as soon as the sanctions 
were lifted, when some foreign capital came in, some companies were formed 
that were—foreign companies—that gathered a solid number of local people who 
had expertise in information technology.” As members of the tech community—
working either remotely or locally but almost entirely for foreign/multinational 
companies—began to earn good salaries some became tech entrepreneurs, 
creating new digital applications and services. These were the first Serbian 
startups, before that term was even known in the country.99 Dušan himself came 
to the field out of necessity (challenging the necessity/opportunity 
entrepreneurship binary discussed in the previous chapter). His parents worked 
for a firm that collapsed like so many others, and his family barely scraped by 
during his high school years. He had been interested in tech entrepreneurship 
and managed to attend some informal education in this realm. Upon graduating 
                                                   
99 Though the majority of computer programmers in Serbia work for traditional companies, tech 
entrepreneurship is dominated by those with at least some programming background. The gender 
imbalance is particularly pronounced in programming. In Startit’s 2017 survey of over 1,800 
Serbian programmers only 12 percent were women. See: https://startit.rs/rezultati-istrazivanja-
domaci-programeri-zadovoljni-poslom-zaraduju-jos-vise-i-zele-da-uce-pajton/. 
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high school in 2000 he found sporadic work as an IT consultant, building 
websites and such.  
What Dušan describes is not actually a “classic form of outsourcing,” as no 
physical parts or components crossed national borders. Rather, this was trade in 
a new, virtual, component: data. The range of occupations represented in Serbia’s 
tech community are all part of the growing digital economy. In Nick Srnicek’s 
broad definition, the digital economy “refers to those businesses that increasingly 
rely upon information technology, data, and the internet for their business 
models” (2017, 2). The digital economy thus cuts across sectors but is united by 
reliance on some form of “platform.” If data is its heart, the platform serves as 
skeleton. Well-known platforms include Uber (ridesharing) and Airbnb (short-
term home rental). But this category also include platforms—such as the globally 
dominant Upwork—for selling one’s labor as an English-language instructor, 
virtual personal assistant, photographer, or graphic designer. From Manuel 
Castells’ ([1996] 2010) concept of the “network society” in which interconnected 
nodes form a dynamic system for the flow of information, to titles like Paradigm 
Shift: The New Promise of Information Technology (Tapscott and Caston 1993), 
this recent focus on the “platform” joins several decades of attempts in both the 
social sciences and popular literature to work out the unifying factors, 
significance, and future implications of emergent forms of digital technologies 
and media.  
In the field, I encountered the burgeoning digital economy via different 
avenues: in conversation with friends and acquaintances who found work 
through various platforms (often teaching English), at the intersection of “digital” 
 211 
and “entrepreneurship” in spaces like Impact Hub Belgrade, in panel discussions 
on youth (un)employment, and via the widely circulating view that IT is the most 
promising (najperspektivnije) field of employment for youth in Serbia. This 
chapter is based on these encounters as well as expert interviews with promoters 
of digitalization, tech entrepreneurship, and IT education. Additionally, five of 
the in-depth interviews I conducted were with young software developers, 
programmers, and tech start-up employees. My analysis is limited by the fact that 
I did not conduct participant observation in IT incubators, technology hubs, or 
tech startups. I thus do not explore the culture of work in such places but rather 
seek to “provincialize and thus particularize the role that digital media play in the 
construction of sociocultural worlds, group identities and representations…and 
phenomenological experience” (Coleman 2010, 496–497) for youth seeking 
dignified work in or out of Serbia. 
Given the diffusion of digitalization in modern life, I only began to 
appreciate the unique challenges and opportunities yoked to the digital economy 
in hindsight. In the field, I had understood interlocutors such as Dušan to be 
promoting a particular form of entrepreneurship, namely, tech entrepreneurship. 
While this was true, I discuss below how the digital economy is only partially 
convergent with entrepreneurial activity and subjectivity, encompassing various 
modes of employment and less reliant on an “inward turn.”  
In this chapter I turn attention to less conspicuous facets of the politics of 
mobility in Serbia. I show how economic subjectivities are cultivated in complex 
relation to place, community, and senses of belonging such that the dichotomy 
between staying and leaving becomes muddied. Below, I describe how tech 
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advocates espouse some of the same entrepreneurial values as did the promoters 
of social entrepreneurship profiled in the previous chapter. These actors also 
harnessed the dominant discourse on brain drain to cast themselves as certain 
social types and lend legitimacy and urgency to their agenda. But their educative 
programs had a decidedly more pragmatic flavor than the likes of “u.lab,” and, 
rather paradoxically, it was promoters of the “digital transformation” of Serbia 
rather than social entrepreneurs who sought to advance a sweeping and 
ambitious vision of national development. Given the particular nature of post- 
Milošević political subjectivities outlined in the introduction, I read the 
development aims of tech promoters as examples of the “state practices, 
functions, and effects [that] increasingly obtain in sites other than the national 
but [that] never entirely bypass the national order” (Trouillot 2001, 131). Below, I 
explore how work in the digital economy enables forms of “virtual migration” 
along with “apolitical activism” while holding the promise of dignified work for 
some somewhere between the here and now and the then and there.  
 
Building Virtual Community 
Jovan, like Dušan, was an ardent builder of the tech community. We first 
met at a busy sidewalk café. His movements and words were conservative, 
deliberate, just what is needed. He dressed in all black: jeans and a t-shirt, or if 
the occasion warranted it, a collared shirt and sweater. He told me that he had 
made the decision to simplify his wardrobe so that getting dressed didn’t suck 
energy from where he wanted to direct it the most: toward developing Serbia’s 
digital economy while growing his own branding and design firm.  
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“Before Christ and after Christ,” Jovan quipped, explaining the 
development of the IT scene in Serbia. “Before Christ and after Christ—that is, 
before social networks and after. Actually, forums were social networks before 
social networks.” Internet forums, he explained, were where programmers, 
designers, and others involved in the nascent Serbian tech scene in the early 
2000s came together to exchange expertise and projects. But both Jovan and 
Dušan from Startit yearned for more facetime with others working in these fields. 
In 2007 Dušan and a friend built a website to promote IT events happening in the 
country. They were invited to a conference in Romania, where there was already a 
flourishing tech scene, and thought, “let’s get this going in Serbia,” as Dušan put 
it. Founding an NGO in order to attract sponsors, they soon put together the first 
startup event in Belgrade, a pitching forum called “How to Web” (a spin-off of an 
annual Romanian event). “We barely found any domestic startups, that is, people 
who had an idea, to pitch, to present their projects,” Dušan remembered.100  
Several years later, it’s a different story—while Serbia’s largest cities of 
Belgrade and Novi Sad are not found on the lists of top European cities for 
“startup readiness” or “scale-up readiness” (neighboring capitals Sofia and 
Bucharest are), organizations like the Digital City Index that produce such 
assessments do not include countries outside the European Union.101 Of course, 
                                                   
100 The Romanian iteration of How to Web is still a large annual conference: 
https://www.howtoweb.co/. 
 
101 Startups are generally considered to be young companies and individual entrepreneurs while 
“scaleups” are companies in a phase of rapid growth and with a number of, usually ten or more, 
employees. See: https://digitalcityindex.eu/city/32. Serbia has also not participated in the Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor since 2009. Serbian startups like Nordeus (mobile game developer) 
and Strawberry Energy (creator of the world’s first public solar charging device) have nevertheless 
garnered international acclaim. 
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challenges in the regulatory, administrative, and educational systems also hinder 
expansion of entrepreneurial activity in the digital economy. The greatest barrier 
is, perhaps, a high level of distrust in Serbian institutions writ large. At a 
discussion I attended in August 2018 featuring the founder of a digital startup, a 
telling moment occurred as he, in great detail, walked the audience through his 
process “from idea to investment,” as the event was billed. “Neither did I want to 
nor did it occur to the [American] investor that I would be registered in Serbia,” 
he said. Titters of laughter and the exchange of knowing smiles confirmed that no 
further elaboration was needed. The options for registering one’s business were 
London or Delaware.   
Nevertheless, there is now general agreement that Information 
Technology is the healthiest sector of the Serbian economy, fueling interest in 
computer programming, online employment, and startup culture. But the 
educational system has not kept pace. The Faculty of Organizational Sciences 
(FON), and particularly its IT track, is considered the most popular in the 
University of Belgrade system and entrance is highly competitive. The situation is 
mirrored at the Faculty of Technical Sciences at the University of Novi Sad. The 
inability of the state university system to accommodate students interested in 
learning computer programming and related digital skills is situated within the 
heated debate on the “misalignment” between university and market discussed in 
chapter 3. Digital economy devotees tended to locate themselves in the camp 
favoring a market-oriented educational system. One of the harshest assessments 
I heard in this vein came from a promoter of technological entrepreneurship. He 
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characterized the educational system as “catastrophic,” pointing a finger directly 
at the university faculty and administration:  
I really believe that there are people who really lecture and work at the 
faculties because they love it, and because they are interested, and because 
it is their life calling. But I simply think that the whole educational system 
is so degraded and encourages negative selection to such an extent that the 
current cadre at the faculties is terrible and don’t have any connection to 
reality, to the economy, with what is needed; rather, they simply want to 
maintain their own system.    
 
My interlocutor here echoes the perception, voiced by Gordana and widely 
shared, of the university as breeding ground for the phenomenon of negative 
selection. But he also makes transparent the view that the educational system 
ought to respond directly to market demands. How and to what extent the 
university system should be reformed to better prepare students for the job 
market is a complex issue (see Greenberg 2014, 102–111). But I think it is fair to 
say that all my interlocutors were advocates of some measure of reform in this 
direction. And yet, one day Zoran, usually a fan of all things digital and 
entrepreneurial, grumbled that if the IT craze continues, “we will be a country of 
computer geeks with no one to run it.” This comment expresses concern for the 
type of citizens fashioned out of students but also points to the incomplete 
overlap between the digital and the entrepreneurial. A computer geek may find a 
lifetime of work as a lowly coder in a large firm; only a select few will found a 
digital startup. A computer geek need not embrace the entrepreneurial values of 
innovation, creativity, flexibility, and self-work that Zoran held so dear in order 
to find dignified (or less than dignified) work.    
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The limited number of university seats available for potential IT students 
has facilitated the growth of informal education outlets, such as Startit’s online 
academy and trainings offered by other tech hubs and startup incubators. The 
digital hype has also been facilitated by, and has spurred the growth of, a now-
annual gathering in Vršac, a small town a few hours’ drive east of Belgrade. The 
conference, with the tagline “live locally, work globally” (živi lokalno – radi 
globalno), is billed as an inspirational and networking event. It is also Jovan’s 
greatest contribution to building Serbia’s tech community. As he explains in a 
lecture honed over the past few years, the idea behind “live locally, work globally” 
is to tap into the global marketplace through various forms of online 
employment—possibilities that hold the promise of making relatively good 
money while living in relatively low-cost Serbian towns. He gives several 
examples of men who have mastered this trick through different forms of work in 
the digital economy: building video games that attracted the attention of a global 
distributor, selling photographs through online platforms, and offering design 
services to global clients. The annual conference showcases many more such 
stories, gathering speakers under the rubrics of “outsourcing,” “startup,” and 
“freelance” to share their own inspirational tales of making a living in the global 
marketplace without ever leaving home.  
I was initially perplexed by the placement of “outsourcing” on par with 
what struck me as the rather different economic modes of “freelance” and 
“startup.” Jovan was among those who bristled at the promotion of Serbia as an 
outsourcing destination. But his critique did not extend to the work itself (here he 
had in mind computer programming specifically, not the call-center drudgery 
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that has also come to Serbia). The way he sees it, insofar as programmers can 
exploit such positions as springboards to more creative, fulfilling ones at the head 
of their own companies or freelance operations, they can serve as useful training 
opportunities.  
Indeed, in his lecture Jovan repeats a similar list of national attributes 
whose promotion in the “Invest in Serbia” commercial described in chapter 3 was 
derided as undignified: “Why do foreigners work with Serbs?” he asks 
rhetorically. “Because—they are pleasantly surprised when they hear how well we 
speak English, our price is essentially competitive on the foreign market, and our 
quality is quite good.” In the context of this talk promoting employment in the 
digital economy the appellative “low-cost, high-skilled” is pragmatically 
transformed from an insulting undersell into a comparative advantage to be 
leveraged in individual efforts to craft an entrepreneurial livelihood and lifestyle, 
or more modestly, to make do in Serbia’s deindustrialized towns. This leveraging 
is a primarily individual act, and the vision presented by Jovan is one of digital 
democratization. His lecture and conference feature success stories from those 
living outside of Serbia’s tech hubs of Belgrade and Novi Sad in order to highlight 
that success in the digital economy depends more on individual ambition and 
savvy than on geographic location. So far, this vision is remarkably analogous to 
the parable of Zoran’s photographer friend in its reliance on key values relayed 
through entrepreneurial and meritocratic registers. But here the activity is less 
inward-facing and more pragmatic; a therapeutic ethos is nowhere to be found. 
In the next section, I show how these economic subjectivities are coaxed forth out 
of the expansive frame provided by the discourse on brain drain.  
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Do What You Love (Here and There) 
Jovan’s talk on “live locally, work globally” opens with several headlines 
lamenting Serbia’s brain drain. Taking one figure given for the number of annual 
departures and dividing by 365, he lingers on the point that “at this moment, 
while you are sitting here, eighty people are packing to permanently leave 
Serbia.” But his audience members are not among the day’s eighty suitcase 
packers, and Jovan positions them as those with their suitcases open, ready to 
learn something new, interested in hearing the stories of the many “who haven’t 
given up” (koji se nisu predali). The dominant discourse on brain drain also 
frames Startit’s activities, if less conspicuously. In the run-up to its Kickstarter 
fundraiser, Startit created the brilliant campaign “I Know we Can” (Znam da 
Možemo). The announcement for an event held in the context of this campaign in 
May 2015 declared: “This is a story about those who stay in Serbia or return and 
achieve success; about those who have found their own way, about a team that 
works and doesn’t complain about challenges.”102 
This message is elaborated in an inspirational three-minute video. Against 
the backdrop of subtle, uplifting music, the video features short clips of successful 
entrepreneurs who speak to the advantages of doing global business from Serbia, 
the flourishing of the startup scene, and the central quality needed by a would-be 
tech entrepreneur: “the determination to start today—no excuses, not tomorrow, 
but today.” Startit cofounder Vladimir Trkulja appears, in sweatshirt and jeans, 
                                                   
102 See: http://startit.rs/znamdamozemo/. Accessed May 14, 2015. This webpage no longer 
includes the description quoted, having been updated with details of the most recent “I Know we 
Can” event.  
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sitting casually in a concrete jungle that suggests the hip Savamala neighborhood 
where the space is located. “We started as a group of young people who wanted to 
change something,” he says. Startit’s other founders add soundbites on the 
group’s development before another entrepreneur appears, a young woman who 
returned to Serbia after seven years in London. “I came back because I believe 
that it is also possible here to- actually, one lives much better here than there.” 
The camera cuts back to Vladimir who delivers a concise explanation of what, 
exactly, is intended by the slogan “I Know we Can.” Radiating calm resoluteness 
he says, “I know that we can change this country; to offer perspektiva to young 
people who want to create a new future, and who want to change the world from 
here.” The music soars as the faces of the other speakers flash by again, each 
voicing the words “I know we can” in front of a chalkboard wall with the same 
message. The clip ends with three figures: investments in teams who have 
participated in Startit projects (two million euros), startups begun through Startit 
projects (forty), and young people employed in these startups (one hundred).103   
The “I Know we Can” campaign embraces the individualizing and self-
responsibilizing elements of global discourses of entrepreneurialism, hitched to a 
promise of expanded horizons via the local idiom of perspektiva, and made 
relevant and urgent through the politics of brain drain. Jovan’s “live locally, work 
globally” lecture does similar work. Part of the message is shared with the 
parables I explored in the previous chapter, namely that it is possible to do what 
one loves in Serbia (provided that what one loves is marketable). The caricature 
                                                   
103 This video can be viewed at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AUTZudferI8. Accessed 
April 7, 2019. 
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of “complaining” youth provides the backdrop for an assertion of key 
entrepreneurial attributes—here, proactivity is at the fore.  
This was not a message relegated to glossy PR materials. When I returned 
to Belgrade in the summer of 2018 I met with Anja, also a member of the Startit 
team but a decade Dušan’s junior. In the first few moments of our interview she 
covered similar ground: “what we are really advocating for, believe in, is that 
technology and entrepreneurship are ‘future-proof’ skills.” Yet rather than 
naming the concrete hard and soft skills one might expect she continued, 
“because we don’t know how [work] will look in twenty years, but if we build up 
(izgradimo) people to be proactive, to think entrepreneurially, to seek out 
opportunities instead of complaining, then they will manage (oni će se snaći).” 
Here, as in the SIA workshops, it is the fashioning of a general kind of habit of 
being entrepreneurial, an opportunity-oriented subjectivity, that becomes key to 
navigating the future of work. At the same time, rather paradoxically, a collective 
vision of national development came through more strongly in the promotion of 
tech rather than social entrepreneurship. But the virtual nature of work in 
Serbia’s digital economy gives rise to two contradictory tendencies: the 
possibilities for “virtual migration” and “apolitical activism.” I elucidate these 
themes below.  
 
Life in a Virtual Bubble 
“As practices of programming bring together and integrate many other 
forms of labor around the world, they not only integrate social life in real 
time; they also disintegrate it by alienating it from its own surroundings. 
The phenomenon, historically unprecedented, questions the very 
foundations of social solidarity around the world.” (Aneesh 2006, 163)  
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The promising ability to “live locally, work globally” via online labor can be 
seen as a version of what sociologist A. Aneesh (2006) dubbed “virtual migration” 
more than a decade ago. Understanding the unique features of online labor as a 
form of migration, Aneesh argued, “enables us to see certain social aspects of the 
transnational integration of labor that remain invisible in the economistic 
language of outsourcing and subcontracting” (2006, 3). Anticipating the present-
day focus on platforms, Aneesh identifies programming languages as the 
lynchpin of this phenomenon. While he was mostly interested in some of its 
general features (such as spatial and temporal integration as well as the structure 
of work and its management), the implications of virtual migration are 
provocative. To what extent can we say that those who work in Serbia’s digital 
economy have “virtually migrated?” Is online labor alienated from its 
surroundings and eroding the bases of social solidarity, as Aneesh suggests in the 
epigraph to this section? Or, what does it mean to “live locally” as a citizen—a 
political subject—when one works globally?  
As I spoke with Anja at Startit she reiterated the breakdown of 
employment options that I had heard from so many: to work in “that one big 
firm” that might exist in any given small town, for “one of those Serbian bosses of 
smaller companies that are much more exploitative,” or to seek employment in 
public administration. Here she lingered, emphasizing the common knowledge of 
needing to join the relevant political party in order to even have the possibility for 
work in the public sector. She continued:  
What we really want, above all, is to empower the individual, and by 
empowering the individual we will actually empower society. What does 
that mean? If we empower individuals to begin to earn their own money 
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and that money does not come from within [Serbia] but rather comes from 
somewhere outside, we first of all increase that foreign trade balance of 
ours in our favor—because some foreign money enters the country—and 
second, that individual becomes much more independent. 
 
The independence alluded to here is morally inflected: it’s a freedom from the 
forces most despised by those like Miloš and Gordana, who aspired to leave 
Serbia for good. Programmers, developers, graphic designers, and others with 
livelihoods embedded in the digital economy and dependent on the global market 
are able, to a great extent, to circumvent the nepotism, clientelism, bureaucracy, 
and state-level instability that affects nearly every other worker in Serbia.  
As Anja told me, “as for the question of ‘does politics affect everyday life?’ 
Well, yes, it does, it’s just that I think it has much less impact on those who are 
independent. So, the effect on the IT sector is very small.” The prototypical 
Serbian “techie” works for foreigners remotely or registers his startup in the US 
to take advantage of a transparent and straightforward tax code. And they make 
good money. Startit’s 2017 survey established that the average programmer 
salary ranges from 700-2,200 euros per month, depending on seniority 
(considered excellent in relation to the national average salary of less than 400 
euros) (Kukić 2017). In this context, it seems reasonable to conclude that one 
might live in a self-made bubble, drawing a good salary, enjoying the finer side of 
Serbian life, and disengaging from the country’s sociopolitical challenges. In 
other words, fulfilling a crude version of the mantra to “live locally, work 
globally.” As Dušan put it:  
IT is currently a way to earn a very good salary and to build around 
yourself a kind of balloon, where the situation in the country does not 
affect you (te ne tangira), where you can afford a loan for an apartment, 
for a car, [where] you do not think much about living expenses. And the 
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trend is very noticeable that the salary of programmers in Serbia is 
currently beginning to approach the salary level of developers in Western 
Europe…not yet and not for everyone, but a good programmer in Serbia 
will cost you essentially similar to a good programmer in the Netherlands. 
And the cost of living is incomparably lower.  
 
The attraction of protecting oneself within a “balloon” or bubble from the 
vicissitudes of national politics (or whatever else might be meant by “the 
situation in the country”) did not resonate only with digital economy workers. I 
finally had the chance to sit down with an acquaintance named Nina in July 2015. 
She was a thirty-three-year-old music composer, somewhat reluctant 
entrepreneur, and mother. We had met in the course of the Social Impact Award 
workshops, when she bounded in and briefly joined our group work before 
distributing pamphlets on a music project and taking her leave. I later learned 
that Nina had a PhD in music composition from a London university. Among 
other ways in which she cobbled together a livelihood since returning to Serbia, 
she had founded an association to promote experimental music. She also gave 
music lessons. While she had fully expected to want to stay in London, from a 
distance she began to see the advantages and opportunities of life in Belgrade. 
She entered the SIA contest with her already “prototyped” music lessons, and her 
face at the awards ceremony registered real disappointment at not being selected 
for funding.  
While Nina did not think of herself as an entrepreneur she was, in other 
words, the very model of “brain circulation” and entrepreneurial acumen being so 
vigourously promoted as antidote to brain drain. But it was clear that her life 
projects were not rooted in any sense of responsibility to repatriate Serbia’s 
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human capital. Instead, she was guided by an ethos of self-reliance and 
resourcefulness, a sense of personal responsibility whose orbit did not extend 
much beyond her family and friends. All the same, I was surprised by the degree 
to which she eschewed even general knowledge of electoral politics:  
Well, I know the name of the president but, you know, all that amounts to 
is that I absolutely don’t care, I mean, it doesn’t have anything to do with 
me nor will it ever have anything to do with me…I don’t believe that we 
have some real influence on the government, and I also don’t believe that 
they can destroy our lives that much. Somehow, if you deal with yourself 
and your own stuff, your own possibilities…I mean, it is what it is (šta je, 
tu je). How it is for everyone else it is for you too, so you just, well, pull out 
the best. 
 
This comment supports the general post-Milošević orientation toward 
politics outlined in the introduction: a realm that one cannot influence and from 
which it is best to keep one’s distance. That the government does not fulfill 
certain expected functions is regarded by Nina pragmatically—“deal with yourself 
and your own stuff,” and “it is what it is.” As our interview wound down Nina let 
out a big yawn, and by way of apology told me that she was three months 
pregnant with twins. Curious because of her nontraditional employment, I asked 
how maternity leave would work for her. She explained how she was essentially 
gaming the system, paying herself an outrageous salary through her association 
so that, when the maternity benefit is calculated, she would receive “a somewhat 
normal salary” for her two years of leave.104  
                                                   
104 Until a recent change in the law (that I touch on in the conclusion), Serbian mothers were 
entitled to take up to a full year of maternity leave (two for twins) during which they received the 
equivalent of their regular salary (or average salary from the previous twelve months). 
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In other words, Nina’s strategy demonstrates how the ability to insulate 
oneself often depends on the fragments of the social safety net still in place. This 
situation is somewhat analogous to the relationship between various forms of 
“gig” labor and full-time employment in the US, where Schor and Attwood-
Charles argue that “the platform economy is free riding on other sectors and 
employers” (2017, 7). It also echoes the improvisational forms of making do and 
getting by that have been mainstay livelihood strategies in socialist (Verdery 
1996), postsocialist (Humphrey 2002), and market (Mörtenböck and 
Mooshammer 2015; Procoli 2004) economies the world over.   
Work in the digital economy is not equal to yet uniquely facilitates the 
possibility for a certain kind of selectively deterritorialized life via forms of 
“virtual migration.” And yet those leading efforts to grow Serbia’s digital potential 
like Jovan, Dušan, and Anja, endorsed a vision of national development that ran 
contra to this tendency. I turn to consider these “state effects” below.  
 
State Effects and the Politics of Mobility 
Promoters of work in the digital economy often espoused a broader vision 
of national development via technology. Jovan’s conception of raising the 
employment rate did not rest on the small-town unemployed finding technology 
jobs, for example. Rather, he thought that if youth had access to quality tech 
education, positions in the service sector would open up for the long-term 
unemployed. I wondered about the extent to which such a vision was shared by 
other enthusiasts of “digital transformation”—that process by which traditional 
business models are being “disrupted” by the digitization of information (Miller 
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2018). When I met with Anja in 2018 she told me about Startit’s operations in 
smaller towns, now that eight new centers had been built. She explained that the 
same three-pronged program was being carried out as in Belgrade: tech 
education, “pushing” the startup story, and promoting new technologies (most 
recently, virtual reality and blockchain). But, she noted, those attracted to 
Startit’s work in smaller towns don’t have the same basic technological skills as 
those in towns with IT faculties and vocational schools.  
Anja explained: “The way we see the ideal scenario for something to 
develop is, let’s say, that Belgrade, Novi Sad, those larger cities that are already 
technologically strong, that they become predominantly ‘product-oriented.’ 
Meaning, that most people develop their own startups, their own products…[and] 
that these smaller towns, with their further technological development, begin to 
be outsourcing towns.” Anja delivered this vision matter-of-factly, presenting it 
as a strategy to avoid internal competition as well as distribute “future-proof” IT 
skills more broadly. But listening, I was struck by what seemed to me to be a 
classist undercurrent.  
“Well, ok,” I probed. “It’s clear that entrepreneurship isn’t for 
everyone…but let’s say that I’m someone in Inđija [a small town between 
Belgrade and Novi Sad where a Startit Center had been established] who comes 
[to Startit] for a training in programming, and then I begin to do that work 
remotely.”  
Anja: “Mm. Yes, freelance.” 
I had been trying to allude to those programmers working as full-time 
outsourced labor for multinational corporations, but agreed, “or as a freelancer” 
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and continued, “do you think that the fear is realistic, that, I mean, that youth 
here are somehow transformed into a cheap labor force?” 
Anja didn’t pause to think. “Yes, the fear is real,” she responded, “but we 
are already a cheap labor force. We are already a country of a cheap labor force, 
just that we are a country with an insufficiently employed cheap labor force. I 
mean, that’s the way I see it right now.”  
Such pragmatism was not intended to condemn any one individual to a 
boring job as an entry-level coder just because they lived in the provinces. Here, 
as in Jovan’s scheme, the danger presented by outsourcing centers for funneling 
talent into boring, dead-end jobs becomes a fate to be circumvented through 
personal savvy. A talented and motivated individual could move from work in an 
outsourcing center to being a self-employed freelancer or even founding their 
own tech startup, given a hefty dose of entrepreneurial ambition.  
But what Anja presents here is also a particular, pragmatic, vision of 
development that highlights how promoters of Serbia’s digital transformation are 
having “state effects”; engaging in practices and processes of governance 
(Trouillot 2001) while also promoting an ideological project of the state, that is, 
(an alternative) “state idea” (Abrams 1988). For example, Jovan’s blueprint for 
living locally while working globally is an individual one that encodes a certain 
do-it-yourself quality. But he also spoke of wanting to form a strong lobby to 
advocate for national-level changes. It seems that such an advocacy group has 
recently been formalized as Initiative Digital Serbia (Inicijativa Digitalna Srbija—
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IDS).105 Founded by the two telecom giants, Microsoft, Startit, several of the 
startups it has fostered, and other companies, IDS officially began work in May 
2017 with a “Digital Manifesto” that outlines a clear and concise strategy for 
advancing the digital transformation of Serbia. The aims of the initiative are 
framed in terms of national progress:  
Even though Serbia is a small country, we have given ourselves large goals 
for fast growth and progress. Our members are companies and 
organizations with high standards and big ambitions. We love technology, 
especially when it is used for smarter and better outcomes. The goal of 
Initiative Digital Serbia is for the programs that we support to lead to real 
changes and involve all sides.…We are united by the desire to significantly 
contribute to the progress and better future of Serbia. (IDS 2017, 5)   
 
This manifesto bears remarkable resemblance to the postwar modernist 
visions that ran parallel along the Cold War ideological divide. Both arguably 
shared an unwavering faith in the power of technology with which “technology 
was theorized as a sort of moral force that would operate by creating an ethics of 
innovation, yield, and result” (Escobar 2012, 36). While the nature of this force 
has shifted greatly with the so-called Fourth Industrial Revolution, faith in the 
integrity of technological progress has remained remarkably resilient over the 
years. In this iteration, the development project is driven by a somewhat unlikely 
cast of characters in which traditional state institutions play a subordinate role.  
Because of their apparent commitment to staying in Serbia as well as such 
development designs, I wondered about the sense of national responsibility felt 
by digital economy acolytes. Were they motivated by a kind of “weak 
nationalism” (Todorova 2015)? Was this a kind of “patriotic professionalism,” 
                                                   
105 See: https://www.dsi.rs/. 
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with which educated urbanites blend the development of knowledge-economy 
skills with an “ethics of concern for the well-being of the nation” (Hoffman 2010, 
7; see also Hemment 2015)? Not quite. My questions about national 
responsibility were met with scoffs. While both Jovan and Startit’s founders 
harness the dominant discourse of brain drain for publicly situating their work, 
their version is brutally stripped of any sense of responsibility to the nation-state. 
But it is not exactly vacant of any sense of responsibility, as they saw themselves 
as real agents of change. I began to understand more of this position in 
conversation with Jovan. In the final section below I return to his story to tease 
out how activism meets digital transformation in relation to the politics of 
mobility in Serbia.  
 
An Apolitical Activism? 
Born in 1980, Jovan was twenty years old during the October Revolution 
of 2000. His personal website coyly suggests that he was quite active in spreading 
the network of “that organization” beyond Serbia’s largest cities. “That 
organization” was Otpor, the student-led network instrumental in finally ousting 
Milošević from power. At the beginning of our interview Jovan sketched out his 
biography, saying, “well, it’s not important now, but I was in Otpor, there was the 
revolution and everything else, and then at the end of 2000 I had two paths: 
politics or business. And I decided to go into business.” I encouraged him to 
elaborate, asking how he had decided between these two paths. But he brushed 
the question off with an annoyed “well, I don’t know...” and a vague response 
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about being young, humble, and wanting something more than that offered by a 
career in small-town politics.  
A few days later we drove together to a panel Jovan was moderating in 
Novi Sad. On the car ride back to Belgrade I got the chance to ask a question I 
had been mulling over since our interview: “Is what you do political? Do you see 
it that way?”  
“Yes, it absolutely is political. This is something bigger than myself,” he 
responded.  
“Hmm.” I tried to formulate a follow-up question that would prompt him 
to make explicit how he saw his current work in relation to his former activism in 
Otpor and his decision to go into business rather than politics. But he continued 
unprompted:  
Sixteen years ago someone from the Socialist Party [Milošević’s party] spit 
in my face. I was handing out flyers and he knew who I was and what it 
was about [organizing for Otpor]. Fifteen years later all the same people 
are in the government in Vršac who I helped take out then. So, it was all 
for nothing. I know that that guy remembers me in front of that column of 
4,000 people. And fifteen years later I was sitting across from him at a 
friend’s birthday party. I started to talk to the person next to me about 
entrepreneurship. And that guy started to listen. I said, “each year, I bring 
200 people to this town [for the annual conference]; next year it will be 
400.” The guy, who is now deputy major, told me to call him so he can 
help facilitate things. He, and others, started to see how this is good for 
them. 
 
“It’s pretty amazing that you can work with someone who spit in your face” 
I ventured, watching for his reaction.  
Jovan took a drag on his cigarette, carefully aiming the smoke out the 
cracked window. With his gaze fixed on the dark and rainy road ahead he replied 
tersely, “this is more important than my vanity.”  
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Jovan sprinkled our conversations with militaristic language: he talked of 
educating an “army” of junior programmers, called freelancer programmers 
“soldiers of fortune,” and envisioned uniting a “front” of promoters of 
entrepreneurship to lobby the government for systemic change. While I saw this 
language as a quirky part of his persona, it also conjured up his past “at the front 
of a column of protesters” against the Milošević regime. Then, the battle for a 
different world was waged in the streets against a state experienced as a “tangible 
and mortal enemy” (Razsa 2015, 60). But now the state was largely experienced 
by the young potential migrants I encountered as a hampering force: a nuisance 
to be circumvented, with weaknesses to be exploited whenever possible and 
electoral politics to be disdainfully avoided. As I shared in the introduction, 
Jovan said: “This population is absolutely uninterested in who runs the state. It 
doesn’t matter to them. They are not interested in politics or anything else. It’s 
only important that they are not bothered [by the state].” On the one hand, Jovan 
seemed disapproving of such “disinterest,” as exemplified by Nina’s professed 
ignorance of politics. On the other hand, his own stance toward politics revealed 
a poignant ambivalence. In his view, change would now come through education, 
a wave of programmers overwhelming the irrelevant and impotent state. And 
effecting that change was a political project.  
Not all promoters of work in the digital economy and tech 
entrepreneurship shared Jovan’s activist past and certainly not all activists in 
Serbia have embraced the technology-driven vision of national development 
outlined here. But Jovan’s work seemed a logical navigation of the “politics of 
disappointment” (Greenberg 2014) that have characterized the aftermath of a 
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revolution that was “all for nothing,” as he put it. At the end of my interview with 
Anja I shared how it seemed to me that many of those who are now involved in 
entrepreneurship were anti-Milošević activists two decades prior. She seemed to 
find this proposition intriguing, but couldn’t confirm it—likely because she 
herself would have been too young at the time to have actively participated in the 
October Revolution. But she thoughtfully considered the second part of my 
question, which was whether or not entrepreneurship could be considered a “new 
form of activism.” “Well, maybe,” she mused:  
I mean, we certainly experience it as something that-, our main mission is 
to improve the situation in which we live. I mean, impr- to enable people 
to live better and such, and that is definitely activism, it’s just that I 
somehow think that it is more of a pragmatic activism. It’s just that, or I 
think, a kind of apolitical activism that says, “whoever is in power, I don’t 
care”….I would say that we are not trying to change the system from the 
inside. Rather, we are changing the environment (okruženje), and then we 
hope that at some point it [the system] will change itself.  
 
This comment reveals politics as a tainted realm “out there,” or maybe “up 
there” in which one doesn’t have any say but that doesn’t really matter anyway. 
For such actors, this—entrepreneurship, IT education, digital transformation—
was a form of “apolitical activism,” or at least an arena of meaningful, agentive, 
and perhaps unexpectedly, collective action. As Greenberg argues, “In Serbia, 
genres of apolitics were rhetorical techniques and ethical strategies for remaining 
socially engaged in contexts in which such engagement is deeply suspect. 
Increasingly, it is necessary to look in apolitical spaces to understand sites where 
postsocialist democratic activism is taking place” (2014, 149). There is resonance 
here with the longer regional genealogy of “antipolitics,” by which dissidents in 
socialist states advocated for a space of civil society that would foster truly 
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democratic action untainted by (immoral, obfuscating) state involvement 
(Greenberg 2014, 152–156; Harper 1999). But the role of the state has shifted, as 
has the nature of political engagement in Serbia. For at least some of my 
interlocutors like Anja, Jovan, and Dušan, spreading the digital transformation 
was about besting the geopolitics of the global economy; a strategy to be engaged 
for subverting the hierarchy of value that would lock Serbian youth into the 
peripheral status of a “cheap labor force” (cf. Mantz 2008). It was about claiming 
a right to stay in a context so many leave, and demonstrating that there was 
dignified work to be had at home—if one creates it oneself. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION: IT’S BETTER THERE BUT NICER HERE 
 
Trajectories: Political 
In March 2018, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić sounded the 
demographic alarm anew. But this time it was not about brain drain. A press 
conference was held at the Government of Serbia. An assistant introduced the 
president and the two officials who would stoically flank him for the duration of 
the event. President Vučić began quietly: “Respected journalists and adored 
citizens of Serbia, today’s address is very important. We will have concrete results 
that are very important for the future of Serbia.” But he first pauses to remember 
the Serbian victims of violence in Kosovo fourteen years prior, when a day of riots 
erupted following two apparently ethnically motivated attacks. Vučić begins with 
this, he says, because he has been trying, for the past five years, to achieve peace 
and a solution to what has come to be called the “Kosovo knot” (Kosovski čvor), 
that seemingly intractable problem of Kosovo’s geopolitical status and the status 
of its ethnic Serb minority.106   
Vučić is proud of this effort, he says, as “you will see, according to the data 
that we will share today, that if we don’t arrive at a resolution…the future does 
not bode well for Serbs. Because of many objective criteria.” The president talks 
more about Kosovo, then of a general social apathy. He then says: “For the past 
                                                   
106 Quotes are my own translation from the full video of the press conference, which I viewed via 
Kurir’s video feed here: https://www.facebook.com/kuririnfo/videos/1832882440108706/. 
Aired March 17, 2018, last accessed April 4, 2019.  
 
 235 
fourteen years, unemployment has, convincingly, been the biggest problem. 
Today unemployment is not the biggest problem, even by the reactions of 
citizens.” The biggest problem? That there are no children. Vučić recites national 
demographic statistics, peering over his glasses to clarify that these figures do not 
include the ethnic Albanian population of Kosovo.  
He asks for attention: “I ask the citizens to hear this, so that you 
understand why the leader of the Republic of Serbia, in addition to all else, seeks 
a resolution to the problem of Kosovo. We conducted a comparison,” he says, “of 
parts of central Serbia and parts of Kosovo with Albanian populations.” He 
recites the population sizes and fertility rates of certain Serbian municipalities, 
adding that these locations were selected for this comparison as they are actually 
larger in size than their Kosovar counterparts.  
Live births, natural deaths. The demographic indicators are rolled out 
methodically, hypnotically. And with each comparison, Kosovar Albanians 
emerge with a positive demographic prognosis against the endangered Serbian 
nation. “In 2060,” Vučić says,  
Serbia will have between 3.9 and 5.5 million residents. We will certainly be 
small, and significantly smaller than today. And for that not America, not 
the European Union, not anyone else is to blame. For that we are ourselves 
deserving (za to smo sami zaslužni), no one else. In line with that, I want 
to tell you that it is possible, according to conservative scenarios, that out 
of 3.9 million residents we will have 1.7 million pensioners, which means 
that we are then finished. As a nation. People simply must understand 
that. We will no longer have any kind of economic potential, no kind of 
demographic potential, and no kind of political potential. 
 
In short: Serbia is shrinking, we have only ourselves to blame, and this is 
why we need to resolve the “Kosovo knot.”	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This press conference took place during a particularly tense month for 
negotiations between Belgrade and Priština. In this context, the presidential 
conjuration of a demographic arms race between ethnic Serbs and Kosovar 
Albanians could be read as a rather stark reassertion of the nationalism that 
Western journalists and political elites are on vigilant watch for in the Balkans 
(cf. Hromadžić 2015, 22). One could also claim that, with such talk, Vučić was 
pandering to his base and nothing more. What this could not logically be is a 
strategy to prompt women to give birth to more children. For it is so-called 
“hedonistic” urban women who have the lowest fertility rates. They are also the 
least likely to be won over with a give-birth-for-the-nation-type argument.  
After I left Serbia in 2016, President Vučić assigned a minister 
responsibility for demography and population politics and established a council 
for this issue as well. The council soon recommended changes to the ten-year-old 
pronatalism strategy and the press conference discussed here was ostensibly 
prompted by the adoption of these changes.107 But there was no obvious catalyst 
for such renewed attention on reproductive habits. National demographic trends 
are just that—long-term trends—and, crucially, it doesn’t seem that any new data 
had been released, rather, the figures referenced by President Vučić were drawn 
from projections based on data from the 2011 census. 
If this pronatalist rhetoric—folded into a lament about Kosovo—were 
intended to distract from the rescinding of rights, it doesn’t seem to have been 
                                                   
107 See: http://pink.rs/politika/37090/pocela-sednica-saveta-za-populacionu-politiku-
predsedava-premijerka-brnabic; and https://naslovi.net/2017-08-21/moj-novi-sad/beograd-
populaciona-politika-prioritet-vlade-srbije/20360362.  
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effective. In December 2017 a revision of the Law on Financial Support for 
Families with Children (Zakon o finansijskoj podršci porodici sa decom) was 
pushed through parliament. Lauded by the government as ensuring greater 
overall maternity benefits, it soon became clear that the devil was in the details. 
As the new law came into effect in July 2018, it was harshly criticized in the 
media—in particular, but not just, for the reduction in paid maternity leave that 
many women would experience. The way in which the purported pronatalist 
stance of the government was undermined by such legislation did not go 
unnoticed. As one journalist put it, “population policy is supposedly a priority of 
this government, one of those imaginary priorities that in reality do not exist and 
in relation to which, on the contrary, everything is so that—in favor of some 
‘higher goals’—the situation additionally deteriorates to the detriment of citizens” 
(Reljanović 2018). 
The cynicism apparent in how these changes have been assessed points to 
more than just a mistranslation between the levels of political discourse and 
policymaking, and I think it would be overly generous to label these the 
“unpredictable effects” of competing policy agendas. Rather, it seems to me that 
the rhetorical linking of demographic crisis to the status of Kosovo, the 
concurrent erosion of maternity rights and benefits, the insistence that the 
economy is improving in direct contrast with the lived experience of most, and 
finally, the very vacillation between brain drain and natality as key governmental 
priorities, all point to a kind of political incoherence. And this incoherence only 
reinforces the mobility strategies and stances outlined in this dissertation: 
migration to an imagined meritocratic “then and there,” an inward turn toward 
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the cultivation of an entrepreneurial self, virtual migration via digital work, and 
an apolitical activism that seeks social change at a level and of a kind that 
(mostly) bypasses the national.    
 
Trajectories: Personal 
In 2015 Tašmajdan Park was under renovation. Now, basket swings large 
enough for several toddlers each, ample shade, and a rubber surface drew a 
steady crowd to the children’s playground in this central Belgrade landmark. It’s 
a hot August day in 2018, two and a half years since I completed the fieldwork on 
which this dissertation is based. My first return trip to Serbia. It’s the season of 
migrant holidays and transnational family visits as well as research trips. I am at 
“Taš” every day with my own family, and I notice the many “mixed” families—in 
this context signaled by children with too-blond hair and curious codeswitching 
habits.  
My son was taking a break from play to chomp on an apple when Igor, one 
of my oldest local friends, joined us on the bench. I was worried I might miss him 
and his wife Nevena. I had, ironically, been headed to a conference in Stockholm 
the exact week they returned from Uppsala to Belgrade to attend a friend’s 
wedding. But we managed to align our calendars for a few quick visits. Their 
move to Sweden had come as a shock. Igor had been working as a consultant for a 
Swedish animation studio for some time and would occasionally fly to their 
headquarters for a few weeks of onsite work. But he didn’t think the firm would 
ever offer him a permanent position, given that it seemed to make economic 
sense for them to just contract him as needed. These friends had only ever 
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discussed such a move (with me) in the most hypothetical of terms. The last time 
we had had coffee Nevena was adamant that she would never leave the language 
school she had founded, despite its struggling status and uncertain future.  
While we now waited for our spouses to join I peppered Igor with 
questions. Had they really wanted to move? How long did it take to get a work 
visa? Were they happy? Igor liked his job but the novelty was beginning to wear 
off. Nevena felt isolated. She was working from home, teaching language lessons 
via Skype while she worked toward a career change. Despite being in Sweden for 
nearly eighteen months they had yet to make real friends. There were many 
things they liked about their new home, in particular the clean air and nature and 
food that they insisted was far healthier. (While I raved about the greenmarket 
produce in Belgrade they insisted that Serbia exports its best agricultural 
products, leaving only the subpar to be purchased locally.) But I found the fact 
that they did not plan to learn Swedish telling. It was a sign that they were not 
ready to commit to making Uppsala their home.  
“I feel bad when I talk about Sweden, because there’s nothing wrong with 
it. It’s just…” Igor mused. It was a cliché, but I knew just what he meant. Sweden 
was the quintessential “orderly country” (određena zemlja) of the “then and 
there” imaginary West. The kind of place evoked in the local idiom “it’s better 
there but nicer here” (bolje je tamo, a lepše je ovde). As a visitor to Stockholm I 
had felt the contrast with Belgrade on my skin as well, to a much greater extent 
than I did when returning to the US. Maybe Igor and Nevena’s story is 
particularly marked by ambivalence because they had not been heavily invested 
in leaving. Leaving was, rather, something that just kind of happened to them.  
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The mobile trajectory of this pair was not the only one that surprised me— 
revealing, perhaps, the limits of my own imagination, or the depth of my 
skepticism about the logistical and other barriers to actually crossing an 
international border. Other migrations were less surprising: a highly talented 
tech entrepreneur who had accepted a job offer in Australia at the time of our 
interview was now in Berlin. A tennis coach-turned-software developer with a 
decade of experience in the US returned to the States after several years back in 
Serbia. A charming young interlocutor who imagined himself as a citizen of the 
world in addition to tech start-up employee had taken a job in Toronto. An 
ambitious Master’s student pinged me on Facebook to say hi and flippantly 
mentioned that she now lives in Canada as a result of marriage and her husband’s 
tech-industry job. These are not the only mobilities I tracked, but this cluster was 
propelled by the specificity of the digital economy and the highly marketable 
skills possessed by such digital economy workers. 
Meanwhile, Impact Hub Belgrade, along with the broader 
entrepreneurship and tech scenes in Belgrade, seemed to be flourishing in 
summer 2018. When I visited IHB the vibe was lively and the long strand of 
pictures of “hublanders” (members) adorning the staircase was a testament to the 
community’s growth. I only managed to chat briefly with one of the team 
members whose tenure extended back to my fieldwork. IHB had recently 
rebranded as an “accelerator,” which this interlocutor explained to mean that 
they were now able to offer members the full “circle” of necessary services, “from 
space to mentorship to investments.” The investment options for Serbian start-
ups ready to “scale up” is indeed an evolving concern beyond the scope of this 
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dissertation. Jovan’s annual technology conference has continued to grow and 
the activities of Startit continue to expand.   
As for a few of the others who so generously shared their stories: I did not 
stay in touch with sisters Mirjana and Mina but both maintain LinkedIn profiles, 
both of which suggest rather unexpected trajectories. Mirjana has gone from 
human resources intern to flight attendant for Emirates airline to writer for a 
financial news portal. Mina has stuck closer to her field of training as a special 
education teacher. I was heartened to read that she had found a position in a 
prestigious Belgrade school, then quite surprised to read that the current school 
listed was in small town in the US. Neither sister has held a position for longer 
than two years, yet I like to think that both have found elements of the dignified 
work they so eloquently expressed desires for and expectations of.  
 Miloš has realized at least part of his ambitious plan to emigrate to the 
United States. When we last connected he was in Boston. Right before my 
departure from Serbia in spring 2016 he had triumphantly secured a tourist visa 
to the US. He now faced the formidable task of figuring out a way to remain in the 
country legally. He had read a draft of my chapter that includes part of his story 
and, reflecting on that time, said that he had been driven by the sense of needing 
to be “on firm ground.” Ironically, given his uncertain status and the tightening of 
US immigration regulations, he now felt that he had found firmer ground across 
the Atlantic.  
Gordana was still in Belgrade, where we met for coffee in August 2018. She 
struck me as a more relaxed version of the person I had met nearly three years 
prior, without the same air of wanting to get something off her chest. She shared 
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a development that was far from expected at the time of our initial interview: she 
had left her department at the University of Belgrade and enrolled in a doctoral 
program for Russian studies at what in Serbia is known as a college (visoka 
škola). As more drama unfolded in her UB department she had seen a call for 
applications for asistent at this other college. Gordana deadpanned that “they 
had to hold a regular competition because no one had a relative who taught 
Russian and needed a job.” She would not lose any time toward her doctorate but 
she needed a new mentor and thesis topic, which she quickly identified. Gordana 
now had a supportive mentor, good working conditions, and decent pay. As she 
seemed to have found a satisfying sense of equilibrium, I was a bit surprised 
when she also mentioned that she had recently passed the C1-level 
(advanced) exam for German, indicating that her long-term plans still included 
departure from Serbia.   
“But do you think you could be happy here?” I wondered, given her 
improved educational and employment status. “No, because of other things,” she 
replied. Like sisters Mirjana and Mina, she also named the dysfunctional 
healthcare system as indicative of a fundamentally disorderly and unpredictable 
state. But it was another comment that more directly exposed the sense of 
existential insecurity experienced by members of Gordana’s generation. On the 
one hand, leaving did not have the same urgent inflection it had before. On the 
other hand, Gordana mused, “my one fear is that there will be some shit over 
Kosovo that will close the borders—and I will have missed my chance to leave.” 
I was quite struck by this statement. Nothing significant was happening 
with the “Kosovo question” at the time and the specter of closed borders seemed 
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far-fetched, especially coming from pragmatic, level-headed Gordana. Yet with 
further contemplation I could appreciate the sense this scenario made. The 
children of the 1990s in Serbia have, from a very young age, witnessed their life 
chances and choices fundamentally configured by events beyond their control. 
Now, as full-fledged adult citizens, what influence could they claim on whether or 
not their government recognized the independence of Kosovo and the 
reverberations such recognition or continued nonrecognition would have? I’m 
not sure.   
Summary 
In this dissertation I have tried to render legible the meanings of migration 
and mobility for Serbia’s children of the 1990s by approaching the politics of 
brain drain as a lens through which to bring broader socioeconomic issues into 
focus. We have seen how brain drain expresses a general concern with national 
competitiveness in a global marketplace (because the nation-state needs a young 
workforce) as well as a more specific anxiety about who will make the future of 
the nation. The dominant discourse on brain drain in Serbia simplistically 
positions the departure of the young and educated as a result of unemployment, 
suggesting that youth solve the problem themselves via entrepreneurship.  
The driving force of the preceding pages is a desire to open up this 
dominant discourse for critical inspection. I do this by turning attention to how 
skilled migration is constituted as a problem and the practices prompted. I show 
how the government’s policy goal of EU accession heightens focus on the 
(un)employment rate and attracting foreign direct investment. The resultant 
“jobless growth,” in turn, facilitates focus on “the unemployed individual,” 
 244 
allowing the government to eschew responsibility for the more complex concern 
of job creation while cloaking the underlying issues in moralizing discourses of 
work. My analysis centered the mobility narratives of young potential migrants in 
an effort to interrupt the assumptions underpinning governmental policies by 
tracking how Serbian youth actually narrate their life chances and choices at 
home or abroad. 
Attention to the historical conditions of possibility for mobility reveals 
three significant periods in the country’s history. Historical memory of both 
“normal” and “gastarbajter” mobility in socialist Yugoslavia, as well as the 
conditions of “entrapment” that followed, importantly inflect contemporary 
meanings of mobility and migration. But my research has demonstrated that 
conditions in Serbia can no longer be primarily described as ones of entrapment 
breeding desires for escape. A central goal of this dissertation has been to show 
how the 2009 shift in the conditions of possibility of travel also marked a shift 
toward more nuanced stancetaking in relation to leaving. Throughout these pages 
I have shown how, by the time of my research, the expectations for mobility and 
dignified work of the young and educated had become more and more often 
calibrated against personal experiences of real-life travel. In interrogating values 
and expectations of work as they relate to mobility, my research demonstrates 
how both meritocracy and entrepreneurialism act as value-laden registers 
through which youthful socioeconomic aspirations are articulated. Finally, I have 
illuminated how work in the digital economy economic muddies the dichotomy 
posited between staying and leaving.  
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In offering a nuanced account of socioeconomic aspiration and the 
imaginative possibilities invested in migration on the European semi-periphery, I 
hope this dissertation serves as an ethnographic intervention into a field of study 
long dominated by reductionist models of motivation and choice. This is also a 
policy intervention: I challenge the grim certainty of migration statistics deployed 
to serve a national narrative of ongoing demographic crisis, highlighting instead 
the creativity and persistence with which young potential migrants turn the 
increased geopolitical openness and nascent digital transformation of Serbia to 
their comparative advantage.  
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